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Any close observer of the regulatory process has learned by now that the
government often requires the expenditure of a huge sum of money
-sometimes billions of dollars-to save a single human life. She has also
learned that there are many regulatory options available that would produce the
same benefits at a far lower cost. She has learned these things largely from a
table prepared during the 1980s by an economist at the Office of Management
and Budget named John Morrall. This table shows the cost per life saved of
various risk-reducing federal regulations. According to the table, this cost
varies dramatically from regulation to regulation, from a low of $100,000 per
life saved to a high of $72 billion. One-third of the regulations on the list
reportedly cost over $100 million for every life they save.'
These numbers are ubiquitous in the literature on risk regulation.
Numerous scholars have relied on Morrall's table, as well as earlier and later
versions of it, in arguing that the costs of regulation often exceed its benefits,
that many more cost-effective strategies exist for reducing risk, that regulation
sometimes increases overall risk, and that regulatory priorities are not set in a
rational manner.2 Morrall's calculations, in short, have been used to support
every one of the most prominent current critiques of the regulatory system.
They have also played a significant role in political debates over regulatory
reform, including most recently the debates surrounding the Republican-
proposed Contract with America.
1. See John F. Morrall III, A Review of the Record. REGULATION. NovJDec. 1986. at 25. 30 tbl.4.
2. This is a sampling of the scholarly sources relying on one or another version of Morrall's table to
make at least one of these arguments: STEPHEN BREYER. BREAKING TIE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD
EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 24-27 (1993): W. KIP VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RISK 264 tbl. 14-5 (1992); Clayton P. Gillette & Thomas D. Hopkins. FederalAgency
Valuations of Human Life, in ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF TIHE U.S., REPORT FOR REcoMMENDATON
88-7, at 368, 368-69 (1988); Randall Lutter & John F. Morrall IIl. Health-Health Analysis: A New Way
To Evaluate Health and Safety Regulation, in THE MORTALITY COSTS OF REGULATORY EXPENDITURES 43.
59 tbl.6 (W. Kip Viscusi ed., 1994); Cass R. Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs, 63 U CHII. L REv. 1533.
1547-48 tbl.2 (1996) [hereinafter Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffsl; Cass R. Sunstem. Paradoxes of the
Regulatory State, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 407, 410 (1990) [hereinafter Sunstein. Paradoxes); W. Kip Viscust.
Regulating the Regulators, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 1423, 1430-36 & tbl.I (1996); Kenneth J. Arrow ei al.. Is
There a Role for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Environmental. Health. and Safety Regulation 7. 272 SCIENCE 22 1.
221 (1996); and Richard J. Zeckhauser & W. Kip Viscusi. Risk Within Reason. 248 SCIENCE 559. 562-63
(1990).
3. CONTRACT WITH AMERICA: THE BOLD PLAN BY REP. NE%,T GINGRICH. REP. DICK ARMEY AND
THE HOUSE REPUBLICANS To CHANGE THE NATION (Ed Gillespie & Bob Schellhas eds.. 1994) (hereinafter
CONTRACT WITH AMERICA]; see also, e.g., Regulatory Reform: Hearing on S. 343 Before the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 87 (1995) [hereinafter Regulatory Reform Judiciary Comm. Heanngl
(testimony of Cass R. Sunstein, Professor. University of Chicago Law School); Joint Hearng an the Impact
of Workplace and Employment Regulation on Business: Heanng Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigations of the House Comm. on Econ. and Educ. Opportunities and the Subcomm. on Regulation and
Paperwork of the House Comm. on Small Bus., 104th Cong. 32 (1995) [hereinafter Joint Hearingl
(testimony of Robert W. Hahn, Resident Scholar. American Enterprise Inst.): 141 CONG. REC. S2041-42
(daily ed. Feb. 2, 1995) (statement of Sen. Murkowski); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REGULATORY
REFORM: INFORMATION ON COSTS, COST-EFFECTIVENESS. AND MANDATED DEADLINES FOR REGULATIONS
24, 49 (1995).
Morrall's table also makes regular appearances in the Office of Management and Budget's annual
reports on federal regulation. See, e.g., OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET. REGULATORY PROGRAM
OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, APRIL 1. 1991-MARCH 31. 1992. at 12 tbl.2 (1991) (hereinafter
1998] 1983
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Despite the pervasive reliance on Morrall's table in scholarly and political
discussion of risk regulation, no one has determined-or even asked-whether
the fantastic costs reported by Morrall are open to question. In this Article, I
fill this gap. I argue that John Morrall's table is in the nature of a modern
urban legend, a vivid, plausible, "false-true tale," circulated broadly,
embellished with local detail, and believed implicitly.4 Like other modem
legends, such as stories about rats served as hamburger and alligators living in
the sewers, John Morrall's story is strange and believable. It reflects the
"hopes, fears, and anxieties" of modem life.5 And it is false-true.
Indeed, as I explain, there is ample room for disagreement with the picture
of the regulatory system drawn by Morrall. For starters, a large percentage of
the regulations appearing at the bottom of Morrall's list-the allegedly costliest
regulations-have never taken effect. Many of these rules were rejected
precisely because the agencies in question determined that their benefits did
not justify their costs; at least by the regulatory reformers' lights, then, these
regulatory decisions should be counted as successes. By topsy-turvy logic,
however, they have become known as regulation's greatest failures.
Equally striking is the disparity between the agencies' (often implicit)
estimates of costs per life saved and Morrall's estimates of such costs.
Morrall's estimates are inevitably higher than the agencies' implicit estimates,
sometimes as much as 1000 times higher. These huge disparities appear to
arise mostly from two adjustments Morrall made to the agencies' estimates of
regulatory benefits. First, in some cases, Morrall rejected the agencies'
estimates of risk and relied instead upon what he regarded as more
reliable-and inevitably lower--estimates.6 Use of lower estimates of risk led
to lower estimates of lives saved, which led to higher costs per life saved.
Second, in all cases, Morrall applied a technique that has come to be known
as "discounting lives": He reduced the estimates of the number of lives that
would actually be saved by a regulation in the future by ten percent for every
year expected to pass before the lives were saved.7 For example, whereas
Morrall estimated that the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) rule limiting arsenic exposures in the workplace8 would actually save
11.7 lives per year,9 this estimate of lives saved dropped to approximately
1991-1992 OMB REPORT]; OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, REGULATORY PROGRAM OF TilE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, APRIL 1, 1987-MARCH 31, 1988, at xx (1987) (hereinafter 1987-1988 OMB
REPORT].
4. Cf. JAN HAROLD BRUNVAND, THE VANISHING HITCHHIKER: AMERICAN URBAN LEGENDS AND
THEIR MEANINGS at xiii (1981).
5. Id. at 2.
6. See Morrall, supra note 1, at 28.
7. See id.
8. See Occupational Exposure to Inorganic Arsenic, 43 Fed. Reg. 19,584 (1978) (to be codified at 29
C.FR. pt. 1910).
9. See Morrall, supra note 1, at 30 tbl.4.
1984 [Vol. 107: 1981
Regulatory Costs
0.35 lives per year after discounting.'0 By deflating the estimates of lives
saved, discounting greatly inflated the costs per life saved of the rules that
were designed to protect against the risks of long-latency diseases and long-
term ecological harm. Again, these are the rules that appear at the bottom of
Morrall's list.
Without these adjustments to the agencies' estimates of regulatory benefits,
the costs per life saved of all but two of the regulations on Morrall's list fall
to less than $5 million." This cost compares favorably to current estimates
of the monetary value of a human life, based on the wage premiums reportedly
accepted by workers in risky occupations: Studies commonly cite a range of
$3 million to $7 million for the value of a statistical life.' 2 Thus, even if one
accepted the rather stringent and controversial condition that market exchanges
are the appropriate measure of the value of a human life, one would be
inclined to conclude that the costs per life saved of the regulations on
Morrall's list-as calculated based on the agencies' estimates of regulatory
benefits-fall well within the bounds of reasonableness.
Moreover, even these lower costs are inflated insofar as they reflect only
one regulatory benefit: the prevention of quantified cases of human sickness
and death. In practice, this means that the only regulatory benefit captured by
Morrall's table, and by my own figures based on the agencies' calculations, is
the prevention of premature human death from cancer. Yet, as we shall see, the
regulatory programs that fare poorly in Morrall's table do not just prevent
cancer. They prevent many human illnesses that cannot be quantified; they
prevent ecological harm; and they prevent harms to values that are widely
shared, such as autonomy, community, and equity. Described in this light, most
of the regulatory programs at the bottom of Morrall's list are not just-barely
cost-justified, they are bargains.
One will want to know whose vision of the costs and benefits of the
regulatory system-Morrall's or mine-is correct. As I explain, however, one
cannot choose between these very different pictures of the regulatory system
without first making important and contested choices about values. The
decision whether to discount lives saved in the future, which explains so much
of the difference between Morrall's numbers and my own, ultimately turns on
one's views of the worth of lives saved today relative to lives saved tomorrow.
10. The estimate of 0.35 lives saved after discounting is based on the following calculations. OSHA
estimated that the annualized costs of this rule would be approximately S32 million. See Occupational
Exposure to Inorganic Arsenic, 43 Fed. Reg. at 19,606. Dividing this cost by Morrall's estimate of 11.7
annual lives saved, see Morrall, supra note I, at 30 tbl.4, leads to a cost per life saved without discounting
of approximately $2.7 million. The ratio of the cost without discounting ($2.7 million) to the cost after
discounting ($92.5 million, see id.) is 0.02918. Rounding this ratio to 0.03 and applying it to the no-
discounting estimate of 11.7 annual lives saved yields an after-discounting estimate of approximately 0.35
annual lives saved.
11. See infra note 392 and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., Viscusi, supra note 2, at 51-74; Viscusi, supra note 2. at 1431.
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Even the assessment of physical risk reflects choices about values. The
decisions whether, for example, to credit the results of studies showing
heightened risks in laboratory animals and whether to fix attention on the
highest plausible estimates of risk turn on one's view of the proper response
to scientific uncertainty. Finally, the very decision to report the cost-
effectiveness of federal regulation as a function of costs per quantified human
life saved presupposes a particular, and particularly narrow, vision of the
purposes of risk regulation. Value choices of this kind underlie Morrall's
numbers, as well as my own. To say that one of these sets of numbers is true,
and the other false, is thus misleading. It depends on one's hopes, fears, and
anxieties.
After examining the values inherent in Morrall's figures, I discuss the
lessons that might be learned from the wide and uncritical embrace that
Morrall's table has received in the literature on risk regulation. Certainly, many
who have relied on Morrall's figures share the values implicit in those figures
and would not be displeased to learn that the figures embody those values. But
this is by no means universally true. Indeed, some of the same authors who
have relied on Morrall's numbers in concluding that the current regulatory
system needs repair have also argued (sometimes in the very same articles)
against the basic assumptions underlying Morrall's numbers. Why then has no
one before now questioned the basis for the breathtaking costs Morrall cites?
I suggest that the widespread acceptance of Morrall's table shows the perils of
precise quantification. A table like Morrall's, with its estimates to the third
decimal point, has the appearance of objective fact. In reality, however,
Morrall's table is like a deep well into which all of the most prominent
criticisms of the current regulatory state have been poured. It is not surprising
that those criticisms may, in turn, be drawn back out of the well. But this tells
us nothing we did not know before the table was prepared.
I. THE STANDARD AccouNT
The last two decades have witnessed unprecedented attention to the costs
and benefits of the regulatory state. Regulations designed to reduce risks to
human health have received particularly close scrutiny. Nevertheless, one can
find few efforts to discover how well the system for regulating risk generally
performs. Certainly, there have been numerous studies of the costs and benefits
of specific regulations 3 as well as many broad-gauged critiques of the
inefficient tendencies of particular categories of regulation, such as technology-
13. See, e.g., John F. Morrall III, Cotton Dust: An Economist's View, in THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS OF
HEALTH AND SAFETY REGULATION 93 (Robert W. Crandall & Lester B. Lave eds., 1981).
1986 [Vol. 107: 1981
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based regulation.' 4 Yet very little empirical evidence exists regarding the
costs and benefits of the risk-regulating system as a whole.'"
In 1986, an economist at the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) named John Morrall attempted to fill this gap. Noting that "there
is little systematic information describing the kinds of risks the government
has chosen to regulate or the effectiveness of these interventions,"'
' 6
Morrall set out to study the cost-effectiveness of federal regulations
designed to reduce risks of premature human death. He chose forty-four
regulations in all, based on the availability of "reasonably complete
information" on costs and benefits.' 7 The centerpiece -of Morrall's article
is a table showing the cost per life saved of these forty-four regulations.'"
Morrall's table, which is reproduced below as Table 1, shows a stunning
variation in costs per life saved: Costs range from as low as $100,000 per
life saved (the cost of the 1967 regulation by the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA) of steering columns' 9) to as high as $72
billion per life saved (the cost of OSHA's 1985 regulation of
formaldehyde°).
Discerning the full impact of this dramatic table on the debate over
risk regulation is complicated by the existence of several different versions
of it, some of which do not bear a citation to Morrall's original work.
Nevertheless, close examination of the relevant literature reveals that the
table, and close variants of it, have been used to support every one of the
most prominent proposals for regulatory reform to have emerged from the
academy or Congress in the last several years. Indeed, it is scarcely an
exaggeration to say that if you hear a scholar or politician talking about
the tremendous disparities in costs per life saved among federal regulatory
programs, you can be sure she is-whether she knows it or not-talking
about Morrall's table.
14. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law. 37 STAN. L
REv. 1333 (1985) [hereinafter Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming Environmental Lawl: Bruce A. Ackerman
& Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The Democratic Case for Market Incentives. 13
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 171 (1988) [hereinafter Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The
Democratic Case].
15. For notable recent exceptions, see Draft Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal
Regulations, 62 Fed. Reg. 39,352 (Office of Management & Budget 1997)- and Robert W. Hahn & John
A. Hird, The Costs and Benefits of Regulation, 8 YA.LE J. ON REGo 233 (1991).
16. Morrall, supra note I, at 25.
17. Id. at 27.
18. See id. at 30 tbl.4.
19. See Initial Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards. 32 Fed. Reg. 2408. 2414-15 (1967) (to be
codified at 49 CF.R. pt. 571).
20. See Occupational Exposure to Formaldehyde, 50 Fed. Reg. 50,412 (1985) (to be codified at 29
C.F.R. pt. 1910) (proposed Dec. 10, 1985).
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TABLE 1. THE COSTS OF VARIOUS RISK-REDUCING REGULATIONS
PER LIFE SAVED 2'
REOULATION STATUS" INMAL ANNUAL COSTS PER LiFE
ANNUAL LIVES SAVED
RISK" SAVED (TIIOUSANDS)
Steering Column Protection (NHTSA 1967) F 7.7 in 10' 1300.000 $100
Unvented Space Heaters (CPSC 1980) F 2.7 in 1o' 63.000 100
Oil & Gas Well Service (OSHA 1983) P 1.1 in 1o' 50.000 100
Cabin Fire Protection (FAA 1985) F 6.5 in 1V' 15.000 200
Passive R straints/Belts (NHTSA 1984) F 9.1 in Io' 1850.000 300
Fuel System Integrity (NHTSA 1975) F 4.9 in 10 400.000 300
Trihalomethanes (EPA 1979) F 6.0 in 10' 322.000 300
Underground Construction (OSHA 1983) P 1.6 in l0' 8.100 300
Alcohol & Drug Control (FRA 1985) F 1.8 in 10 4.200 500
Servicing Wheel Rims (OSHA 1984) F 1.4 in IO0 2.300 500
Seat Cushion Flammability (FAA 1984) F 1.6 in l0s 37.000 600
Floor Emergency Lighting (FAA 1984) F 2.2 in IV 5.000 700
Crane Suspended Personnel Platform (OSHA 1984) P 1.8 in l0' 5.000 900
Children's Sleepwear Flammability (CPSC 1973) F 2.4 in 10' 106.000 1300
Side Doors (NHTSA 1970) F 3.6 in 10' 480.000 1300
Concrete & Masonry Construction (OSHA 1985) P 1.4 in IO0 6.500 1400
Hazard Communication (OSHA 1983) F 4.0 in 10' 200.000 1800
Grain Dust (OSHA 1984) P 2.1 in 10' 4.000 2800
Benzene/Fugitive Emissions (EPA 1984) F 2.1 in 10' 0.310 2800
RadionuclidesUranium Mineas (EPA 1984) F 1.4 in 10 1.100 6900
Asbestos (OSHA 1972) F 3.9 in 10' 396.000 7400
Benzene (OSHA 1985) P 8.8 in 10' 3.800 17,100
Arsenic/Glass Plant (EPA 1986) F 8.0 in I0 0.110 19,200
21. This table is a reproduction of Morrall's. See Morrall, supra note 1, at 30 tbl.4.
22. F = Final; P = Proposed; R = Rejected.
23. Annual deaths per exposed population.
1988
1998] Regulatory Costs 1989
Ethylene Oxide (OSHA 1984) F 44 in 10' 800 25.600
ArseniclCopper Smelter (EPA 1986) F 9.0 in 10' 0.060 26.500
Uranium Mill Tailings/Inactive (EPA 1983) F 4.3 in 10' 2-100 2"7.600
Acrylonitrile (OSHA 1978) F 94 in 10' 6.900 37.600
Uranium Mill Tailings/Active (EPA 1983) F 4.3 in 10' 2,100 53.000
Coke Ovens (OSHA 1976) F 1.6 in 1O' 31.000 61.800
Asbestos (OSHA 1986) F 6.7 in 10' 74 700 89.300
Arsenic (OSHA 1978) F 1.8 in 10' I 700 91.500
Asbestos (EPA 1986) P 29 in 10' 10,000 104.200
DES (Cattlefeed) (FDA 1979) F 31 in 10' 68.000 13Z.ODD
Arsenic/Glass Manufacturing (EPA 1986) R 3.8 in 10' 0-250 142.000
Benzene/Storage (EPA 1984) R 6.0 in 10' 0.043 20W000
Radionuclides/DOE Facilities (EPA 1984) R 4.3 in 10' 0001 210.=
Radionuclides/Elemental Phosphorous (EPA 1984) R 1.4 in 10' 0.046 270.000
Acrylonitrile (OSHA 1978) R 9.4 in 10' 0 600 308.000
Benzene/Ethylbenzenol Styrene (EPA 1984) R 2.0 in 10' 0006 48300
Arsenic/Low-Arsenic Copper (EPA 1986) R 2-6 in 10' 0.090 764.000
Benzene/Maleic Anhydride (EPA 1984) R I I in I0 0_02)9 20.000
Land Disposal (EPA 1986) P 13 in 10' 2.520 3.500.000
EDB (OSHA 1983) P 2.5 in 10' 0.002 15.6W.000
Formaldehyde (OSHA 1985) P 6 8 in 10' 0.010 72.000.000
A. The Table
In the 1986 article unveiling his now-famous table on regulatory costs,
John Morrall sets the stage by placing in perspective the risks addressed by the
regulations he studied. The annual overall risk of dying for the average
American is, he informs us, 9 in 1000.24 That is, approximately one in every
100 Americans dies each year. Morrall breaks this figure down even further,
providing the annual risk we each face of dying in a specific way. We each
face, for example, a 1-in-l0,000 risk of being murdered;25 a 5-in-l0,000,000
24. See Morrall, supra note 1, at 25.
25. See i& at 26 tbl..
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risk of being killed by a lightning bolt;26 and a 1.8-in-1,000 risk of dying
from cancer.' This last figure is especially significant because, according to
Morrall, the health (as opposed to safety) regulations in his study that have
become final are "aIr' aimed at reducing risks from cancer.28 Citing an
influential study by epidemiologists Sir Richard Doll and Richard Peto, a study
which concluded that occupational and environmental exposures account for
only six percent of all cancers,29 Morrall asserts that "the most important
known causes of cancer seem to be immune, for political or practical reasons,
to regulatory control. 30 The clear implication of Morrall's observations is
that even if we were to devote infinite resources to reducing human cancer
risks, and even if our efforts were to achieve perfect success, we would
nevertheless eliminate only a tiny fraction of the overall risks of dying from
cancer.
31
And, according to Morrall's figures on regulatory costs, we do indeed
devote a substantial (even if not infinite) number of resources to reducing the
risks of cancer. The least expensive regulations on Morrall's list-safety
regulations designed, not to prevent cancer or other illnesses, but to prevent
deaths from accidents-cost $100,000 per life saved. The further one moves
down Morrall's table, the more fantastic the costs become. At the same time,
as one moves down the list, the character of the rules begins to change,
shifting from safety rules to health rules justified, in quantitative terms,
exclusively by their prevention of human cancer. 2 After the thirtieth
regulation on the list, the costs begin to exceed $100 million for every life
saved. The last three regulations on the list each cost more than $1 billion per
life saved. Even the most ardent defender of the current regulatory system
must wince at such numbers.
What is the basis for these numbers? Morrall provides some explanation
of the method he used to arrive at them. In estimating compliance costs,
Morrall reports that he "generally" accepted agencies' estimates "without
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. Id. at 32.
29. See Richard Doll & Richard Peto, The Causes of Cancer: Quantitative Estimates of Avoidable
Risks of Cancer in the United States Today, 66 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 1191, 1256 tbl.20 (1981).
30. Morrall, supra note 1, at 26 (citing Doll & Peto, supra note 29).
31. Cf., e.g., BREYER, supra note 2, at 6-7 (remarking on the small contribution of regulated and
"regulatable" activities to the risks from cancer).
32. Of the last 26 regulations on the list, the quantified life-saving benefits of 24 include only cancer
cases avoided. The exceptions are EPA's land disposal rule, see Hazardous Waste Management System:
Land Disposal Restrictions, 51 Fed. Reg. 44,714, 44,737 (1986) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 260-62,
264-65, 268, 270-71) (proposed Dec. 11, 1986), and OSHA's benzene rule, see Occupational Exposure to
Benzene, 50 Fed. Reg. 50,512, 50,541 (1985) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910) (proposed Dec. 10,
1985). Of these 26 regulations, only one-EPA's benzene/fugitive emissions rule, see National Emission
Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Benzene Equipment Leaks (Fugitive Emission Sources), 49 Fed.
Reg. 23,498 (1984) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 61)-has escaped the charge that its costs exceed its
benefits. See, e.g., Lutter & Morrall, supra note 2, at 59 tbl.6.
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adjustment."33 He explains that although agencies have an incentive to
underestimate costs, this underestimation may be offset by the fact that firms
often come up with unexpected ways to reduce the costs of compliance. 4
In estimating the benefits of regulation, however, Morrall did not adopt the
agencies' estimates. Instead, he made two significant adjustments to these
estimates in developing his table. First, Morrall adjusted the agencies'
estimates of future costs and benefits-including the number of lives saved by
regulation-by applying a ten percent discount rate to them. 35 This discount
rate was in line with the guidelines then used by the OMB in performing cost-
benefit analysis. 36 In explaining his decision to discount future lives saved,
Morrall asserts that his judgment on this point is "impeccable" because one
would otherwise have to conclude that a regulation saving 100 lives a decade
from now is better than a regulation saving ninety-nine lives today and that
"all rules yielding continuous benefits are worth any amount of immediate
costs. '37 As I have mentioned, discounting can have a large effect on
estimates of future benefits. 31 It is important to realize, however, that the
column on Morrall's table that reports annual lives saved does not reflect
discounting; discounting is instead reflected (implicitly) only in the derivation
of the costs per life saved, reported in the last column of the table.39
Second, Morrall adjusted the agencies' estimates of the number of lives
saved through regulation by relying on different-and lower-estimates of risk
and regulatory effectiveness than those provided by the agencies.' For safety
regulations, Morrall "often" reduced agency assumptions about the efficacy of
regulation "from 100-percent effectiveness to a more reasonable figure such as
50 percent."'" For health regulations, where the agency relied on the highest
estimate in a range of risk estimates, Morrall sometimes picked an intermediate
estimate supplied by the agency.42 In other cases, he selected what appeared
33. Morrall, supra note 1, at 29. Although Morrall says that he only "generally"-rather than
"always"--accepted the agencies' estimates of costs. I assume throughout this discussion that he accepted
those estimates without adjustment in all cases since he provides no example to the contrary.
34. See id.
35. See i&t at 28.
36. See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET. ExEcTIvE OFFICE OFiE PRESIDENT. CIRCLLAR A-94.
at 4 (1972).
37. Morrall, supra note 1, at 28.
38. See supra notes 7-12 and accompanying text.
39. Telephone Interview with John F. Morrall III. Chief. Human Resources and Housing Branch.
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget (Dec. 18. 1996): see
supra Table 1.
40. In addition, where regulations would prevent nonfatal injuries and/or property damage, Morrall
subtracted monetary benefits from costs and also translated the avoidance of nonfatal injuries into additional
lives saved. He reports that he did the latter by assuming, based on studies of individuals' willingness to
pay to avoid health risks, that 50 nonfatal hospitalizations or two permanent disabilities were equivalent
to one death. See Morrall, supra note 1, at 28.
41. Id. at 29.
42. See id at 28.
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to him to be "the most reliable" estimate of risk,43 provided in some cases by
"published studies that appeared to reflect prevailing scientific views more
accurately than the agency estimate."" He specifically notes that he rejected
OSHA's estimate of the risks of ethylene oxide and instead used the estimate
of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) because EPA purportedly had
relied on epidemiological rather than animal studies.45 Beyond this example,
Morrall does not elaborate on the specific adjustments he made to the
agencies' estimates of cancer risk, nor does he elaborate on his specific reasons
for making those adjustments.
In spite of these downward adjustments, Morrall believes that his estimates
of the variance in cost-effectiveness between health and safety rules "are
probably understated by a large margin" because cancer risks "are routinely
overestimated by federal agencies" whereas "safety risks ... are less likely to
be overestimated because of the greater availability of hard data., 46 Moreover,
he asserts that since cancer strikes mostly in old age whereas occupational
accidents befall a younger group, estimates of cost-effectiveness based purely
on premature mortality-and not on costs "per year of life saved" 4 --will
understate the differences in cost-effectiveness between health and safety rules.
Finally, Morrall notes that his estimates of cost-effectiveness are probably
overstated because he generally relies on average rather than marginal costs.
48
Morrall draws four main lessons from his figures regarding costs per life
saved. First, he concludes that the most important determinant of cost-
effectiveness is the legal status of the regulation in question: "The average and
median of cost-per-life-saved estimates for the 26 final rules are $23 million
and $2 million, respectively, compared to $400 million and $289 million,
respectively, for the eight rejected rules."49 Morrall speculates that this might
mean that "very low benefits or high costs is one factor that may lead to the
rejection of a regulatory proposal," but he says that "it is not possible to infer
from the data how important this consideration is or what role it plays in rules
that are eventually adopted."50 Second, he contends that safety regulation,
aimed at reducing risks from accidents, is much more cost-effective than health
regulation, aimed entirely (he says) at reducing risks from cancer.5 Indeed,
he contends that if we had $1 billion to spend on risk reduction, we could save
either 2000 lives through safety regulation or twenty-seven lives through
43. Id.
44. Id. at 29.
45. See id.; see also infra Subsection II.B.2.e.
46. Morrall, supra note 1, at 32.
47. Id.
48. See id. at 31.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See id. at 32.
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regulation of cancer risks.52 Third, Morrall suggests that the numbers in his
table provide some evidence that President Reagan's Executive Order No.
12,291 53 -which required cost-benefit analysis for major federal
regulations-had provided a measure of regulatory reform, insofar as
regulations enacted after the issuance of this executive order had one-third the
statistical variance (in terms of costs per life saved) of previous regulations. 4
Finally, Morrall concludes his article by arguing that, based on the amount
of money workers are allegedly willing to accept in return for a slightly
increased risk of death on the job, roughly half of the regulations on his list
would fail a cost-benefit test.55 Although he concedes that a plausible
argument could be made on behalf of, say, EPA's 1984 regulation of
radionuclide emissions from uranium mines 56 (which cost $6.9 million per
life saved57) or OSHA's 1972 rule on asbestos 5 ($7.4 million per life
saved59), Morrall would draw the line at EPA's 1986 regulation of arsenic
plants6° ($19.2 million per life saved 61). Once that level of costs is reached,
Morrall believes, "it is very likely that resources are being wasted and better
life saving strategies are being foregone. 6 "
B. The Table's Influence
Many scholars of the regulatory process share Morrall's concerns.
Economists and legal scholars, for example, have lambasted the prohibition
against the consideration of costs that is embodied in many environmental
laws.63 They have criticized the basic mechanism of implementing
52. See id.
53. 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981), revoked by Exec. Order No. 12.866. 3 CER. 638 (1993). repnnted in 5
U.S.C. § 601 app. at 557-61 (1994). For a thoughtful critique of regulatory review under Executive Order
No. 12,291, see E. Donald Elliott, TQM-ing OMB: Or Why Regulatory Review Under Executnve Order
12,291 Works Poorly and What President Clinton Should Do About It. LAv & Co. M.%iP PROBS., Spring
1994, at 167. In 1993, President Clinton replaced Reagan's order with Executive Order No. 12.866. which
also requires cost-benefit analysis. See Exec. Order No. 12.866. 3 C.F.R. 638. On Executive Order No.
12,866 generally, see Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing rhe Regulatory State. 62 U. Cmii
L. REV. 1 (1995).
54. See Morrall, supra note 1, at 34.
55. See id.
56. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Regulation of Radionuclides. 49
Fed. Reg. 43,906 (1984) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 61).
57. See Morrall, supra note I, at 30.
58. See Standard for Exposure to Asbestos Dust. 37 Fed. Reg. 11.318 (1972) (to be codified at 29
C.F.R. pt. 1910).
59. See Morrall, supra note 1, at 30.
60. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Standards for Inorganic Arsenic.
51 Fed. Reg. 27,956 (1986) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pi. 61).
61. See Morrall, supra note 1, at 34.
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislaoion. 17 ECOLOGY LQ 233 (1990).
Various environmental laws have been interpreted to preclude the consideration of costs. See. e.g., TVA
v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 173-74 (1978) (holding that. once a federal action is found to jeopardize an
endangered species in violation of the Endangered Species Act of 1973, courts may not balance costs and
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environmental and workplace safety regulation-technology-based standards
or, more pejoratively, "command-and-control" regulation-as cost-ineffective
and have offered as an alternative market-based measures such as pollution
taxes and emission trading schemes. 64 They have charged that agencies'
methods for assessing cancer risks overestimate the risks posed to human
health by chemicals and other substances,65 and have concluded that this
overestimation causes agencies to devote too many resources to addressing
trivial risks.66 EPA itself has begun to worry that it is paying too much
attention to small risks and too little attention to large ones and has suggested
that a rearrangement of its regulatory priorities may be in order.67
These somewhat arcane topics recently surfaced in political circles when
the 104th Congress considered the legislative package accompanying the
Contract with America.68 Among other things, this cluster of bills would have
required that health and safety regulations pass cost-benefit analysis, 69 that
agencies implement the most cost-effective means of regulating risk,7 and
that quantitative risk assessment-peer-reviewed and subject to judicial
review-be the basis for health and safety regulations.7'
Morrall's table has become Exhibit A in the academic and political case
for regulatory reform. Indeed, one rarely finds an article critiquing the current
system that does not at least refer to Morrall's original table or a close variant
of it, if not reproduce it in full.72 The table has been relied on to argue that
benefits in deciding whether to enjoin the federal action); Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 824
F.2d 1146, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that EPA may not consider costs in determining the level of
acceptable risk for hazardous air pollutants under the Clean Air Act); Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d
1130, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding that EPA may not consider costs in setting National Ambient Air
Quality Standards under the Clean Air Act); Hercules, Inc. v. EPA, 598 F.2d 91, 111-12 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(holding that EPA may not consider costs in setting effluent limits for toxic water pollutants under the
Clean Water Act).
64. For the classic statements of this argument in the legal literature, see Ackerman & Stewart,
Reforming Environmental Law, supra note 14; and Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law:
The Democratic Case, supra note 14. For a critique of claims that market-based environmental measures
promote democracy as well as efficiency, see Lisa Heinzerling, Selling Pollution. Forcing Democracy, 14
STAN. ENVTL. Li. 300 (1995).
65. See, e.g., Albert L. Nichols & Richard J. Zeckhauser, The Perils of Prudence, REGULATION,
NovlDec. 1986, at 13.
66. See, e.g., BREYER, supra note 2, at 18-19.
67. See OFFICE OF POLICY ANALYSIS, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: A
COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS at xviii-xx (1987).
68. CONTRACT WITH AMERICA, supra note 3.
69. See Risk Assessment and Cost-Benefit Act of 1995, H.R. 1022, 104th Cong.; Job Creation and
Wage Enhancement Act of 1995, H.R. 9, 104th Cong. § 324.
70. See Comprehensive Regulatory Reform Act of 1995, S. 343, 104th Cong. § 2; cf. Exec. Order No.
12,866, § l(b)(1 1), 3 C.F.R. 638, 640 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 558 (1994) ("Each agency
shall tailor its regulations to impose the least burden on society .... ").
71. See H.R. 1022; H.R. 9 § 324. For a cogent critique of the risk assessment bills, see John S.
Applegate, A Beginning and Not an End in Itself. The Role of Risk Assessment in Environmental Decision-
Making, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1643 (1995). Congress, though, has not lost its appetite for regulatory reform.
See, e.g., Regulatory Improvement Act of 1997, S. 981, 105th Cong.
72. For sources relying on one version or another of Morrall's table in critiquing current regulation,
see sources cited supra note 2. See also, e.g., International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886
F.2d 871, 916-17 n.14 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting), rev'd, 499 U.S. 187 (1991); ROBERT
1994
Regulatory Costs
the costs of many environmental regulations exceed their benefits," that many
regulations are cost-ineffective or that there are cheaper ways of saving human
lives,74 that expensive regulations endanger human lives by their very
expense,75 and that government does not set priorities in a rational manner,
indeed, that risk regulation is a "crazy quilt., 76 Sometimes the table is relied
on to make all of these arguments at once.' Morrall's "widely circulated
table'7 has, in short, served as an empirical foundation for every major
proposal for wholesale regulatory reform. 9  It has become a kind of
regulatory Rorschach test, capable of eliciting whatever negative view of the
risk-regulating system the observer might hold. s°
Even so, the full influence of Morrall's figures on the debate over
regulatory reform would be easy to miss. Morrall's basic 1986 table has
occasionally been updated by Morrall and others for use in subsequent articles
and documents.8 These later versions of the table often have lost track of
Morrall's contribution to the regulatory debate. For example, the 1986 table
was updated for use in the reports accompanying the federal budget for fiscal
year 1992.2 This updated version was itself reproduced in a report by the
OMB on the cost-effectiveness of health and safety regulation." This was
V. PERCIVAL Er AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 561 fig.4.8 (2d ed. 1996); U S GEN ACCOt:'h-nG
OFFICE, supra note 3, at 25, 49.
73. See, e.g., Viscusi, supra note 2, at 1430-36 (using cost-benefit analysis based on wage premium
studies). For an argument that valuations of life based on individual preferences will likely vary across
contexts (and thus some disparities in costs per life saved should not be surprising), see Lewis A
Komhauser, The Value of Life, 38 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 209 (1990).
74. See, e.g., BREYER, supra note 2, at 22; Arrow et al.. supra note 2, at 221; Zeckhauscr & Viscust.
supra note 2, at 559.
75. See, e.g., Viscusi, supra note 2, at 1454.
76. Cass R. Sunstein, Informing America: Risk, Disclosure, and the First Amendment. 20 FLA ST U
L. REV. 653, 657 (1993); see also 141 CONG. REC. 52042 (daily ed. Feb. 2. 1995) (statement of Sen
Murkowski) (arguing that regulatory priorities are often products of 'overreacuon")
77. See Regulatory Reform Judiciary Comm. Hearing, supra note 3. at 89 (statement of Cass R_
Sunstein).
78. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Regulatory Reform: Where Are We Going 7. 31 WAKE FOREST L REv 58 1.
582 (1996).
79. An updated version of Morrall's table figured quite prominently in testimony on regulatory reform
bills introduced in the 104th Congress. See sources cited supra note 3. Some of these sources cute the
version of the table appearing in Lutter & Morrall, supra note 2, at 59 tbl.6. See. e.g.. Joint Hearing. supra
note 3, at 39 (statement of Robert W. Hahn).
80. But see Daniel A. Farber, Playing the Baseline: Civil Rights. Environmental Law and Statutory
Interpretation, 91 COLUm. L. REV. 676, 677 n.5 (1991) (reviewing CASS R. SUNsmIN. AFTER ThE RIGIrrs
REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE (1990)) (arguing that disparities shown in Sunstem's
figures on costs per life saved, see SUNSTEIN, supra, at 239-41--figures derived in part from Morrallrs
table-are not paradoxical, as Sunstein suggests, unless it can be shown that government regularly rejects
regulations that cost less per life saved).
81. Morrall updated the table for his own use in 1994. See Luttcr & Morrall, supra note 2. at 59 tbl.6
He also appears to have updated the table for use in others' work. See. e.g., ViScUSi. supra note 2. at 264
tbl.14-5 (reproducing Morrall's table, as "updated by John F. Morrall 111 via unpublished communication
with the author, July 10, 1990"); Viscusi, supra note 2, at 1432-35 tbl.1 (same).
82. See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERN.MEtFt. FISCAL
YEAR 1992, at 370 tbl.C-2 (1992) (citing Morrall, supra note 1, and explaining that the table was updated
"by the Author, et al.").
83. See 1991-1992 OMB REPORT, supra note 3. at 12 tbl.2.
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also the version upon which then-Judge Breyer relied in his widely read book
on risk regulation.' Scholars have, in turn, relied on Breyer's table in arguing
against various features of the current regulatory system. 5 By these third and
fourth iterations of Morrall's list, Morrall's contribution was lost altogether.
Here is another example of the same phenomenon: The 1987-1988 version
of OMB's annual report, Regulatory Program of the United States
Government,8 6 included a shortened version of Morrall's 1986 table with a
cite to Morrall;8 7 the OMB report was then cited (without reference to
Morrall) in a report on the valuation of human life, prepared by Clayton
Gillette and Thomas Hopkins for the Administrative Conference;88 and
Gillette and Hopkins's report has been cited (again without reference to
Morrall) in numerous sources as support for the proposition that costs per life
saved vary dramatically among federal regulatory programs.89 Examples of
this dynamic-first a cite to Morrall, then a cite to the source citing Morrall,
and so on until the connection to Morrall is forgotten-could be multiplied."
All of these accounts of regulatory costs derive from the same single
source-Morrall's 1986 table-but the debt to Morrall has been obscured. 9
84. See BREYER, supra note 2, at 24 tbl.5 (reproducing an updated version of Morrall's table, citing
as sources OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET, supra note 82; and 1991-1992 OMB REPOr, supra note
3, at 12).
85. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Conflicting Values in Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1661, 1670 n.15
(1994) (citing BREYER, supra note 2).
86. 1987-1988 OMB REPORT, supra note 3.
87. See id. at xx (citing Morrall, supra note 1). The 1987-1988 report also cites the previous year's
report. This latter source contains some numbers identical to those in Morrall's list, which was prepared
the same year, and some that are noticeably different. Compare, e.g., OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET,
REGULATORY PROGRAM OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, APRIL 1, 1986-MARCH 31, 1987, at xxi
tbl.3 (1986) [hereinafter 1986-1987 OMB REPORT] (reporting that OSHA's 1984 ethylene oxide rule cost
$60 million per life saved), with Morrall, supra note I, at 30 tbl.4 (reporting that this rule cost $25.6
million per life saved).
88. See Gillette & Hopkins, supra note 2, at 368 n.5 (citing 1987-1988 OMB REPORT, supra note 3).
89. See, e.g., Komhauser, supra note 73, at 211 & n.9 (citing Gillette & Hopkins, supra note 2);
Daniel A. Farber, Revitalizing Regulation, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1278, 1283 n.17 (1993) (book review) (same).
90. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 80, at 239-40 app. B (citing Morrall, supra note 1, at 30 Ibl.4);
Daniel A. Farber, Risk Regulation in Perspective: Reserve Mining Revisited, 21 ENVTL. L. 1321. 1356 &
n.160 (1991) (citing SUNSTEIN, supra note 80).
91. An earlier table on regulatory costs prepared by Morrall in a 1983 paper coauthored with Ivy
Broder has also played a large role in the regulatory debate. See Ivy E. Broder & John F. Morrall Ill, The
Economic Basis for OSHA's and EPA's Generic Carcinogen Regulations, in WHAT ROLE FOR
GOVERNMENT? 242, 250 & tbl.15.2 (Richard J. Zeckhauser & Derek Leebaert eds., 1983). This earlier
table, which shows the costs per life saved of six OSHA and EPA cancer regulations, was, in a sense, a
dress rehearsal for Morrall's more extensive table prepared in 1986: The 1983 table's estimates of the lives
saved by the six regulations are in most cases identical to the figures provided for these regulations in 1986.
(As I discuss later, however, see infra Table 2, the costs per life saved reported in the 1983 table differ
dramatically from the costs per life saved reported in the 1986 table.) With minor adjustments, Broder and
Morrall's 1983 table formed the basis for a key table in John Mendeloff's book arguing that largely cost-
blind standard-setting at OSHA has produced an unduly low volume of workplace regulation, that is, that
overregulation has led to underregulation. See JOHN M. MENDELOFF, THE DILEMMA OF TOXIC SUBSTANCE
REGULATION: HOW OVERREGULATION CAUSES UNDERREGULATION AT OSHA 22 tbl.2.1 (1988) (crediting
Morrall and Broder's contribution to a table showing the costs per life saved of various OSHA regulations
and describing adjustments to their figures). The estimates of costs per life saved that Mendeloff derived
from Morrall and Broder's table serve as the empirical foundation for the "overregulation" portion of
1996
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Subsequent versions of Morrall's 1986 table also confuse matters by taking
different approaches to updating. Some, but not all, of the updated versions
alter the figures on costs to reflect the impact of inflation on compliance
costs. 92 Most updated versions also alter the figures on costs to reflect at least
some of the changes in the rules that have occurred subsequent to Morrall's
original publication. In particular, where a rule was proposed at the time of the
1986 list but later became final, the updated versions typically refer to the
costs of the final rather than the proposed rule.93 The updated versions of
Morrall's original list also often exclude some of the rules he included though
they do not always exclude the same rules." Sometimes the updated versions
Mendeloff's critique. See id. at 22 tbl.2.1 n.a. Mendeloff's argument has itself played an influential role
in the academic and political debate over risk regulation. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas 0 McGanty.
Not So Paradoxical: The Rationale for Technology-Based Regulation. 1991 DUKE LJ 729. 730 (crediting
Mendeloff with the first elaboration of the idea that '*overregulation produces undcrrcgulation." which has
since become a standard part of the critique of current regulation); see also Cass R. Sunstein.
Administrative Substance, 1991 DUKE L.J. 607. 629 (discussing Mendeloff's cntique and arguing that
technology-based regulation leads to an "overregulation produces undcrrcgulation" paradox). Morrall's
pivotal contribution to Mendeloff's argument has gone largely unnoticed. But see THoMAS 0. McGARrrY
& SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO, WORKERS AT RISK: THE FAILED PROMISE OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND
HEALTH ADMINISTRATION 269 (arguing that Mendeloff's figures on regulatory costs are "on the high side"
in part due to "Mendeloff's heavy reliance upon cost calculations published in papers by John Moriall. the
OMB economist who made a career of criticizing OSHA standards"). For a critique of Mendeloff' critique.
see id. at 267-91.
92. Compare OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET, supra note 82. at 370 tbl.C-2 (showing costs in
1990 dollars), with Viscusi, supra note 2, at 1432-35 tbl.l (showing costs in 1984 dollars). The adjustment
for inflation has sometimes led to mistakes. Close comparison of Morrall's 1986 list with two different
updates to this list-the list used in the budget for fiscal year 1992 and an updated version Morrall himself
prepared in 1994-reveals, bizarrely, that in some cases the costs of regulation first decreased (between
the original list and the 1992 version) and then increased (between the 1992 version and Morrall's 1994
update). Compare, e.g., Morrall, supra note I, at 30 tbl.4 (reporting that the ban on diethylstilbestrol (DES)
in cattlefeed cost $132 million in 1984 dollars), with OFFICE OF MANAGEMIENr & BUDGET. supra note 82.
at 370 tbl.C-2 (reporting the cost as $124.8 million in 1990 dollars). and Lutter & Morrall. supra note 2.
at 59 (reporting the cost as $178 million in 1992 dollars). Morrall reports that such differences are due to
mistakes in adjusting for inflation in the 1992 budget's version of the table, and he advises against using
this version. Telephone Interview with John F. Morrall III, supra note 39. This is the version. however.
used by then-Judge Breyer, see, e.g., BREYER, supra note 2, at 24-27 tbl.5. and, occasionally, by Professor
Sunstein, see, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 80, at 239-40 app. B.
93. All of the following sources refer, for example, to the final (as opposed to proposed) versions of
OSHA's rules on grain dust, see Grain Handling Facilities, 52 Fed. Reg. 49.592 (1987) (to be codified at
29 C.F.R. pts. 1910, 1917), and benzene, see Occupational Exposure to Benzene, 52 Fed. Reg. 34.460
(1987) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910)--though they disagree about how much these rules cost. See
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET, supra note 82, at 370 tbl.C-2 (stating that. in 1990 dollars. the grain
dust rule cost $2.8 million per life saved and the benzene rule cost S8.9 million); Sunstean. Health-Health
Tradeoffs, supra note 2. at 154748 (stating that, in 1992 dollars, the grain dust rule cost S8.8 million and
the benzene rule cost $23.1 million); Viscusi, supra note 2. at 1432-35 (stating that, in 1984 dollars, the
grain dust rule cost $5.3 million and the benzene rule cost $17.1 million).
94. See, e.g., OFFICE OF MANAGEIENT & BUDGET, supra note 82. at 370 tbI.C-2 (excluding 10 rules.
including rules regarding benzene air emissions, radionuclide emissions from elemental phosphorous plants
and Department of Energy facilities, and arsenic air emissions): Sunstein. Health-Health Tradeoffs, supra
note 2, at 1547-48 tbl.2 (excluding rules on oil and gas well service. OSHA's 1972 asbestos rule. EPA's
rules regarding arsenic emissions from glass plants and copper smelters, and the rules on land disposal and
ethylene dibromide (EDB)); Viscusi, supra note 2. at 1432-35 tbl.l (excluding rules regarding steering
column protection, fuel system integrity, trihalomethanes, children's sleepware flammability, and side doors;
OSHA's 1972 rule on asbestos and its rules on acrylonitnle, coke ovens, and arsenic:; and the FDA's ban
on DES in cattlefeed).
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also add rules-including both rules that were in place at the time of the 1986
list and rules that were subsequently proposed.95
Morrall's figures on regulatory costs have thus influenced a wide group in
academia and in government, and different versions of his 1986 table have
proliferated. There appears, however, to be no systematic rationale at work in
choices about altering Morrall's original list; sometimes rules are added or
subtracted without apparent logic. Even so, the variations on Morrall's 1986
list differ in detail rather than in overall substance. They contain almost all of
the rules Morrall's list contains, and they certainly follow the general thrust of
his original table. That is, all of the variations on Morrall's list report that
costs per life saved vary strikingly among federal regulatory programs and that
these costs quite often reach hundreds of millions, even billions, of dollars. For
simplicity's sake, therefore, I use Morrall's 1986 table as the focal point for
the discussion that follows. Several of my most pointed criticisms, however,
apply more to the uses to which his table has been put than they do to the
original table.
II. TABLE OF LEGENDS
Despite the widespread reliance on Morrall's 1986 table and its variants,
I have not found any source in the literature on risk regulation that analyzes
in any detail either the criteria for inclusion of rules on the table or the
stunning costs reflected there. Yet, as I explain in this part, the list is both
overinclusive and underinclusive in its choice of rules. Moreover, comparison
of Morrall's numbers with the agencies' own explanations of their decisions
yields surprising results: Morrall's estimates of costs per life saved are far
higher-sometimes orders of magnitude higher-than the agencies' estimates
of such costs.
I discuss my findings with respect to both the selection of rules and the
determination of costs per life saved in some detail for two reasons. First,
Morrall's table has led not only to a widespread perception that the costs of
life-saving rules are often wildly variant and wildly high but also to a
perception that the decisionmaking processes that lead to such rules reflect a
mindless fixation on trivial risks. Examination of the actual decisionmaking
processes that led to these rules creates a markedly different impression.
Second, it is essential that others be able to reproduce-and question-my
conclusions about the representativeness and accuracy of the numbers reflected
in Morrall's table. Perhaps my most fundamental objection to Morrall's table
is that it buries important normative choices in a seemingly objective array of
95. See, e.g., OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BuDGET, supra note 82, at 370 tbl.C-2 (adding 15 rules to
the list, ranging in effective date or date of proposal from 1970 to 1991),
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numbers.96 By providing merely a summary report of my own conclusions, I
would be repeating Morrall's most basic mistake. I would like my own
analysis to begin a conversation about the costs and benefits of risk regulation,
not end one.
A. Choosing the Rules for the List: Overinclusion and Underinclusion
John Morrall and many others have used his table to argue that there is
something systematically amiss in our system for regulating risk. That is, his
table has not been used merely to point out the existence of some regulations
that cost too much in relation to the benefits they confer or that cost too much
in comparison to alternative ways of regulating risk. His table has been used
instead to support wholesale regulatory reform. It is thus important to consider
the legal status of the regulations appearing on Morrall's list. If it turns out
that the current system for regulating risk managed to reject many of the
costliest regulations on the list before they were ever implemented, that result
would undermine the argument for wholesale reform; this is particularly true
if the very reason for rejection was that the costs of the rules exceeded their
benefits. It is also important to know whether the rules on Morrall's list
comprise a representative sampling of the products of the current regulatory
system. If they do not-and if they systematically err by, for example,
excluding rules or rulemaking possibilities that imposed or would have
imposed lower costs per life saved-this would also diminish the case for
wholesale regulatory reform.
I thus begin this part by discussing the legal status of the rules on
Morrall's list. As it turns out, Morrall's table is itself a crazy quilt. A
substantial portion of the rules on the list were rejected by the relevant
agencies on the very ground that their benefits did not exceed their costs.
Although Morrall himself notes that cost-effectiveness was an important
determinant of legal status,97 he only glancingly acknowledges that a
substantial percentage of the rules at the bottom of his list were rejected for
a reason he would presumably applaud. 9 Still more troubling is the omission,
in several updated versions of Morrall's list, of any mention of the legal status
of the rules on the list;99 these versions of the lists imply, incorrectly, that all
of the rules on the list are in force and generating current costs. Perhaps most
perplexing, however, is that several of the rules on Morrall's list simply do not
96. See infra Part III.
97. See Morrall, supra note 1, at 33; see also supra text accompanying notes 49-50
98. See Morrall, supra note 1, at 31 ("Evidently. very low benefits or high costs is one factor that may
lead to the rejection of a regulatory proposal, although it is not possible to infer from the data how
important this consideration is or what role it plays in rules that are eventually adopted.") cf. VtscUS.
supra note 2, at 265 (discussing Morrall's list, and noting that "OMB blocked some of the particularly
inefficient regulations").
99. See, e.g., BREYER, supra note 2. at 24-27 tbl.5.
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exist; two never existed, as far as I can tell, and two were proposed but not
issued.'O Insofar as the list includes rules rejected for the very reason that
their costs were deemed unjustified and rules that do not exist, the list is
overinclusive.' °'
In addition, although Morrall indicates that his criterion for inclusion of
rules on the table was the availability of "reasonably complete information" on
costs and benefits, 02 there are many regulations, and failures to regulate, that
fit this criterion but were nevertheless excluded from the list. These regulations
imposed, or would have imposed, dramatically lower regulatory costs than
many of the rules Morrall did include. In this sense, therefore, the list is
underinclusive as well.
1. Overinclusion: Rules Rejected Because Their Benefits Did Not Exceed
Their Costs
In this subsection, I discuss several rules on Morrall's list that were
rejected precisely because their benefits did not exceed their costs. By the
regulatory reformers' lights, the rejection of such rules should be viewed as a
success story. Nevertheless, these rules appear at the bottom of Morrall's list,
a placement that suggests, perversely, that these decisions were among the
worst of those he examined.
a. Benzene (EPA 1984)
In 1977, EPA listed benzene as a hazardous air pollutant under section 112
of the Clean Air Act.'0 ' At the time, section 112 required EPA to regulate
air pollutants "which may reasonably be anticipated to result in an increase in
mortality or an increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible,
illness" and directed the agency, in regulating such pollutants, to "provide an
ample margin of safety to protect the public health."'0 In 1980, EPA
proposed performance-based standards under section 112 for benzene emissions
from several categories of sources: benzene storage vessels, 05
100. See infra Subsection II.A.2.
101. In this section, I generally take Morrall's estimates of risks and costs as given; that is, I assume
that the rules I discuss here indeed reflect the costs per life saved that Morrall assigned to them, It is
important to realize, however, that the costs per life saved of the rules I discuss here reflect the same
significant adjustments that I will discuss with respect to other rules. See infra Section ll.B. Morrall's
estimates of the costs per life saved of the rejected rules are thus likely overstated by a wide margin as
compared to the agencies' estimates.
102. Morrall, supra note 1, at 27.
103. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Addition of Benzene to List of
Hazardous Air Pollutants, 42 Fed. Reg. 29,332 (1977).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a)(1), (b)(l)(B) (1988) (amended 1990).
105. See Benzene Emissions from Benzene Storage Vessels; National Emission Standard for Hazardous
Air Pollutants, 45 Fed. Reg. 83,952 (1980) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 61) (proposed Dec. 19, 1980).
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ethylbenzene/styrene plants, °6 and maleic anhydride plants.""° In proposing
these standards, EPA referred to several different health risks caused by
benzene, including leukemia, aplastic anemia, and potentially inheritable
chromosomal abnormalities;' 08 the agency, however, quantified only the
increased risks of leukemia.3 9
Four years later, after a change of administration, EPA withdrew these
proposed standards altogether in a 1984 rulemaking cited in three different
places in Morrall's table. In doing so, EPA asserted that
both the benzene health risks (annual leukemia incidence and
individual lifetime risk from high exposure) to the public from these
source categories and the potential reductions in health risks
achievable with available control techniques are too small to warrant
Federal regulatory action under section 112 of the Clean Air Act."0
The agency's explanation of its decision to withdraw these standards reads like
it was written by the regulatory reformers who have relied on Morrall's table.
The agency emphasized that, since the time that the standards had been
proposed, the source categories in question had reduced their benzene
emissions by a larger amount than new control measures could achieve."'
Because of these reductions, the remaining risks from these facilities were
lower than EPA had originally estimated." 2 In defending its reliance on the
106. See National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Benzene Emissions from
Ethylbenzene/Styrene Plants, 45 Fed. Reg. 83,448 (1980) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 61) (proposed
Dec. 18, 1980).
107. See National Emission Standard for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Benzene Emissions from Maleic
Anhydride Plants, 45 Fed. Reg. 26,660 (1980) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 61) (proposed Apr. 18.
1980).
108. See, e.g., Benzene Emissions from Ethylbenzene/Styrenc Plants. 45 Fed. Reg. at 83.449 n.2.
109. See, e.g., id. at 83,449-50. EPA also expressed uncertainty about its numerical estimates of risk.
The epidemiological studies on which the agency relied, it conceded, contained several difficulties: They
involved a "healthy white male cohort of workers" and thus might not accurately have described risks to
other subpopulations, such as women, children, people of color, the aged, and the sick; leukemia was the
only health effect studied; and the agency's estimates did not take into account the potential for "cumulative
or synergistic effects (from] concurrent exposurefs]" to a variety of substances. Id. at 83.450. As the agency
noted, these uncertainties could just as well have meant that the agency's estimates of risk were understated
as overstated. See Benzene Emissions from Benzene Storage Vessels, 45 Fed. Reg. at 83.954: Benzene
Emissions from Ethylbenzene/Styrene Plants, 45 Fed. Reg. at 83.450. For an extended discussion of the
uncertainties in EPA's estimates of risks from benzene and of the policy decisions implicit in its estimates
of risk, see Howard Latin, Good Science, Bad Regulation, and Toxic Risk Assessment, 5 YALE J. OS REG.
89 (1988). As for costs, the agency estimated that the industry would likely save money as a result of the
proposed standards for ethylbenzene/styrene plants because those standards would cause firms either to
reduce their benzene requirements due to materials recovery or to reduce their process energy requirements.
See Benzene Emissions from Ethylbenzene/Styrene Plants, 45 Fed. Reg. at 83,455.
110. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Benzene Emissions from Maleic
Anhydride Plants, Ethylbenzene/Styrene Plants, and Benzene Storage Vessels, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,558, 23,558
(1984) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 61).
111. See id at 23,562.
112. For EPA's revised estimates of risk, see National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air
Pollutants; Benzene Emissions from Maleic Anhydride Plants. EthylbenzenelStyrene Plants, and Benzene
Storage Vessels, 49 Fed. Reg. 8386 (1984) (to be codified at 40 C.FR. pt. 61).
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quantitative risk assessments showing low risks, the agency rejected arguments
that these risk assessments underestimated risks because they did not take
account of potentially enhanced risks to vulnerable subgroups or of synergistic
effects from chemical mixtures. The agency explained that it had no data
permitting the quantification of enhanced risks to vulnerable subgroups or
enhanced risks from synergisms.1 3 It conceded, however, that these were
"qualitative factors" that could influence (in an unelaborated way) its risk
estimates.
14
EPA explicitly refused to countenance a regulation justified only by the
rationale that the agency "should err on the side of caution" because that
principle did not "fully consider the obligation of reasonable accuracy in
selecting appropriate test data upon which to estimate impacts.""5 And, in
a comparison that would warm the hearts of many regulatory reformers, the
agency explained that it had come to the conclusion that the risks from
benzene emissions from the three source categories in question were too small
to warrant regulatory action partly by comparing the risks of benzene to the
lifetime risks for other environmental hazards such as smoking, drowning, and
electrocution.' 
6
Given this history, the inclusion of EPA's 1984 decisions on Morrall's list
is baffling. Indeed, regulations having the risk and cost profiles cited by
Morrall were never even proposed. As I just noted, the emissions from the
facilities proposed to be regulated decreased substantially between the EPA's
initial proposal to regulate them and its withdrawal of that proposal. EPA
announced the lower risk estimates-with their correspondingly higher
(implicit) costs per life saved-in 1984, in the course of rejecting the initial
proposal. Morrall cites these estimates of risk, not the estimates of risk found
at the time of the proposal in 1980, in reporting the risks and costs of these
rules." 7 But the agency never proposed regulating benzene emissions at the
risk and cost levels cited by Morrall. The risk estimates cited by Morrall were
reported by EPA in the course of withdrawing the proposed standards.
Thus, no person or firm ever spent the $202 million, $483 million, and
$820 million per life saved that Morrall reports on his 1986 list,118 and no
113. See Benzene Emissions from Maleic Anhydride Plants, Ethylbenzenc/Styrene Plants, and Benzene
Storage Vessels, 49 Fed. Reg. at 23,561.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 23,563.
116. See id. at 23,562.
117. Compare Morrall, supra note 1, at 30 tbl.4 (reporting 0.043 annual lives saved by the
benzene/storage rule, 0.006 by the benzenelethylbenzenol styrene rule, and 0.029 for the benzene/maleic
anhydride rule), with Benzene Emissions from Maleic Anhydride Plants, Ethylbenzene/Styrene Plants, and
Benzene Storage Vessels, 49 Fed. Reg. at 8389-90 (reportin excess cancer cases per year of 0.043 from
benzene/storage vessels, 0.0057 for ethylbenzenol/styrene process vents, and 0.029 from maleic anhydride
process vents-after taking into account reductions in emissions that had occurred since the time of the
proposed rule).
118. See Morrall, supra note 1, at 30 tbl.4. Although I believe the costs of rules that were never
proposed do not belong on Morrall's list, regardless of whether Morrall's figures are accurate or inaccurate,
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government agency ever proposed spending these amounts. (Miraculously,
however, in updates to Morrall's list, the costs associated with these long-dead
regulations have continued to grow.) " 9 Moreover, these regulations were
withdrawn because EPA concluded that the risks they would have regulated
were too small to warrant regulatory action; that is, they were withdrawn based
on one of the very considerations that Morrall and others have argued should
inform regulatory decisions on risk. At least by the regulatory reformers'
lights, these regulations deserve a place of honor on any table documenting
agency performance. Nevertheless, they are among the ten regulations at the
very bottom of Morrall's list. To be sure, by use of the letter "R" in the
column designating legal status, Morrall himself noted that these rules had
been rejected. 20 But this is a subtlety that has largely been missed in
subsequent uses of the table.' 2' Moreover, the very act of labeling the rules
"rejected" implies that rules having these reported risk and cost profiles were
at one time proposed. As I have shown, they were not. In sum, therefore, the
regulations should not appear on Morrall's table.'
it is worth noting the disparity between Morrall's estimates of the costs per life saved of EPA's benzene
rules and other economists' estimates of such costs. In 1984, for example, a study funded in part by EPA
concluded that EPA's proposed regulation of benzene emissions from maleic anhydride plants would have
cost approximately $6.5 million per life saved. See John A. Haigh ct a).. Benefit-Cost Analysis of
Environmental Regulation: Case Studies of Hazardous Air Pollutants. 8 HARV. Et vit. L R.Ev. 395. 408
(1984) (estimating that the rule would save 0.4 lives per year at an annual cost of S2.6 million). In 1986,
Morrall reported that this rule would have cost more than 100 times as much, or $820 million per life
saved. See Morrall, supra note I, at 30 tbl.4.
119. See, e.g., Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs, supra note 2. at 1548 tbl.2 (reporting. based on an
update to Morrall's 1986 list, that the (rejected) benzene regulations cost 5273 million. $652 million, and
S1I billion per life saved, compared to the costs of S202 million. $483 million, and $820 million reported
in Morrall's list).
120. See Morrall, supra note 1. at 30 tbl.4.
121. Indeed, as I have noted, see supra text accompanying note 99. some subsequent uses of the table
omit any reference to legal status whatsoever. See, e.g., BREYER. supra note 2, at 24-27. But see Sunstein.
Health-Health Tradeoffs, supra note 2, at 1548.
122. Several years after EPA's 1984 decision to withdraw its proposed benzene rules, the D.C. Circuit
overturned the agency's approach to setting emission standards under section 112 of the Clean Air Act. See
Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA (Vinyl Chloride), 824 F2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that
EPA may not consider costs in determining an acceptable level of risk from hazardous air pollutants). On
a voluntary remand from this decision, EPA again chose not to regulate maleic anhydride process vents.
explaining that benzene was no longer used in the manufacture of maleic anhydride. See National Emission
Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Benzene Emissions from Maleic Anhydride Plants.
Ethylbenzene/Styrene Plants, Benzene Storage Vessels. Benzene Equipment Leaks, and Coke By-Product
Recovery Plants, 54 Fed. Reg. 38,044, 38,046 (1989) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 61). The agency also
declined to regulate ethylbenzenelstyrene plants, concluding that the existing level of control at these
facilities already provided an ample margin of safety. See id. The highest risk from ethyl benzenelstyrene
process vents, as estimated by the agency, was a risk of about I in 100.000, faced by about 600 people;
this would, the agency observed, amount to approximately one cancer case every 5000 years. See td. The
EPA did, however, issue a standard requiring more effective controls for benzene storage vessels. See id.
John Graham subsequently estimated this regulation's cost per year of life saved to be $290.000. See John
D. Graham, The Risk Not Reduced, 3 N.Y.U. ENvTL. L.J. 382. 396 tbl.2 (1994). None of these post-Vinyl
Chloride decisions appears in updated versions of Morrall's table. For an argument that the Vinyl Chloride
decision had little practical effect on EPA's substantive requirements under section 112. but rather
"effectively forced EPA's policymaking underground." see Dwyer. supra note 63. at 271.
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b. Radionuclides (EPA 1984)
EPA's regulation of radionuclides also grew out of section 112 of the
Clean Air Act. In 1979, EPA listed radionuclides as a hazardous air pollutant
under section 112. 23 In 1983, EPA proposed standards for several categories
of sources of radionuclide emissions, including Department of Energy (DOE)
facilities' 24 and elemental phosphorus plants.25
In 1984, EPA withdrew both of the standards it had proposed the previous
year. 26  In reasoning reminiscent of its withdrawal of the benzene
regulations, the agency explained that "current practice provides an ample
margin of safety in protecting the public health from the hazards associated
with exposure to airborne radionuclides."'' 27 In elaborating on its decision,
the agency attempted to place the risks from radiation exposure in perspective:
[E]veryone is exposed to background radiation due to cosmic
radiation, and radioactivity in minerals, soils, and even our own
bodies. Background radiation levels vary across the U.S., but average
about 100 [millirem per year] for each person. There is very little that
people can do to control exposure to background radiation. Over a
lifetime this exposure is estimated to contribute to a fatal cancer risk
of about one or two cases for every one thousand people. 21
Although the agency had slightly increased its estimates of the risks from the
relevant facilities since the time of the proposal, 29 it nevertheless chose to
123. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Addition of Radionuclides to List
of Hazardous Air Pollutants, 44 Fed. Reg. 76,738 (1979).
124. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Standards for Radionuclides, 48
Fed. Reg. 15,076 (1983) (to be codified at 40 C.FR. pt. 61) (proposed Apr. 6, 1983). The agency estimated
that the individual risk of adverse health effects from radionuclides emitted by the DOE-administered
facilities with the highest radionuclide emissions (including, for example, sites where nuclear weapons were
produced and tested) was less than 2 in 10,000 and that the population risk from these facilities was less
than one potential health effect for every 15 years of operation. See id. at 15,080. Morrall's estimate of
lives saved is very different: He reports that the proposed rule would have saved one life every 1000 years.
See Morrall, supra note 1, at 30 tbl.4. For a discussion of the effect of Morrall's lower risk estimates on
his estimates of the costs per life saved of the final rules on his list, see infra Subsection II.B.2.
125. See Standards for Radionuclides, 48 Fed. Reg. at 15,084. The agency estimated that the eight
elemental phosphorous plants then operating in the United States posed an individual risk of at most I in
10,000 to the maximally exposed individual. See id. at 15,084-85. Combined with the agency's population
figures, this risk would lead to about one health effect per 20 years of operation of all these facilities or
an average of 0.05 health effects per year. See id. at 15,085. Morrall's estimate is only marginally different.
See Morrall, supra note 1, at 30 tbl.4 (estimating that the rule regarding elemental phosphorous plants
would save 0.046 lives per year).
126. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Regulation of Radionuclides, 49
Fed. Reg. 43,906 (1984) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 61).
127. Id. at 43,907.
128. Id. at 43,911.
129. See id. at 43,911-12 (stating that risks from elemental phosphorous plants lead to approximately
one fatal cancer case every 17 years (or an average of 0.058 per year) and risks from DOE facilities lead
to approximately one fatal cancer case every 13 years (an average of 0.077 per year)). Morrall's estimates
of 0.046 and 0.001 annual lives saved by the elemental phosphorous and DOE rules, respectively, see
Morrall, supra note 1, at 30 tbl.4, are again lower than the agency's.
2004
Regulatory Costs
withdraw the proposed standards because the aggregate risk to the populations
living near these facilities remained low and because the costs of reducing
emissions would be high."3
The history of these regulations thus reveals, at least from the regulatory
reformers' perspective, another story of success rather than failure. Like the
withdrawn benzene regulations, the two radionuclide regulations to which
Morrall refers were decisions to withdraw regulation rather than to impose it.
Moreover, as in the case of the withdrawn benzene regulations, these decisions
were made after a balancing of risks and benefits that Morrall and other
regulatory reformers would presumably support. Nevertheless, the two
withdrawn radionuclide regulations are also among the bottom ten regulations
on Morrall's table. 13'
c. Asbestos (EPA 1986)
In 1986, EPA proposed banning virtually all manufacturing and use of
asbestos, 132 and this ban become final three years later. 33 The Fifth Circuit
invalidated the ban in 1991, largely because the court concluded that the costs
of the ban exceeded its benefits.'3 In my view, EPA's invalidated rule does
not belong on updated versions of Morrall's list, even if Morrall himself
cannot be faulted for having included the proposed rule back in 1986.
The asbestos ban was EPA's first and (so far) only nationwide ban of a
toxic substance under section 6(a) of the Toxic Substances Control Act
(TSCA),'135 which allows comprehensive cross-media and cross-industry
regulation of toxic pollutants. EPA banned asbestos because it concluded that
the ban would save approximately 200 lives that would have otherwise been
lost due to cancer over a thirteen-year period, plus an unquantified number of
lives that would have otherwise been lost due to cancer in years beyond the
study period or due to other illnesses (such as asbestosis) at any time."3 The
agency estimated that the ban would cost a total of $450 million to $800
130. See Regulation of Radionuclides, 49 Fed. Reg. at 43.911.
131. The Environmental Defense Fund challenged EPA's decision to withdraw the radionuclide
standards. After Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA (Vinyl Chloride). 824 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir.
1987), the court granted EPA's motion for a voluntary remand of the radionuclide emission standards. EPA
eventually promulgated standards for radionuelide emissions. See National Emission Standards for
Hazardous Air Pollutants; Radionuclides, 54 Fed. Reg. 51,564 (1989) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 61).
These new standards do not appear on updated versions of Morrall's list.
132. See Asbestos; Proposed Mining and Import Restrictions and Proposed Manufacturing, Importation.
and Processing Prohibitions, 51 Fed. Reg. 3738 (1986) (to be codified at 40 C.FR. pt. 763) (proposed Jan.
29, 1986).
133. See Asbestos; Manufacture, Importation, Processing, and Distribution in Commerce Prohibitions.
54 Fed. Reg. 29,460, 29,468 (1989) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 763).
134. See Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991).
135. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (1994).
136. See Asbestos; Manufacture, Importation, Processing, and Distribution in Commerce Prohibitions,
54 Fed. Reg. at 29,468, 29,476. Throughout this discussion. I refer to the cost-benefit profile of the final
rule.
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million. 37 At OMB's insistence, 138 the agency also provided disaggregated
cost estimates, industry by industry, and disaggregated risk estimates.'39 The
Fifth Circuit, in reviewing EPA's rule in Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 4'
used these disaggregated estimates in concluding that the costs per life saved
of the rule ranged from $7 million to $8 million (in the asbestos paper
products industry) to $72 million to $106 million (in the asbestos shingles
industry).' 4' Morrall reports EPA's 1986 asbestos rule as final with a cost of
$104.2 million per life saved. 42 This happens to be within the range of the
highest of the disaggregated cost estimates cited by the court.
The asbestos ban, however, never took effect. In Corrosion Proof Fittings,
the Fifth Circuit found many reasons to overturn the EPA's rule. Among them
was that, in the court's view, the costs of the rule exceeded its benefits. The
court could not believe that in providing for the regulation of "unreasonable
risk" under TSCA, Congress had meant for the agency to spend so much
money to save so few lives:
While we do not sit as a regulatory agency that must make the
difficult decision as to what an appropriate expenditure is to prevent
someone from incurring the risk of an asbestos-related death, we do
note that the EPA, in its zeal to ban any and all asbestos products,
basically ignored the cost side of the TSCA equation. The EPA would
have this court believe that Congress, when it enacted its requirement
that the EPA consider the economic impacts of its regulations, thought
that spending $200-300 million to save approximately seven lives
(approximately $30-40 million per life) over thirteen years is
reasonable.
The EPA's willingness to argue that spending $23.7 million to
save less than one-third of a life reveals that its economic review of
its regulations, as required by TSCA, was meaningless.... If we
were to allow such cavalier treatment of the EPA's duty to consider
the economic effects of its decisions, we would have to excise entire
sections and phrases from the language of TSCA. Because we are
judges, not surgeons, we decline to do so. 143
137. See id. at 29,468.
138. See PETER S. MENELL & RICHARD B. STEWART, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 103-06
(1994) (quoting Letter from Robert P. Bedell, Deputy Adm'r, Office of Info. and Regulatory Affairs, Office
of Management and Budget, to A. James Barnes, Esq., Acting Deputy Adm'r, Environmental Protection
Agency (Mar. 27, 1985) [hereinafter Bedell Letter]).
139. See Asbestos; Manufacture, Importation, Processing, and Distribution in Commerce Prohibitions,
54 Fed. Reg. at 29,484-85.
140. 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991).
141. See id. at 1222.
142. See Morrall, supra note 1, at 30 tbl.4.
143. Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1222-23.
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Thus, the asbestos ban, like the regulations regarding benzene and
radionuclides, was rejected based on the very reasoning that regulatory
reformers have argued should underlie risk regulation. Indeed, Corrosion Proof
Fittings is cited in the literature on regulatory reform as a model for sound
decisionmaking.' Again, therefore, the asbestos rule seems not to belong at
the bottom of a list documenting the overall failure of risk regulation to take
adequate account of costs.
Because the asbestos rule had not yet been overturned when Morrall
initially prepared his list in 1986, inclusion of the rule on the list at that time
was not unreasonable. Updated versions of the list, however, continue to
include the asbestos rule-and even list it as "final"--despite its
invalidation.'45 The wrinkle here is that the rule was rejected by a court
rather than by the agency that proposed it. Perhaps the rule is thus relevant to
evaluating agency performance. In other words, the rule might be regarded as
showing, not the shortcomings of legal requirements imposed by Congress (the
interpretation of which ultimately led the Fifth Circuit to overturn the rule), nor
of judicial review, but of agencies' implementation of statutory mandates.
The trouble with this idea is that Morrall's table has not been limited to
the purpose of showing agencies' isolated shortcomings. To the contrary, it has
been used as evidence of the need for wholesale reform of the risk-regulating
system-including reform of the underlying substantive statutes and of the
system for judicial review.'46 But on these counts, the ultimate fate of the
asbestos rule should be regarded as another victory for the regulatory
reformers' agenda.
Moreover, if Morrall's list is to serve as a means of evaluating agency
performance in isolation from the performance of statutory mandates and
judicial review, then it contains some glaring omissions. One famous example
of agency overreaching in the area of risk regulation is the 1976 Consumer
Product Safety Commission's (CPSC) regulation of swimming pool slides. 47
This safety regulation was overturned by the Fifth Circuit on the ground that
the agency had not shown that the primary risk it targeted-a 1-in- 10,000,000
risk of spinal injury and paralysis-would be appreciably reduced by the
proposed rule. 48 As Judge Wisdom stated in a concurring opinion, 'The
144. See, e.g., Edward W. Warren & Gary E. Marchant. -More Good Than Harm" A First Principle
for Environmental Agencies and Reviewing Courts, 20 ECOLOGY LQ. 379, 382 (1993).
145. See, e.g., Lutter & Morrall, supra note 2, at 59 tbl.6: Viscusi. supra note 2. at 1434 tbl.I. In his
1994 update to his own table, Morrall, without explanation, lowered the estimate of the costs per life saved
of EPA's asbestos rule from $104.2 million to $72.9 million. See Lutter & Morrall. supra note 2. at 59
tbl.6.
146. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 2.
147. See Safety Standard for Swimming Pool Slides. 41 Fed. Reg. 2742 (1976) (to be codified at 16
C.F.R. pt. 1207). For criticism of this rule as a case of agency overreaching. se Cass R. Sunstcm.
Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405.478-79 (1989) (describing regulations
such as CSPC's rule on swimming pool slides as an "excessive intrusion into the marketplace-).
148. See Aqua Slide 'N' Dive Corp. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n. 569 F2d 831. 840-44 (5th
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benefits from these [regulations] have no reasonable relationship to the costs
they will impose."' 49 Thus, as with the asbestos ban, two stories about the
pool slide regulation are possible. In one view, it is an example of how the
current regulatory system-which includes the process of judicial review-can
catch the purportedly most extreme regulations, in which case it is a success
story. Or it is an example of how agencies sometimes produce cost-ineffective
rules, in which case it is a story of failure. If the latter is the message Morrall
wanted to send regarding the asbestos ban, then he should have included the
swimming pool regulation on his list, too. If he had done so, however, his
conclusion about the relative cost-effectiveness of health and safety
regulation 5' would have begun to break down.
d. Acrylonitrile (OSHA 1978)
In January 1978, citing the "grave danger" posed by acrylonitrile as
evidenced by animal and epidemiological studies showing an increased risk of
cancer from acrylonitrile exposures,' OSHA proposed an emergency
temporary standard for the control of acrylonitrile exposures in the
workplace. 52 At the same time, OSHA also proposed a permanent standard
for acrylonitrile 53 OSHA considered several alternatives for the permanent
standard, including a permissible emission limit (PEL) of 2.0 parts per million
(ppm) and a PEL of 1.0 ppm.'-" In October 1978, OSHA issued a final rule
on acrylonitrile, reflecting a PEL of 2.0 ppm. 55
Morrall's list contains two 1978 OSHA rulemakings with respect to
acrylonitrile; one rule is listed as final and one as rejected. 56 According to
Morrall, the final regulation cost far less per life saved than the rejected
regulation ($37.6 million as compared to $308 million). 5 7 Although
Morrall's 1986 list does not explicitly say so, it seems reasonable to conclude
that the two 1978 acrylonitrile regulations appearing on his list-one rejected,
one final-reflect the two regulatory alternatives mentioned above, the 1.0 ppm
Cir. 1978).
149. Id. at 845 (Wisdom, J., concurring).
150. See supra text accompanying notes 51-52.
151. OSHA also emphasized research demonstrating that acrylonitrile produces other adverse health
effects besides cancer, including birth defects, blood disorders, and neurological, respiratory, and
gastrointestinal problems. See Emergency Temporary Standard for Occupational Exposure to Acrylonitrile
(Vinyl Cyanide), 43 Fed. Reg. 2586, 2591-93 (1978) (to be codified at 29 C.FR. pt. 1910) (proposed
standard and notice of hearing, Jan. 17, 1978).
152. See id.
153. See Occupational Exposure to Acrylonitrile (Vinyl Cyanide), 43 Fed. Reg. 2608 (1978) (to be
codified at 29 C.FR. pt. 1910) (proposed standard and notice of hearing, Jan. 17, 1978).
154. See id. at 2610, 2614.
155. See Occupational Exposure to Acrylonitrile (Vinyl Cyanide), 43 Fed. Reg. 45,762 (1978) (to be
codified at 29 C..R. pt. 1910).
156. See Morrall, supra note 1, at 30 tbl.4.
157. See id.
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PEL and the 2.0 ppm PEL. This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that
Morrall discusses these two alternatives in his 1983 article with Ivy Broder,
and his figures on risks are identical in the 1983 and 1986 articles.'" s
The rejected alternative, proposing a PEL of 1.0 ppm, does not belong on
Morrall's list. It was rejected before it ever imposed the costs of $308 million
per life saved reported by Morrall. Moreover, this stricter standard was rejected
because OSHA found that it could not feasibly be imposed on the relevant
industry. 59 Granted, this focus on feasibility is not the kind of fine-tuned
cost-benefit analysis that many regulatory reformers have endorsed. Yet even
without this refined analysis, OSHA rejected the 1.0 ppm alternative in favor
of a more lenient standard. This should, by the regulatory reformers' lights, be
another success story.
Moreover, it seems backwards to criticize regulatory performance based
on the hypothetical costs imposed by a hypothetical alternative that the agency
rejected in favor of a more cost-effective standard. Agencies are usually
commended rather than chastised for considering a broad range of alternatives.
Morrall's approach to evaluating the work of agencies appears to be just the
opposite: If an agency so much as mentions a possible regulatory alternative,
even if the agency rejects the alternative in virtually the same breath as it
mentions it, the costs of that alternative can thereafter be enshrined in a list
designed to assess overall regulatory performance. 60
158. Compare id. (reporting that the final acrylonitrile rule would save 6.9 lives per year. and the
rejected acrylonitrile rule would have saved 0.6 additional lives per year). with Broder & Morrall. supra
note 91, at 250 tbl.15.2 (same).
159. See Occupational Exposure to Acrylonitrile (Vinyl Cyanide). 43 Fed. Reg. at 45.774.
160. One other fact about the rejected acrylonitrile regulation bears mentioning. As noted. in his 1983
article written with Ivy Broder, Morrall reported the costs and benefits of two regulatory alternatives-the
PEL of 2.0 ppm eventually adopted by OSHA and the rejected PEL of 1.0 ppm. In addition, his 1983
estimates of the annual lives saved by each alternative were identical to his 1986 estimates of annual lives
saved. In their 1983 estimates of the costs and benefits of the rejected PEL, however. Broder and Morrall
reported only incremental costs and benefits, relative to the more lenient (and ultimately chosen) standard:
that is, their estimates reported the cost per life saved of the additional life-saving benefits associated with
the stricter rule. See Broder & Morrall, supra note 91, at 250 tbl.15.2 n.b. Given that the estimates of lives
saved in the 1986 table are identical to the 1983 estimates, one must conclude that the 1986 table, too.
reports only the incremental costs and benefits of the more stringent (and ultimately rejected) standard for
acrylonitrile. The average costs per life saved of the rejected rule are significantly lower than the
incremental costs of this rule. Based on Broder and Morrall's 1983 figures. the average cost per life saved
of the rejected acrylonitrile regulation was approximately $5.5 million, as compared to the incremental cost
per life saved of $28.8 million (the total annualized cost of the 1.0 ppm standard would have been $41.6
million ($24.3 million plus $17.3 million) divided by 7.5 total annual lives saved (6.9 plus 0.6)). See id.
at 250 tbl.15.2 (dividing total costs of $41.6 million by 7.5 total lives saved). While many have argued that
incremental costs and benefits are more pertinent to sensible policymaking than are average costs and
benefits, see, e.g., OMB Position on Use of Risk Assessment. Cost-Effectiveness Analysis. Benefit-Cost
Review in Setting Standards for Toxic Air Pollutants. 14 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1593. 1600 (Jan. 13. 1984)
[hereinafter OMB Position], reporting incremental costs for some regulations and average costs for others
confuses evaluation of the rules on Morrall's list, especially since Morrall himself reports that the list
generally reflects average costs, see Morrall. supra note I. at 31. The regulations as to which incremental
costs are reported will almost inevitably appear less attractive than the regulations as to which average costs
are reported, merely as a function of the accounting convention used- the incremental costs of
environmental regulation are seldom lower than average costs. See BREYER. supra note 2. at 10-19
(elaborating on the problem of the "last 10 percent," the premise of which is that incremental costs of
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e. Summary
I have described several rulemaking proceedings that, from all
appearances, embody a regulatory approach consistent with the one advocated
by regulatory reformers such as Morrall. It is thus more than a little awkward
that these rulemaking proceedings-which all culminated in the rejection of a
regulation deemed too costly in relation to its benefits-are made to appear,
by their placement at the bottom of Morrall's list, as among the worst of the
lot.
2. Overinclusion: Rules That Do Not Exist
Morrall's list also contains several rules that either were once proposed but
were never issued or appear never to have existed at all. Such rules also do not
belong on this list.
a. Ethylene Dibromide (OSHA 1983)
In 1983, OSHA proposed to limit workers' exposure to ethylene dibromide
(EDB) by, among other things, lowering the permissible exposure limit for
EDB from 20 ppm to 0.1 ppm. 6' The agency estimated that, at that time,
approximately 600 workers were continuously exposed to EDB and that one
to eight excess cancers could be expected in this population as a result of such
exposure.'62 As for individual lifetime risk, the agency found that the risk of
nasal tumors from EDB exposure reached as high as a stunning 725 in
1000-a risk, OSHA noted, "far greater.., than for any other hazard that
OSHA has regulated in the past, where the risks have been quantified."'
' 63
The agency also estimated that about 56,000 workers were intermittently
exposed to EDB, but it found that it could not quantify the risks to these
workers from this exposure. 6' Nor was it able to quantify the risks of
noncancer health effects, though it noted that dose-response relationships had
been -established for hepatic necrosis, toxic nephropathy, and reproductive
environmental protection and remediation are higher than average costs).
161. See Occupational Exposure to Ethylene Dibromide, 48 Fed. Reg. 45,956 (1983) (to be codified
at 29 C.ER. pt. 1910) (proposed Oct. 7, 1983).
162. See id. at 45,977.
163. Id. at 45,975. A comparison of OSHA's estimates of the risks from EDB with Morrall's estimates
is instructive because it begins to reveal how dramatically Morrall's estimates of risk sometimes depart
from the agencies'. Morrall estimates the individual risks from EDB exposure to be 2.5 in 10,000. See
Morrall, supra note 1, at 30 tbl.4. As noted in the text, OSHA estimated that the risk of nasal tumors from
EDB reached as high as 725 in 1000. Thus Morrall's estimate of risk differs from OSHA's estimate by
more than two orders of magnitude. Beyond saying that he sometimes chose what he regarded as more
reliable estimates of risk than the agencies', see Morrall, supra note 1, at 28-29, Morrall does not explain
this disparity.
164. See Occupational Exposure to Ethylene Dibromide, 48 Fed. Reg. at 45,977.
2010 [Vol. 107: 1981
Regulatory Costs
toxicity. 65 The agency also cited research showing that the carcinogenic
effects of EDB were "considerably enhanced" when EDB exposure was
combined with exposure to another chemical;"6 specifically, the carcinogenic
effects of EDB and disulfiram together were eighty-five times higher than the
effects of EDB alone,' 67 making EDB a "proven synergistic agent."'1' This
proposed regulation of EDB is the second-to-last regulation appearing on
Morrall's list, with a cost of $15.6 billion per life saved. 69
Despite OSHA's findings on the risks of EDB, this regulation has never
taken effect. Although the agency has never formally withdrawn the proposal,
it seems safe to say-fourteen years later-that the proposal is dead.'70 In
1986, when Morrall first compiled his list, it was understandable that he would
include this rule. At that time, only three years had elapsed since the rule was
first proposed, and many rules take longer than three years to become
final.' But it is hard to imagine a justification for including this long-
moribund regulation on current versions of Morrall's list, which purport to
reflect regulatory costs relevant to today's debates over the regulatory
state. 1
72
b. Arsenic and Copper Smelters (EPA 1986)
In 1980, EPA listed inorganic arsenic as a hazardous air pollutant under
section 112 of the Clean Air Act. 73 EPA then proposed standards for arsenic
emissions from two kinds of copper smelters: low-arsenic and high-arsenic
smelters.' 74 In 1986, the agency issued a final rule regulating arsenic
emissions from low-arsenic copper smelters alone. 75 Morrall's list contains
two 1986 rules on arsenic emissions from copper smelters, one designated
165. See id. at 45,974.
166. Id. at 45,971.
167. See id.
168. Id. at 45,974.
169. See Morrall, supra note I, at 30 tbl.4.
170. The regulation has occasionally resurfaced in OSHA's descnptions of its regulatory agenda. See.
e.g., Semiannual Agenda of Regulations. 54 Fed. Reg. 16.836, 16.841 (1989). The likely reason for
OSHA's failure to issue a final rule on EDB is that, after OSHA proposed its EDB rule. EPA effectively
banned EDB's use as a pesticide, thus eliminating most of the nsks OSHA had sought to prevent. See
Tolerances and Exemptions from Tolerances for Pesticide Chemicals in or on Raw Agncultural
Commodities; Revocation of Exemption from Tolerance for Ethylene Dibromide, 49 Fed. Reg. 17.144
(1984) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 180).
171. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas 0. McGarity, Reorienting OSHA: Regulatory Alternauves and
Legislative Reform, 6 YALE J. ON REG. I, 39 & n.228 (1989) (discussing the slow pace of OSHA
rulemakings).
172. See, e.g., Viscusi, supra note 2, at 1434-35 tbl.l (including the rule in his table).
173. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Addition of Inorganic Arsenic to
List of Hazardous Air Pollutants, 45 Fed. Reg. 37,886 (1980).
174. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Proposed Standards for Inorganic
Arsenic, 48 Fed. Reg. 33,112 (1983) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 61) (proposed July 20. 1983).
175. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Standards for Inorganic Arsenic.
51 Fed. Reg. 27,956 (1986) (to be codified at 40 C.FR. pt. 61).
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"Arsenic/Copper Smelter" and the other, "Arsenic/Low-Arsenic Copper."' 76
Morrall's "Arsenic/Copper Smelter" rule must then refer to the regulation of
high-arsenic copper smelters. Morrall reports that the "Copper Smelter" rule
is final and costs $26.5 million per life saved.' 77 This rule does not exist.
In its final rule on inorganic arsenic emissions, EPA reported that the
standard it had proposed for high-arsenic copper smelters would have affected
only one copper smelter in the country, the smelter owned by ASARCO, Inc.,
located in Tacoma, Washington.178 The agency also reported that ASARCO
had, the month before, announced that it would close this smelter. 179 This
announcement was the rather disappointing climax to an unusual series of
public hearings in which EPA officials had encouraged the participation of
local residents in the determination of an ample margin of safety for
restrictions on arsenic emissions from the Tacoma smelter.'
Because ASARCO had decided to close the only high-arsenic copper
smelter in the country, EPA withheld further action on high-arsenic copper
smelters and announced that it would "reconsider the need for a separate
standard applicable to existing high-arsenic smelters if there is evidence that
ASARCO-Tacoma will resume copper smelting operations."'' As a
consequence, the agency promulgated only one standard for arsenic emissions
from copper smelters, not the two that Morrall lists. Contrary to Morrall's
report, therefore, there is no copper smelter rule imposing $26.5 million in
costs per life saved.
One might argue that inclusion of the "copper smelter" standard on this list
is appropriate because ASARCO, at least, claimed that one reason for the
closure of its copper smelter was the burden of the anticipated new
environmental regulations.8 2 Thus, it might be argued that, even though the
withdrawn rule itself did not impose costs on ASARCO, the prospect of
having to comply with the proposed rule was so fearsome that the company
176. Morrall, supra note 1, at 30 tbl.4.
177. See id.
178. See Standards for Inorganic Arsenic, 51 Fed. Reg. at 27,957.
179. See id.
180. Assessments of this experiment in participatory risk management are mixed. For an optimistic
account, see Robert B. Reich, Public Administration and Public Deliberation, 94 YALE U. 1617 (1985).
For less sanguine appraisals, see David Doniger, The Gospel of Risk Management: Should We Be
Converted?, [1984] 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,222, 10,223 (June 1984); and Peter Dorman,
Environmental Protection, Employment, and Profit: The Politics of Public Interest in the Tacoma/Asarco
Arsenic Dispute, REV. RADICAL POL. ECON., Winter 1984, at 151. See also AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS
THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 165-98 (1996) (analyzing the role of utilitarianism in the
ASARCO dispute).
181. Standards for Inorganic Arsenic, 51 Fed. Reg. at 27,957. There is little chance that the ASARCO
smelter will resume operations any time soon because it has been dismantled. See Kery Murakami, Famous
Tacoma Stack Coming Down Sunday, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 13, 1993, at AI.
182. See Copper Smelter Closes on Coast as Market Shrinks for Metal, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1985,
at A14.
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chose to close the plant rather than comply. 83 The closure of the plant was,
on this view, a cost of the proposed rule even though the rule never went into
effect. Accounts by sources other than ASARCO, however, blamed the closure
on falling copper prices,'t and ASARCO itself conceded that it was not the
proposed arsenic regulation, but new restrictions on sulfur dioxide emissions,
that most contributed to the decision to close.'8 Thus, the proposed, but
never issued, high-arsenic rule does not belong on Morrall's list.
c. Arsenic and Glass Manufacturing Plants (EPA 1986)
At the same time that it issued a regulation pertaining to arsenic emissions
from copper smelters, EPA also regulated arsenic emissions from glass
manufacturing plants. Morrall lists two 1986 EPA rules on such emissions
(designated "Arsenic/Glass Plant" and "Arsenic/Glass Manufacturing").'1 6 He
reports the "glass plant" rule as final and the "glass manufacturing" rule as
rejected. 8 7 According to his list, the final glass plant rule cost $19.2 million
per life saved, and the rejected glass manufacturing rule would have cost $142
million per life saved.' 88
But there was only one 1986 EPA rulemaking involving inorganic arsenic
emissions from any kind of "glass plant," and this was the rulemaking
regarding glass manufacturing plants. 9 How Morrall determined that there
were separate rules for "glass plants" and "glass manufacturing" is unknown,
let alone how he determined that one rule was rejected and one final, and that
one cost $19.2 million per life saved and the other $142 million per life
saved.' 90 The more expensive, rejected rule does not exist.
183. For a discussion of the effect of proposed regulation on industry behavior, see Nicholas A.
Ashford & George R. Heaton, Jr., Regulation and Technological Innovation in the Chemical Industry. LAw
& CONTEMP. PROBs., Summer 1983, at 109, 120 (arguing that OSHA's behavior may change businesses'
perceptions of the need to change their technological courses).
184. See, e.g., Felicity Barringer, EPA Asks Residents' Advice About Arsenic Plant,. WASII. POST. July
14, 1983, at A13 (describing a report by EPA economist Robert L. Coughlin concluding that economic
factors would probably force closure of the ASARCO plant within five years).
185. See Cass Peterson, High-Pollution Smelter To Close IMithin a Year: Asarco Cites Environmental
Regulations, WASH. PoST, June 29, 1984, at A2 (stating that the cost of the arsenic rule would be only S3
million).
186. Morrall, supra note I, at 30 tbl.4.
187. See id.
188. See id.
189. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Standards for Inorganic Arsenic.
51 Fed. Reg. 27,956 (1986) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 61).
190. I shall have more to say about EPA's final glass plant rule in discussing Morrall's estimates of
risks and costs. See infra Subsection II.B.I.c.
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d. Radionuclides and Uranium Mines (EPA 1984)
In its 1983 proposed rule on radionuclides, which I have already
discussed,'9' EPA also proposed limiting emissions from uranium mines.'
In its 1984 decision on radionuclides, however, the EPA withdrew its proposed
standards for uranium mines after finding that its proposed standard contained
two legal flaws.193 The 1984 ruling regarding radionuclide emissions from
uranium mines, listed as final on Morrall's list, was thus a decision to
withdraw regulation rather than impose it. 94 Thus, this decision, too, should
have been excluded from the list. 95
e. Summary
The discussion so far suggests that, from the standpoint of legal status,
Morrall's list, and updated versions of it, are quite overinclusive. There is little
justification for including on this list rules that were rejected on the ground
that their benefits did not justify their costs. Regardless of whether the agency
or a court made the decision not to impose such a rule, such a decision should
be seen, from the regulatory reformers' perspective, as a success story. There
is also little reason to include on the list rules that do not exist.
Overinclusiveness is, however, just one of the problems with Morrall's list.
3. Underinclusion: Excluded Rules and Failures To Regulate
Morrall's list is also underinclusive in two important respects. First, the list
excludes several prominent agency rules about which comprehensive
information on costs and benefits existed at the time Morrall prepared his 1986
list. These rules apparently satisfied Morrall's stated criterion for inclusion of
rules on the list-the availability of "reasonably complete" information on
costs and benefits196--yet he excluded them anyway. The cost profiles
191. See supra Subsection ll.A.l.b.
192. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Standards for Radionuclides, 48
Fed. Reg. 15,076, 15,083-84 (1983) (to be codified at 40 C.FR. pt. 61) (proposed Apr. 6, 1983).
193. The agency concluded, first, that the dispersion technology it had proposed for control of
radionuclide emissions from uranium mines was not a lawful means of emission control under section 112
of the Clean Air Act and, second, that the proposed rule failed to satisfy the statute's public health purposes
by not reducing aggregate population risk. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants;
Regulation of Radionuclides, 49 Fed. Reg. 43,906, 43,912-13 (1984) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 61)
(withdrawal of proposed standards, Oct. 31, 1984).
194. At the same time, the agency announced that it would attempt to develop a standard for uranium
mines based on new and lawful methods of control. See id. at 43,913. The agency eventually issued
standards for these sources in 1989. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants;
Radionuclides, 54 Fed. Reg. 51,654 (1989) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 61).
195. It is worth noting, once again, that Morrall's estimate of the lives that would have been saved
annually by this rule (1.1 lives) is much lower than EPA's estimate (five). Compare Morrall, supra note
1, at 30 tbl.4, with Regulation of Radionuclides, 49 Fed. Reg. at 43,912.
196. Morrall, supra note 1, at 27.
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associated with these rules challenge Morrall's sweeping conclusion about the
cost-ineffectiveness of health regulation. 97 EPA's phase down of lead in
gasoline, 198 for example, was estimated to produce net monetary benefits; in
other words, its cost per adverse health condition avoided (primarily impaired
cognitive development in children and elevated blood pressure in adults) was
less than zero.199 Similarly, the Clean Air Act's provisions controlling
common air pollutants (particulates, sulfur dioxide, ozone, carbon monoxide,
and nitrogen dioxide)200 were estimated to have produced approximately
$37.3 billion in benefits in 1978 alone, and this was assuming that each human
life had a value of only $1 million °'' These benefits dwarfed annual costs,
estimated at approximately $13.7 billion for 1981. 202
A second way in which Morrall's list is underinclusive is that it does not
evaluate the costs and benefits of complete failures to regulate. It evaluates the
costs and benefits of failures to regulate only when nonregulation followed a
proposal to regulate, as with the withdrawn restrictions on benzene and
radionuclides. 3 It does not report, to name two examples, the costs and
benefits of the twenty-year-long failure of the EPA to use the Clean Air
Act2°4 to address the problem of acid deposition,' 5 or the failure of OSHA
to address the risks posed by thousands of industrial chemicals that have been
shown to have toxic effects or that are suspected carcinogens.- 6 Yet the
costs and benefits of failures to regulate should play a role in any overall
evaluation of the regulatory system. By evaluating failures to regulate, one
might begin to suspect, not that the regulatory system has reached too far, but
that it has not reached far enough." 7
Given that "reasonably complete" information was available with respect
to many regulations and failures to regulate that were excluded from Morrall's
197. See supra text accompanying notes 51-52.
198. See Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives; Gasoline Lead Content. 50 Fed. Reg. 9386 (1985)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 80).
199. See JOEL SCHWARTZ ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY. COSTS AND BENEFITS OF
REDUCING LEAD IN GASOLINE: FINAL REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS at VIII-26 tbI.Vlll- (1985).
200. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408-7410 (1994).
201. See Paul R. Portney, Air Pollution Policy, in PUBLIC POLICIES FOR ENVIRON'sm E tL PROTEcTION
27, 54-60 (Paul R. Portney ed., 1990) (discussing A. MYRICK FREEmAN 111. AIR AND WATER POLLUTIO.N
CONTROL: A BENEFIT-COST ASSESSMENT (1982); A. MYRICK FREEmAN II. THE BENEFITs OF AIR AND
WATER POLLUTION CONTROL: A REVIEW AND SYNTHESIS OF RECENT ESTIMATES. REPORT TO THE
COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (1979)).
202. See id. at 69-70 (discussing MICHAEL HAZLLA & RAYMOND J. Kopp. THE SOCIAL COST OF
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REGULATIONS: A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS (Resources for the Future
Discussion Paper QE86-02, 1986)).
203. See supra Subsections II.A.l.a-b.
204. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671.
205. See Heinzerling, supra note 64, at 319.
206. See MCGARITY & SHAPIRO, supra note 91. at 13.
207. Of course, it would not be practicable to insist upon an examination of the costs per life saved
of every potential life-saving regulation; such a project would quickly become unmanageable. Nevertheless.
one should at least acknowledge that data on the costs per life saved by enacted regulations tells only one
side of the story.
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list, one is left to speculate about the true criteria for inclusion of rules on the
list. In this regard, it is striking to notice how many of the rules at the bottom
of the list had drawn criticism from either the Council on Wage and Price
Stability (COWPS)2"' during the 1970s or OMB 21 in the 1980s, while
Morrall was working at those agencies. COWPS criticized OSHA's rules
regulating acrylonitrile,210  arsenic, 2 ' benzene,212  and coke ovens.2 '
OMB forced a softening of OSHA's rules on ethylene oxide 24 and
formaldehyde 2 5  and pointedly criticized EPA's rules on arsenic,
216
asbestos, 217 and radionuclides. 2 8 During the years in question, COWPS and
OMB took it as their mission to bring cost-benefit analysis to the regulatory
21process. 19 COWPS even took the nonobvious position that its statutory
charge of assessing the effects of regulatory action on inflation included
evaluating regulations according to cost-benefit analysis. 220  COWPS
frequently criticized OSHA for "steadfastly refrain[ing]" from quantifying the
number of lives that would be saved by its regulations,2 t and for failing to
208. For a concise description of COWPS's oversight authority, see Harold H. Bruff, Presidential
Management of Agency Rulemaking, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 533, 546-48 (1989). See also SAMUEL P.
HAYS, BEAUTY, HEALTH, AND PERMANENCE: ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1955-
1985, at 372-73 (1987).
209. On OMB's role in regulatory oversight, see, for example, Alan B. Morrison, OMB Interference
with Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way To Write a Regulation, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1059 (1986) and Erik
D. Olson, The Quiet Shift of Power: Office of Management & Budget Supervision of Environmental
Protection Agency Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12,291, 4 VA. J. NATURAL RESOURCES L. I (1984).
210. See THOMAS D. HOPKINS ET AL., COUNCIL ON WAGE AND PRICE STABILITY, EXECUTIVE OFFICE
OF THE PRESIDENT, A REVIEW OF THE REGULATORY INTERVENTIONS OF THE COUNCIL ON WAGE AND
PRICE STABILITY 1974-1980, at B-65 to B-68 (1981). Morrall himself prepared the analysis of the rule for
COWPS. See Broder & Morrall, supra note 91, at 349 n.31 (citing JOHN MORRALL, COUNCIL ON WAGE
AND PRICE STABILITY, REPORT SUBMITTED TO RARG ON OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURE TO ACRYLONITRILE
272 (1978)).
211. See Dianne R. Levine, Exposure to Inorganic Arsenic in the Workplace, in BENEFIT-COST
ANALYSES OF SOCIAL REGULATION 21, 24-27 (James C. Miller III & Bruce Yandle eds., 1979).
212. COWPS criticized OSHA's original benzene rule, which as I note below, see infra text
accompanying note 378, was identical to the rule proposed after remand from the Supreme Court and which
appears on Morrall's list. See COUNCIL ON WAGE AND PRICE STABILITY, APPENDIX: ANALYSIS OF
PROPOSED BENZENE STANDARD (1977). For a discussion of COWPS's objections, see Brief for
Respondents at 18-20, Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980)
(No. 78-911).
213. See Exposure to Coke Oven Emissions: Proposed Standard Before the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration, Docket No. H-017A, at 9-12 & tbl.D (1976) [hereinafter Exposure to Coke Oven
Emissions] (statement of John F. Morrall III, Senior Economist, on Behalf of COWPS).
214. The legality of OMB's interference with the ethylene oxide rulemaking was raised, but not
decided, in Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Tyson, 796 F.2d 1479, 1483-84 (D.C. Cir. 1986). See
also MCGARITY & SHAPIRO, supra note 91, at 85-87.
215. See MCGARITY & SHAPIRO, supra note 91, at 108-11, 159-61.
216. See OMB Position, supra note 160.
217. See MENELL & STEWART, supra note 138, at 105-06 (quoting Bedell Letter, supra note 138).
218. See OMB Position, supra note 160.
219. For a history of COWPS's (successful) efforts to bring cost-benefit analysis to NHTSA. see Jerry
L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, Inside the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration: Legal
Determinants of Bureaucratic Organization and Performance, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 443, 467-69 (1990).
220. See Levine, supra note 211, at 27.
221. Id. at 25.
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assign a monetary value to human life. 2  In OMB's hands, cost-benefit
analysis became a one-way ratchet; it was used to criticize proposals for
regulation, never to criticize failures to regulate.'m The bottom of Morrall's
table, in short, reads like a COWPS/OMB regulatory hit list, and this is not a
point in favor of its objectivity. 224
4. Conclusion
I have argued that eight out of the eleven rules at the very bottom of
Morrall's list, and several others, do not belong on the list at all, either because
they were rejected for the very reason that their costs exceeded their benefits
or because they have, for other reasons, never taken effect. Excluding these
rules dramatically narrows the range of cost-effectiveness reflected on
Morrall's list. As I discuss in the next section, this range narrows still more
when the agencies' estimates of risks and costs-rather than Morrall's-are
used to derive the figures on cost-effectiveness.
B. Competing Estimates of Costs per Life Saved
The selection of rules for Morrall's list is not the only shortcoming of the
list. The costs per life saved reported by Morrall are also problematic. This
section compares Morrall's estimates of the risks avoided by the regulations
on his list and the costs they would impose with the agencies' estimates of
those risks and costs. As we shall see, Morrall's estimates are strikingly
different from-and inevitably higher than--the agencies' estimates. Indeed,
as I explain below, there is as much as a 1000-fold variance between Morrall's
estimates of costs per life saved and the agencies' (often implicit) estimates of
these costs. 2 5 These differences appear to stem from two sources: Morrall's
discounting of the number of lives the regulations were expected to save in the
future by ten percent per year and his adjustments to the agencies' quantitative
risk assessments.226 I organize my discussion in this section along these
lines.227
222. See id. at 27.
223. See PERCIVAL Er AL., supra note 72, at 694.
224. It is interesting to note that another of the rare attempts to identify the costs per life saved of
federal regulations also relied extensively on COWPS's calculations of regulatory costs, and the rules
covered by these calculations fared poorly on that list too. See John D. Graham & James W. Vaupel. The
Value of a Life: What Difference Does It Make?, in WHAT ROLE FOR GOVERNmE"?.. supra note 91. at
176, 179-83 tbl.ll.l.
225. For a summary of the findings in this section, see infra note 392.
226. For a more detailed description of discounting future lives saved and of quantitative risk
assessment, see infra Subsections III.A. 1-2.
227. I focus on the regulations that have been asserted to fail any one of the currently circulating tests
for determining the wisdom of social regulations (such as cost-benefit analysis). These are the regulations
that, on Morrall's list, appear below EPA's 1984 rule regarding fugitive emissions of benzene. see. e.g..
Viscust, supra note 2, at 264 tbl.14-5 (asserting that regulations listed below benzene/fugitive emissions
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1. Discounting
Explaining why Morrall's estimates of costs per life saved differ so
stunningly from the agencies' estimates is largely a process of elimination.
These differences are not in any case attributable to different estimates of
regulatory compliance costs; Morrall did not alter the agencies' cost
estimates. 228 Nor, as to the rules discussed in this subsection, are the
differences attributable to different estimates of risk; for these rules, Morrall's
estimates of actual lives saved are identical or nearly identical to the agencies'
estimates. In addition, the differences in estimates of costs per life saved are
too large to be attributable to any effects of price inflation in the interval
between the agencies' estimates and Morralls. 229 The only other adjustment
that Morrall reports he made to the agencies' estimates was to discount future
lives saved by ten percent per year.230 Thus, with respect to the rules
discussed in this subsection, the vast difference between Morrall's and the
agencies' estimates of costs per life saved must be attributed to
discounting.23'
a. Asbestos (OSHA 1972), Acrylonitrile (OSHA 1978), and Arsenic
(OSHA 1978)
Morrall included on his list three rules that OSHA enacted before the
agency began estimating the number of lives that would be saved through its
regulation of various workplace health risks. 2  Thus, in none of these cases
can we isolate the effect of discounting on Morrall's calculations by comparing
the agency's estimates with Morrall's. 233 We can, however, discern the effect
of discounting on Morrall's 1986 estimates by comparing them with estimates
fail the cost-benefit test), which Morrall finds to cost $2.8 million per life saved, see Morrall, supra note
1, at 30 tbl.4.
228. See Morrall, supra note 1, at 29.
229. Cf infra note 397 (adjusting agencies' estimates of costs based on the Consumer Price Index).
230. See Morrall, supra note I, at 28.
231. In order to isolate the effect of discounting on Morrall's estimates, I report the agencies' estimates
of risks and costs without any discounting. I discuss the appropriateness of discounting the future benefits
of health regulation infra Part III.
232. See Occupational Exposure to Acrylonitrile (Vinyl Cyanide), 43 Fed. Reg. 45,762 (1978) (to be
codified at 29 C.FR. pt. 1910); Occupational Exposure to Inorganic Arsenic, 43 Fed. Reg. 19,584 (1978)
(to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910); Standard for Exposure to Asbestos Dust, 37 Fed. Reg. 11,318 (1972)
(to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910). In 1980, a plurality of the Supreme Court held that OSHA must first
find a risk "significant" before regulating it, see Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum
Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 642 (1980) (plurality opinion), which greatly increased the use of quantitative risk
assessment. See John S. Applegate, The Perils of Unreasonable Risk: Information, Regulatory Policy, and
Toxic Substances Control, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 261, 283-84 (1991).
233. See Occupational Exposure to Acrylonitrile (Vinyl Cyanide), 43 Fed. Reg. at 45,790 ("While the
actual estimation of the number of cancers to be prevented is highly uncertain, the evidence indicates that
the number is likely to be appreciable."); Occupational Exposure to Inorganic Arsenic, 43 Fed. Reg. at
19,607 ("Mhe actual estimation of the number of cancers to be prevented is highly uncertain."); Standard
for Exposure to Asbestos Dust, 37 Fed. Reg. at 11,318 (presenting no agency estimate).
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offered in Morrall's 1983 article written with Ivy Broder.234 In that article,
Morrall and Broder did not discount future lives saved. 235 The following
table compares the two sets of estimates of risks and costs:
TABLE 2. COST-EFFECTIVENESS OF OSHA REGULATIONS:
MORRALL (1983) VS. MORRALL (1986)3
REGULATION MORRALL 1983: MORRALL 1986: MORRALL 1983: MORRALL 1986:
ANNUAL LivEs ANNUAL LIVES COST PER LIFE CosT PER LIFE
SAVED SAVED SAVED SAVED
(MILUONS) (MILLIONS)
(1984 DOLLARs)
Asbestos 396.00 396.00 $0.189 $7.4
(OSHA 1972)
Acrylonitrile 6.90 6.90 3.50 37.60
(OSHA 1978)
Arsenic 5.40 11.70 20.20 92.50
(OSHA 1978)
In both 1983 and 1986, Morrall estimated that OSHA's asbestos rule
would save 396 lives per year, yet his estimate of the cost per life saved of
this rule grew almost forty times between 1983 and 1986." Likewise, he
reported in both 1983 and 1986 that the acrylonitrile rule would save 6.9 lives
annually, yet his 1986 estimate of costs per life saved is more than ten times
higher than his 1983 estimate.238 In addition, despite the more than doubling
of his estimate of the number of lives saved by the arsenic regulation (from 5.4
in 1983 to 11.7 in 1986), Morrall reported in 1986 that the cost per life saved
of this rule was over four times as high as he had reported in 1983. These
234. See Broder & Morrall, supra note 91.
235. Rather than discounting lives saved, Morrall and Broder discounted the estimates of the monetary
value of life reflected in workers' and consumers' willingness to pay for risk reductions. See id. at 253.
They reasoned that the estimates from existing studies were based on the risk of accidents leading to
immediate death rather than the risk of contracting cancer after a long latency period and that valuations
would be lower for more remote harms. See id. at 252-53. For a more detailed discussion of the concept
of discounting human lives, see infra Subsection III.A. I.
236. For the sources of these figures, see Broder & Morrall, supra note 91, at 250 tbl. 15.2; and
Morrall, supra note I, at 30 tbl.4.
237. In 1983, Morrall thought that his figures on risks and costs probably *underestimate ... deaths
prevented and ... overestimate ... costs per life saved." Broder & Morrall, supra note 91. at 250 tbl.15.2
n.a.
238. The same general observation applies to the rejected acrylonitrile standard, which, as I have
argued, see supra Subsection II.A.l.d. does not belong on Morrall's table: In 1983 Morrall estimated that
this standard would save 0.6 lives at a cost of S28.8 million apiece, but by 1986 the cost for the same
benefit had swollen to S308 million. Compare Broder & Morrall, supra note 91. at 250 tbl.15.2. with
Morrall, supra note 1. at 30 tbl.4.
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large differences must be due to discounting, as this is the only methodological
difference between the two sets of estimates.239
b. Arsenic and Low-Arsenic Copper Smelters (EPA 1986)
As noted earlierm as a result of its listing of inorganic arsenic as a
hazardous air pollutant under section 112 of the Clean Air Act, EPA
promulgated in 1986 a rule pertaining to low-arsenic copper smelters.24 The
rule required primary copper smelters to control arsenic emissions through
application of the technology that would provide "the maximum reduction in
risk to public health and is available and can be applied without causing
widespread plant closure or imposing costs that far exceed any public health
benefit."' ' 2 Although the agency originally believed that the new standard
would affect six of the fourteen primary smelters in operation at the time, 3
the agency's final standard required further controls at only one smelter in the
country, the ASARCO smelter in El Paso, Texas.2' The agency reasoned as
follows:
For five of the six smelters that the proposed standard would have
affected, EPA concluded that the costs were disproportionate to the
risk reductions that could be obtained. Furthermore, the revised
economic analysis showed that for two of these five smelters the
239. Morrall does not cite a source for his estimates of the number of lives saved by these rules, and
as noted, see supra notes 232-233 and accompanying text, we do not have agency estimates to consider
in these cases. There is, however, some reason to be skeptical of Morrall's estimates of lives saved. For
example, an analysis of OSHA's proposed arsenic standard, performed by COWPS, took a stab at
estimating how many lives would be saved by the rule and came up with a range of 12 to 106 lives saved
per year. See Levine, supra note 211, at 25. The low extreme of this range is almost identical to Morrall's
1986 estimate of 11.7 lives saved annually. The COWPS analysis-admittedly "not the work of a technical
expert in the area of epidemiology," id. at 24-was based on the application of "alternative hypotheses
about the relationship between dose and response" for arsenic and cancer, id. at 25. No effort was made
to select a best estimate, although the analyst-who was, to repeat, not an expert in this field-believed
that all the estimates "grossly overestimate the benefits from the proposed standards." Id. at 26. COWPS
reported that the cost per life saved of the arsenic rule was between $1 million and $9 million. See id. at
27. Even the upper end of this range is an order of magnitude below Morrall's 1986 estimate. Amid this
much variability, it is hard to know which of these estimates is closest to the one the agency might have
embraced had it estimated costs per life saved. For the purposes of summarizing my findings with respect
to costs per life saved, I use Broder and Morrall's 1983 estimate (divided in half to reflect Morrall's 1986
doubling of his estimate of lives saved) only because I use Broder and Morrall's estimates with respect to
other OSHA rules for which there are no agency estimates of risks. See infra note 392. Note, however, that
if COWPS's figures are closer to the mark, the costs per life saved which I report for OSHA's arsenic rule,
see infra note 392, are approximately two to twenty times too high.
COWS also estimated the costs of the acrylonitrile standard. Its estimate of $1.37 million per cancer
case avoided is a far cry from Morrall's 1986 estimate of $37.6 million for the same benefit. Compare
HOPKINS Er AL., supra note 210, at B-66, with Morrall, supra note 1, at 30 tbl.4.
240. See supra Subsection II.A.2.b.
241. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Standards for Inorganic Arsenic,
51 Fed. Reg. 27,956 (1986) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 61).
242. Id. at 27,972.
243. See id. at 27,969.
244. See id. at 27,970.
2020
Regulatory Costs
control costs were likely to result in the smelters remaining
permanently closed. The analysis of the converter control requirement
also indicated that for the sixth facility, ASARCO-El Paso, that risk
reduction could be obtained at a cost that does not present
unreasonable economic and social effects .... Consequently, EPA
revised the cutoff to distinguish between primary copper smelters
where additional emission control is reasonable and those where
control imposes costs that far exceed any public health benefit....
Based on available information, this cutoff requires application of
converter secondary controls only at the ASARCO-El Paso
smelter.245
In other words, based on an assessment of risks, costs, and technological
feasibility, EPA set the new emissions standard at precisely the level that
would capture the only smelter in the country where the agency reckoned
further controls would be cost-justified. This hardly seems to be an example
of an agency run amok. In fact, the agency's approach here appears to follow
OMB's recommendation, offered to EPA during the Reagan administration,
that the agency look at incremental-indeed, site-specific--costs and benefits
in setting emission standards for toxic pollutants. 2  Nevertheless, the rule on
low-arsenic copper smelters has the dubious distinction of appearing fifth from
the bottom on Morrall's list.
The rule fares so poorly on the list because, according to Morrall, it costs
$764 million per life saved.247 As noted, however, EPA itself reported that
the rule would require new controls at only one facility, the ASARCO-EI Paso
smelter. For this smelter, EPA estimated the costs to be $1.85 million in
capital costs, leading to $379,000 in annualized costs.2 "4 EPA also estimated
that the rule would save .09 lives per year249-or approximately one life
every eleven years. Using rough calculations, this amounts to approximately
$4,169,000 per life saved in the first eleven years of the rule's operation. "
Thus, using EPA's estimates of risks and costs, the costs per life saved of this
regulation are more than two orders of magnitude below those reported by
Morrall. This difference must be due entirely to discounting, as Morrall's
245. Id. at 27,975.
246. See OMB Position, supra note 160, at 1600. In effect, therefore, the costs reported for this
regulation-like those reported for the rejected acrylonitrile standard previously discussed. see supru
Subsection II.A.I.d; supra note 160--are incremental costs.
247. See Morrall. supra note I, at 30 tbl.4.
248. See Standards for Inorganic Arsenic, 51 Fed. Reg. at 27.97 1.
249. See id. at 27,970 (reporting that the annual cancer incidence would be reduced from .38 to .29
cases per year--thus saving .09 lives annually).
250. To arrive at this figure, I multiplied EPA's estimate of annualized costs (S379.000) by I I (as the
rule would save one life approximately every II years).
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estimate of 0.9 annual lives saved is identical to EPA's,25' and he did not
adjust the agency's estimate of compliance costs.2s2
c. Arsenic and Glass Manufacturing Plants (EPA 1986)
EPA's 1986 rule pertaining to arsenic emissions also deals with glass
manufacturing plants that use commercial arsenic as a raw material.-"
Among other things, the rule requires existing glass plants to limit their
emissions of arsenic to 2.75 tons per year, or, in the alternative, to reduce
emissions by at least 85%. 254 At the time the rule was promulgated, the
agency reported that there were a total of seventy-five glass furnaces, at
twenty-seven different plants, which used arsenic as a raw material." The
agency also noted, however, that nearly 80% of the total arsenic emissions in
the country at that time came from just eleven uncontrolled furnaces at five
separate plants 56 The agency eventually focused on six glass plants, which
together were responsible for 90% of the emissions and their corresponding
risks. 57 The agency found that requiring further controls at the other existing
glass plants would impose "excessive" costs in relation to the small risks that
would be avoided2 58 Even among the six highest-polluting plants, however,
the agency ultimately concluded that further controls were warranted at only
two of them. The agency explained its decision as follows:
Based on a consideration of these risk and cost data, it was concluded
that further control should be required at the Martinsburg and
Charleroi plants. However, at the other four plants where risk and
achievable risk reduction potential are lower, it was concluded that
further control is not necessary, and if required, would impose costs
which are disproportionately high compared to the benefits of
reducing the estimated current risks.259
251. See Morrall, supra note 1, at 30 tbl.4.
252. It is also worth noting that before Morrall prepared his 1986 table on regulatory costs and before
EPA issued a final standard on low-arsenic copper smelters, OMB had expressed its opinion on the
proposed standard. OMB estimated that regulating arsenic emissions at the ASARCO-EI Paso facility-the
only facility regulated by the standard that appears on Morrall's list-would cost $7 million per fatal cancer
prevented, a figure two orders of magnitude below Morrall's own estimate. See OMB Position, supra note
160, at 1600 tbl.V.
253. See Standards for Inorganic Arsenic, 51 Fed. Reg. at 27,959. I refer throughout to the
"arsenic/glass plant" rule. As noted above, see supra Subsection II.A.2.c, Morrall also lists a 1986 EPA
rule, "arsenic/glass manufacturing," which he reports as rejected. There was only one 1986 rule regarding
arsenic emissions from glass (manufacturing) plants, however, and this was the final rule discussed in the
text. See supra Subsection II.A.2.c.
254. See Standards for Inorganic Arsenic, 51 Fed. Reg. at 27,959.
255. See id. at 27,993.
256. See id.
257. See id at 27,995.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 27,997.
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EPA wrote the new emission standard in such a way that, in practice, it would
apply to only the two plants-in Martinsburg and Charleroi-at which it found
that emission controls would be cost-justified. EPA expressed some concern
that requiring controls at the Charleroi plant would lead the plant to close but
noted that representatives of the plant had stated that they planned to
discontinue producing arsenic-containing glass.260
Thus, based on an analysis of risks, costs, and technological feasibility,
EPA ultimately (again) produced a nationwide emissions standard that in
practice required controls at only one facility in the country.2' If one were
to review only EPA's explanation of its new standard and of its rejection of
further controls, one would be likely to conclude that this explanation reflects
exactly the kind of analysis the regulatory reformers want to precede regulatory
decisions-an analysis sensitive to site-specific costs, to technological
constraints, and to the relationship between costs imposed and benefits
produced.2
Despite this attention to costs and benefits, Morrall reports that the rule
still ended up costing $19.2 million per life saved. 3 Many observers have
placed this rule in the "failing" portion of Morrall's list because they regard
$19 million as too much to spend to save a life.26 Again, however, this
estimate departs notably from the agency's. Morrall reports that the rule
responded to an initial annual risk of 8 in 10,000 and that it would save 0.11
lives per year.265 EPA reported identical risk estimates for the Martinsburg
glass plant (the only plant expected to implement new controls as a result of
the rule).' EPA also reported that the costs of controlling arsenic emissions
at this plant would amount to $533,000 in annualized costs. 67 Multiplying
these annualized costs by nine (to arrive at the costs associated with saving one
life in nine years) results in a cost per life saved of approximately
$4,797,000,' 6' a number far below the $19.2 million per life saved that
Morrall reports. Again, therefore, discounting appears to play a critical role in
Morrall's estimates of costs per life saved.
260. See id.
261. Again, therefore, the costs reported in Morrall's table are effectively incremental costs.
262. OMB during the Reagan years suggested this approach. See supra note 246 and accompanying
text.
263. See Morrall, supra note 1, at 30 tbl.4.
264. See, e.g., Viscusi, supra note 2. at 264 tbl. 14-5; Lutter & Morrall, supra note 2, at 59; Sunstein.
Health-Health Tradeoffs, supra note 2, at 1547-48 tbl.2.
265. See Morrall, supra note 1, at 30 tbl.4.
266. See National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Standards for Inorganic Arsenic.
51 Fed. Reg. 27,956, 27,996 tbl.IV-4 (1980) (to be codified at 40 C.FR. pt. 61) (estimating the initial
annual risk as 8 in 10,000 and the number of lives saved per year as 0.11).
267. See id. at 27,995 tbl.IV-3.
268. As just noted, both Morrall and EPA estimated that the rule will save 0.11 lives per year. This
is the same as estimating that one life will be saved every nine years. at an annualized cost of 5533.000.
Multiplying S533,000 by nine yields a cost per life saved of 4,797.000.
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d. Asbestos (OSHA 1986)
In 1986, OSHA tightened the standards for workplace exposure to asbestos
that it had set in 1972.269 Morrall estimated that the 1986 rule on asbestos
would save 74.70 lives per year, at a cost of $89.3 million apiece.27 OSHA
calculated that the rule would save 74.72 lives per year from cancer alone at
a cost of $6.09 million apiece.27 This figure does not include the noncancer
illnesses prevented by the rule, such as asbestosis, or the rule's prevention of
disease in groups indirectly exposed to asbestos.27 Since Morrall did not
adjust the agency's cost estimates, and since Morrall's and OSHA's estimates
of annual lives saved are virtually identical, the difference in estimates of costs
per life saved can, again, only be attributable to discounting.273
e. Summary
In each of these cases, a great discrepancy exists between the agency's
estimate of costs per life saved and Morrall's. The difference is caused not by
different predictions regarding the compliance costs of, or risks avoided by, the
rule but instead stems from Morrall's decision to discount future lives saved
by ten percent per year. Leaving aside for now whether this decision is
justifiable,274 we have seen that it profoundly affects estimates of regulatory
cost-effectiveness. 2
75
269. See Occupational Exposure to Asbestos, Tremolite, Anthophyllite, and Actinolite, 51 Fed. Reg.
22,612 (1986) (to be codified at 29 C.FR. pts. 1910, 1926). For a discussion of OSHA's 1972 rule on
asbestos, see supra Subsection II.B.1 .a.
270. See Morrall, supra note 1, at 30 tbl.4.
271. See Occupational Exposure to Asbestos, Tremolite, Anthophyllite, and Actinolite, 51 Fed. Reg.
at 22,666 tbl.25 (stating an expectation to save 74.72 lives per year at a net cost of $455.2 million per
year). The figure in the text was determined by dividing $455.2 million by 74.72, resulting in a cost
estimate of $6.09 million per life saved.
272. See id. at 22,666.
273. In a 1994 update to his 1986 table, Morrall reports that OSHA's 1986 asbestos regulation cost
$2.8 million per life saved, reflecting a decrease of more than $85 million from the 1986 list. See Lutter
& Morrall, supra note 2, at 59 tbl.6. In his article containing the updated table, Morrall does not discuss
this change. He has told me, however, that he lowered the estimate of costs per life saved on the basis of
new epidemiological studies, which concluded that the risks from asbestos were higher than had been
previously estimated. Telephone Interview with John F Morrall 11, Chief, Human Resources and Housing
Branch, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget (July 17, 1997).
Perhaps this also explains why Morrall's estimate of the costs per life saved of EPA's 1986 asbestos ban
dropped from $104.2 million in 1986 to $72.9 million in his updated 1994 table. Compare Mormll, supra
note I, at 30 tbl.4, with Lutter & Morrall, supra note 2, at 59 tbl.6.
274. See infra Subsection III.A.l for a discussion of this issue.
275. It is thus not surprising that Robert Hahn's recent effort to identify the costs per life saved of
various federal regulations reports results similar to Morrall's, as Hahn's figures, too, reflect discounting
of future benefits. See Robert W. Hahn, Regulatory Reform: What Do the Government's Numbers Tell Us?,
in RisKs, COSTS, AND LivEs SAVED 208, 248 n.41 (Robert W. Hahn ed., 1996).
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2. Estimating Risks
In several cases, Morrall not only discounted future lives but also
adjusted-inevitably downward-the agencies' estimates of actual risk. In this
subsection, I discuss the rules whose cost profiles were affected by Morrall's
new risk estimates, again focusing on the bottom half of the list. Because the
quantified benefits of these rules were dominated by the prevention of
cancer 276 -a benefit presumed to occur in the future rather than
immediately-Morrall's estimates of the costs per life saved by these
regulations were, like the estimates discussed in the preceding section, greatly
increased by his application of a ten percent annual discount rate to the
agencies' estimates of the number of lives saved. As to this group of rules,
however, Morrall's cost estimates were also increased due to his use of risk
estimates very different from those the agencies used.
2
"
a. Formaldehyde (OSHA 1985)
In 1985, OSHA proposed a rule limiting occupational exposure to
formaldehyde. 278 Among other things, the agency proposed a PEL of 1.0
ppm.2 79 This regulation was proposed at the time Morrall compiled his
original list; it became final in 1987.2 OSHA estimated that its final
regulation would cost a total of $64.2 million per year.2' For the industries
in which existing exposures to formaldehyde were above the proposed limits,
OSHA estimated that the annualized cost of the rule would be $28.9
million.z 2 The agency also estimated, "for illustrative purposes," that, in the
industries just mentioned, the regulation would save between 6.5 and 47.5 lives
that would have been lost to cancer over a forty-five-year exposure period.8 3
Finally, the agency reported that the rule would produce annual monetary
276. Indeed, the quantified life-saving benefits of all but two of the rules discussed n this subsection
include only the prevention of human cancer. The exceptions are EPA's land disposal ban. see Hazardous
Waste Management System: Land Disposal Restrictions, 51 Fed. Reg. 44,714.44.738 (1986) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. pts. 260-62, 264-65, 268, 270-71) (proposed Dec. II. 1986). and OSHA's benzene rule, see
Occupational Exposure to Benzene, 50 Fed. Reg. 50,512, 50.541 (1985) (to be codified at 29 C.FR. pt.
1910) (proposed Dec. 10, 1985).
277. See also supra note 163 (discussing the large disparities between Morrall's and OSHAs estimates
of risks from EDB).
278. See Occupational Exposure to Formaldehyde. 50 Fed. Reg. 50.412 (1985) (to be codified at 29
C.F.R. pt. 1910) (proposed Dec. 10, 1985).
279. See id.
280. See Occupational Exposure to Formaldehyde, 52 Fed. Reg. 46.168 (1987) (codified at 29 C.FR.
pts. 1910, 1926).
281. See id. at 46,241.
282. See id. at 46,238.
283. Id. at 46,241. This estimate differs only slightly from OSHA' estimate at the time the rule was
proposed that the rule would prevent from 6 to 52 cases of cancer. See Occupational Exposure to
Formaldehyde, 50 Fed. Reg. at 50,464.
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benefits of approximately $41.2 million (reflecting cost savings due to avoided
cases of respiratory irritation and dermatitis).2s4
Thus, based on OSHA's figures, the final rule cost approximately $21.8
to $159.1 million per quantified cancer case avoided. 85 Morrall, for his part,
asserts that the proposed rule cost a stunning $72 billion per life saved." 6 I
first attempt to explain the basis for Morrall's estimates of the cost per life
saved of this rule and then offer a critical perspective on the agency's own
estimates.
What accounts for the large difference between OSHA's and Morrall's
estimates of costs per life saved? A large part of the difference must be due
to discounting. But in this case, differing estimates of risk also explain some
part of the difference. Whereas OSHA estimated that at least six and possibly
as many as forty-seven lives (or about one life, on average, per year) would
be saved due to the rule over a forty-five year period, Morrall concludes that
the rule would save only one life in 100 years. 7 Morrall does not explain
how he arrived at an estimate of risk so different from the agency's, other than
to say that on several occasions he adopted estimates that "appeared to reflect
prevailing scientific views more accurately than the agency estimate."' 88
There is good reason to believe, however, that Morrall's estimates of risks
and costs came straight from OMB's controversial review of the formaldehyde
rule. In evaluating the rule, three OMB economists took issue with the risk
assessment performed by OSHA's scientific team (which included an
epidemiologist, a toxicologist, an industrial hygienist, and a biochemist). Using
different statistical methods from OSHA, the OMB economists concluded that
formaldehyde was merely an "irritant" and that OSHA's rule would cost $72
billion per life saved-the same figure used by Morrall.289 As one critic of
OMB's review put it: "I am not aware that OMB has expertise in biology,
epidemiology and toxicology, which are necessary for risk assessments.' '2 °
284. See Occupational Exposure to Formaldehyde, 52 Fed. Reg. at 46,241-42.
285. These figures were derived by first subtracting total annual monetized benefits ($41.2 million)
from total annual costs ($64.2 million), to reach a net annual cost of $23 million; the latter figure was
multiplied by 45 (to account for the 45-year study period), and divided by the estimated number of lives
saved (6.5 or 47.5). Note that my assumption that this rule will continue to impose onerous costs for 45
years probably greatly overstates the costs of the rule, as the engineering controls used to comply with the
rule likely will have been installed within the first few years of the rule's operation.
286. See Morrall, supra note I, at 30 tbl.4. Updated versions of Morrall's list refer to OSHA's final
rule and report that the rule cost more than $86 billion per life saved (in 1990 dollars). See, e.g., BRYER,
supra note 2, at 26-27 tbl.5.
287. He reports that there are 0.01 lives saved annually by the rule. See Morrall, supra note I, at 30
tbl.4.
288. Id. at 28-29. Morrall's very high estimate of the costs per life saved of this rule is also due in
part to the fact that his estimate reflects incremental costs rather than average costs. Telephone Interview
with John F. Morrall III, supra note 273; see also supra note 160 (discussing the relationship between
incremental and average costs).
289. See Judith Havemann, Assessed Cancer Risk Is Inflated, OMB Says Regulatory Agencies May Get
Guidelines, WASH. POST, July 13, 1986, at A8.
290. Id. (quoting Dr. Frederica Perera, then-Assistant Professor of Public Health, Columbia University).
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The deputy director of OSHA's Health Standards Directorate later testified
about his experience dealing with OMB:
[T]he comments we get from the economists at OMB are so
ridiculous that they actually become funny.... An example is that
Dr. Infante and Dr. Rodgers and I met with two economists from
OMB and discussed the health hazards of formaldehyde with them,
and they adamantly argued with us about the toxicity of
formaldehyde. Dr. Infante had to give them an epidemiology lesson,
and Dr. Rodgers had to give them a toxicology lesson, and I had to
describe how to do risk assessments for them.-9'
Morrall's deflation of OSHA's estimate of the risks of formaldehyde is all
the more striking when one considers the evidence that even OSHA's estimate
of risk was too low. OSHA was dragged kicking and screaming through every
step of the formaldehyde rulemaking.292 When, in the middle of this process,
new studies appeared that indicated that formaldehyde posed higher risks than
had been previously estimated,293 OSHA effectively neutralized the studies'
impact by departing from usual practice and presenting a range of risk
estimates rather than "best estimates." 2' In another break from usual
practice, OSHA also relied most heavily on a risk estimate that incorporated
a nonlinear dose-response relationship at low exposures, notwithstanding the
fact that the agency had acknowledged that use of a linear dose-response curve
was appropriate when synergistic effects were suspected and that formaldehyde
might act synergistically with other chemicals in causing cancer. '95 The D.C.
Circuit ultimately overturned the rule on this basis, concluding that although
"OSHA acknowledged the truth of facts that appear[ed] to compel it to assume
linearity at low doses in its risk assessments," it then either "discard[ed] the
resulting estimates or at least [gave] them comparatively scant weight." 29
OSHA derived its highest estimate of lives saved-47.5, over a forty-five
year period-by using a linear dose-response curve..2 97 Use of this curve was,
291. Oversight of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration: Hearings Before the Comm. on
Labor and Human Resources, 100th Cong. 513-14 (1988) (statement of John Martonik, Deputy Director.
Health Standards Directorate, Occupational Safety & Health Admin.); see also MCGARrIY & SHAPIRO.
supra note 91, at 110.
292. See McGARrrY & SHAPIRO, supra note 91, at 87-89, 108-1I. 159-61.
293. See id. at 109-10.
294. Id. at 110.
295. See International Union, UAW v. Pendergrass, 878 F.2d 389, 395 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
296. Id. at 396. The court remanded the case to the agency for either a better explanation or a new
risk estimate. On remand, OSHA lowered the exposure limit it had initially proposed to 0.75 ppm. See
Occupational Exposure to Formaldehyde, 57 Fed. Reg. 22.290. 22.290 (1992) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R.
1910). It stated that it was unable to quantify the difference in risk posed by the 1.0 ppm standard and the
0.75 ppm standard but explained that the lower standard was chosen in order to ensure safety. See id. at
22,305.
297. See Occupational Exposure to Formaldehyde. 52 Fed. Reg. 46.168, 46,242 tbl.8 (1987) (codified
at 29 C.F.R. pts. 1910, 1926). This estimate is based on the assumption of lineanty at low doses. See
Pendergrass, 878 F.2d at 395.
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as just noted, consistent with the agency's acknowledgement of formaldehyde's
synergistic potential. Thus, the agency's highest estimate of lives saved appears
to be more reliable than the lowest estimate, given all the facts. This, in turn,
implies that the low estimate of cost, $21.8 million per life saved, is closer to
the mark than the high estimate, $159.1 million per life saved. Recall, too, that
OSHA's estimate of the lives saved by the rule pertained only to the industries
where formaldehyde exposures exceeded the exposures allowed by the new
standard.298 The annualized costs of compliance for these industries were
estimated to be $28.9 million, or less than half the total annualized costs of the
rule.299 If one assumed that most of the monetized annual benefits of the rule
($41.2 million in cost savings due to avoided cases of respiratory irritation and
dermatitis)3°° were from these industries, where exposures were highest, then
one could report that this rule saved workers in these industries from cancer
at a negative net cost. This would be a misleadingly positive account of the
rule, however, given that the rule also imposed over $30 million in annual
costs on other industries, for an uncertain, and perhaps trivial, life-saving
return.
b. Land Disposal (EPA 1986)
By the early 1980s, federal laws were in place that limited the discharge
of pollution into the air and water.30' Some of these restrictions had worked
in part by simply shifting pollution from these media onto the land. It had also
become clear by this time that all landfills, however well designed, would
eventually leak,30 2 and early experience with the Superfund law30 3 had
begun to reveal how expensive and time-consuming the cleanup of
contaminated land would be.
In recognition of these facts, Congress in 1984 severely limited the
disposal on land of hazardous wastes.3t 4 Known as the "land disposal ban,"
the legislation required that hazardous waste be treated prior to land disposal
or that there be a showing that the waste, if disposed of on land, would not
migrate during the period it remained hazardous. 35 The law directed EPA
298. See supra text accompanying notes 282-283.
299. See Occupational Exposure to Formaldehyde, 52 Fed. Reg. at 46,238 tbl.6 (breaking down
compliance costs by industry).
300. See id. at 46,241-42.
301. These laws included, most prominently, the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1994), and
the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
302. See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 72, at 265.
303. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability (Superfund) Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9675.
304. See Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6924).
305. See 42 U.S.C. § 6924(d)(1), (e)(1), (g)(5), (m).
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to promulgate rules implementing these requirements in stages.' One of
EPA's sets of proposed regulations implementing the land disposal restrictions
is the 1986 "land disposal" regulation appearing on Morrall's list.0 This
regulation applied to the so-called "California List" wastes, which included
such hazardous wastes as polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), cyanides, certain
highly corrosive wastes, and wastes containing metals (such as arsenic, lead,
and mercury) above a specified concentration.N
Morrall reports that this regulation saves 2.5 lives annually at a cost of
$3.5 billion per life saved.30 These figures differ dramatically from those
offered by EPA in support of its proposed rule. The agency estimated that the
annualized costs of the rule would be approximately $97 million. 310 The
agency also estimated that the rule would, over seventy years, prevent
approximately 2853 "weighted cases" of cancer, fetal toxicity, decreases in
reproductive capacity, and other adverse health effects. 31' The rule would
thus prevent about forty-one cases of adverse human health effects per year,
at a cost of $2.38 million per case avoided. 3'2 Even taking into account the
fact that some of the adverse health effects prevented by the rule are nonfatal,
there is a vast spread between Morrall's risk estimates and the agency's.
Indeed, given that Morrall himself concludes that the rule will save 2.5 lives
annually, given his practice of accepting agency cost estimates without
adjustment, and given the fact that the agency estimated the costs of this rule
to be $97 million per year, it is difficult to imagine how Morrall came up with
a figure of $3.5 billion per life saved. Certainly, however, a large part-if not
all-of the spread between Morrall's estimates and the agency's estimates
results from the combined effect of Morrall's lower risk estimates and his
discounting of lives saved.313
306. See id. § 6924(d), (e), (g).
307. See Hazardous Waste Management System: Land Disposal Restricions, 51 Fd. Reg. 44.714
(1986) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 260-62, 264-65, 268. 270-71) (proposed Dec. II, 1986).
308. See id. at 44,715. These were called 'California List" wastes because California had regulated
them and in so doing had determined the concentrations at which they could be safely disposed of on land.
See Land Disposal Restrictions for Certain "California List" Hazardous Wastes and Modifications to the
Framework, 52 Fed. Reg. 25,760, 25,761 (1987) (to be codified at 40 C.ER. pts. 260-62. 264-65. 268. 270-
71).
309. See Morrall, supra note I, at 30 tbl.4.
310. See Hazardous Waste Management System: Land Disposal Restrctions. 51 Fed. Reg at 44,737.
311. Id at 44,738. These estimates did not include adverse environmental effects avoided by the rule.
See id. at 44,737-38.
312. See id. at 44,738.
313. Although only a proposal at the time Morrall prepared his initial list, the land disposal rule is now
final. See Land Disposal Restrictions for Certain "California List" Hazardous wastes. 52 Fed. Reg. 25.760
(1987) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 260-61, 262, 265, 268, 270-71). A challenge to the rule, brought
by the Hazardous Waste Treatment Council, was dismissed for want of standing. See Hazardous Waste
Treatment Council v. Thomas. 885 F.2d 918, 927 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
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c. Uranium Mill Tailings (EPA 1983)
In response to the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act of
1978,314 EPA issued rules providing for the stabilization, control, and cleanup
of radioactive materials at active and inactive uranium processing sites.
315
Uranium tailings piles are hazardous primarily because they create a risk of
lung cancer (the tailings contain radium, which produces radon, which is a
human carcinogen), and the hazard is long-lived: The radium in uranium
tailings piles will take several hundred thousand years to decay to about ten
percent of current levels.3t6
The uranium tailings statute does not give specific guidance as to the level
of cleanup to be achieved. EPA decided to make it the agency's
objective to establish standards that take account of the tradeoffs
between costs and benefits in a way that assures adequate protection
of the public health, safety, and the environment; that can be
implemented using presently available techniques and measuring
instruments; and that are reasonable in terms of overall costs and
benefits. 7
Though the agency decided to set standards based on the relationship between
costs and benefits, it acknowledged that a formal cost-benefit analysis was
impossible in this context:
It was not possible to carry out a formal quantitative cost-benefit
analysis to reach these conclusions. Many of the hazards reduced (or
avoided) through application of alternative standards can neither be
evaluated quantitatively nor restated in terms of a common index of
value. The major hazard, the extent of possible future misuse of
tailings by man, is almost impossible to quantify. A further
complication is that the benefits of successful control accrue over a
very long period of time, whereas the costs occur now. We can only
roughly estimate how long control will last and how many cases of
lung cancer might be avoided over the full term of effective
control.3t8
314. Pub. L. No. 95-604, 92 Stat. 3021 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
315. See Environmental Standards for Uranium and Thorium Mill Tailings at Licensed Commercial
Processing Sites, 48 Fed. Reg. 45,926 (1983) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 192).
316. See id. at 45,927-28.
317. Standards for Remedial Actions at Inactive Uranium Processing Sites, 48 Fed. Reg. 590, 590
(1983) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 192).
318. Environmental Standards for Uranium and Thorium Mill Tailings at Licensed Commercial
Processing Sites, 48 Fed. Reg. 19,584, 19,596-97 (1983) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 192) (proposed
Apr. 29, 1983).
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Despite these caveats, the agency did provide some rough numerical
estimates of the costs and benefits of its rules. With respect to tailings at active
uranium processing sites, the agency estimated that, without the rule, the
tailings at all piles in existence at the time of the final rule would cause about
500 deaths from lung cancer over the course of a century.3'9 The agency
predicted that additional tailings would raise the total number of deaths per
century to about 600 by the year 2000.320 EPA estimated total compliance
costs of about $260 million for all tailings in existence at the time of the final
rule or $310 million to $540 million for tailings projected to be generated by
the year 2000.321 These estimates included costs borne as a result of other
regulations and thus reflected "the upper bounds of cost and economic impact
imposed by these standards. '322 The combination of risks and costs for
tailings existing in 1983 (when the final rule was issued) yields a very rough
estimate of approximately $520,000 per life saved. EPA itself estimated that
the costs per life saved, calculated only regionally and only over the next
century, was $2.5 million. 23 This number dropped to $130,000 per life saved
if nationwide benefits, for 1000 years, were taken into account. 324
Morrall reports that this regulation saves 2.1 lives per year at a cost of $53
million per life saved.325 His figure on annual lives saved is less than half
of EPA's, whose estimate of 500 lives saved in the first century translates to
an average of five lives saved per year. Once again, then, Morrall's reporting
of substantially higher-100 times higher--costs per life saved than the
agency's (implicit) estimate must be attributed to a combination of different
risk estimates and discounting.
With respect to the rule pertaining to tailings at inactive uranium
processing sites, 326 EPA again cautioned that a formal cost-benefit analysis
was impossible in this context, given the uncertainties and lengthy periods of
time involved in the rulemaking.32 7 Nevertheless, the agency did offer some
rough estimates of costs and benefits. The agency estimated that its rule would
save 200 lives over the course of a century, at a total cost of approximately
$314 million.328 This amounts to a cost of about $1.57 million per life saved
during the first century of the rule's effects. As the agency noted, however, the
319. See Environmental Standards for Uranium and Thonum Mill Tailings at lUccnscd Commercial
Processing Sites. 48 Fed. Reg. at 45,929.
320. See id.
321. See id. at 45,945.
322. Id.
323. See id. at 45,944-45.
324. See id.
325. See Morrall, supra note 1, at 30 tbl.4.
326. See Standards for Remedial Actions at Inactive Uranium Processing Sites, 48 Fed. Reg. 590
(1983) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 192).
327. See id. at 596.
328. See id. at 596-97.
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rule would also prevent "a total of many thousands" of deaths over the life of
the control system required by the rule.329
Morrall reports that this regulation saves 2.1 lives per year at a cost of
$27.6 million per life saved. 330 His figure on annual lives saved is very
similar to EPA's, whose estimate of 200 lives saved in the first century
translates to an average of two lives saved per year. Morrall's reporting of a
substantially higher-twenty times higher-cost per life saved than the
agency's (implicit) estimate must be attributed again to a combination of
different risk estimates and discounting. Given the closeness of Morrall's risk
estimates and those of the agency, however, the difference in cost estimates
must in this case be due almost entirely to discounting.
d. Coke Ovens (OSHA 1976)
Citing a "significant risk of cancer to the exposed working population,"
OSHA in 1976 regulated emissions from coke ovens. 331 Because this rule
was issued before OSHA began quantifying the lives that would be saved by
its health regulations, 332 it is not possible to compare Morrall's 1986
estimates of risks and costs with the agency's. In 1983, however, Broder and
Morrall estimated that this rule would save 35.4 lives per year at a cost of $4.5
million per life saved.333 In 1986, Morrall figured the same rule would save
thirty-one lives per year at a cost of $61.8 million per life saved a.31 Some of
the difference in cost estimates is attributable to the different estimates of lives
saved (35.4 versus 31), but this difference (amounting to less than one-tenth
of the earlier estimate of lives saved) cannot explain the more than ten-fold
difference in costs cited by the two sources. Discounting appears mostly
responsible for the fantastic cost estimates cited by Morrall in 1986, as
compared to the estimates Broder and Morrall reported in 1983.
The 1983 estimate that the coke oven rule would save 35.4 lives, at a cost
of $4.5 million each, appears to have been drawn directly from Morrall's 1976
statement in opposition to OSHA's proposed rule, offered on behalf of
COWPS.33 5 In that statement, Morrall chided OSHA for refusing to engage
in cost-benefit analysis and for refusing to assign a dollar value to human
life.336 He suggested that a more sensible way of reducing risks from coke
329. Id. at 597.
330. See Morrall, supra note 1, at 30 tbl.4.
331. Exposure to Coke Oven Emissions, 41 Fed. Reg. 46,742 (1976) (to be codified at 29 C.FR. pt.
1910). OSHA also cited evidence that coke oven emissions were associated with nonmalignant respiratory
diseases such as bronchitis, emphysema, and pneumoconiosis. See id. at 46,744, 46,748.
332. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
333. See Broder & Morrall, supra note 91, at 250 tbl.15.2.
334. See Morrall, supra note 1, at 30 tbl.4.
335. See Exposure to Coke Oven Emissions, supra note 213, at 10-12.
336. See id. at 5-6.
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oven emissions might be simply to "rotate out" workers after five years on the
job.337 He estimated that OSHA's proposed rule would save from eight to
thirty-five lives each year, at a cost of $4.5 million to $158 million apiece. 338
In an article written in 1978, he opined that the same rule would cost from $9
million to $48 million per life saved, depending on which risk estimate was
used.339
Morrall's various estimates of the risk of coke oven emissions differ
dramatically from some of the estimates that emerged during OSHA's
rulemaking. In its explanation of the final standard, OSHA observed that the
rulemaking record contained widely varying estimates of the number of lives
that would be saved every year by the rule."' These included COWPS's
estimate that the rule would save between eight and thirty-five lives per year,
and the very different estimate, contained in the Inflation Impact Statement
(IIS), of 240 lives saved yearly by the rule."' OSHA took issue with some
of the assumptions of COWPS's analysis; in particular, it noted that COWPS
had underestimated the exposed population by approximately forty percent and
had used a risk factor for coke oven workers that actually reflected the (lower)
risk factor for coke plant workers.' 2 As for the IIS estimate, OSHA noted
that if one accounted for likely deaths from competing causes over the
assumed period of exposure, the US estimate of lives saved would drop to
211. 34' The IIS's estimate of 240 lives saved, even adjusted downward to
211 as OSHA suggested, is much higher than Morrall's 1986 estimate of 31
annual lives saved.34 If one accepted the adjusted IIS figure of 211 annual
lives saved and COWPS's "best guess" of around $200 million in annual
costs,345 the cost per life saved of this regulation would be less than $1
million-or over $60 million less per life saved than Morrall estimated in
1986.
It is worth stressing that OSHA itself did not believe it was capable of
providing a meaningful estimate of the number of lives that would be saved
by this regulation. OSHA could not say, for example, whether the new
standard would eliminate all mortality from coke oven emissions; 6 it could
not quantify the decreases in mortality that would result indirectly from the
337. Id. at 8, 12.
338. See id. at tbl.D.
339. See John F. Morrall III, OSHA and U.S. Industry, ti ECONOMIC EIFEc-rs OF GovnE.R..Ns'-r.
MANDATED CosTS 70, 77 n.35 (Robert F. Lanzillotti ed., 1978).
340. See Exposure to Coke Oven Emissions, 41 Fed. Reg. 46,742. 46.750 (1976) (to be codified at




344. The upper limit of COWPS's range of estimates is, however, virtually the same number (35) as
that reported by Broder and Morrall in 1983 (35.4). See Broder & Morrall, supra note 91. at 250 tbl.15.2.
345. Exposure to Coke Oven Emissions, 41 Fed. Reg. at 46,749.
346. See id. at 46,750.
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rule (such as those caused by increased medical surveillance and improved
hygiene facilities);347 and it could not quantify the lives saved in the general
population in surrounding communities due to the new rule. 48 Moreover, the
agency believed that the task of quantifying the benefits of the rule was greatly
complicated by the long latency periods involved in the occupational health
hazards (such as cancer) associated with coke oven emissions.39 On the last
point, OSHA concluded that,
unless exposures are reduced now, we believe the mortality rate will
not decline, and coke oven workers will continue to suffer the excess
mortality of the past. In our view, the final rule provides immediate
benefits relating to mortality by protecting employees today so that
their mortality will be significantly reduced in the future.35
And, pressed by COWPS to identify the monetary value of a human life,
OSHA demurred: "[T]here are so many difficulties involved in attempting to
assign a dollar value to the benefits of the standard that such figures would not
provide a meaningful indication of the true value of the standard. 35
e. Ethylene Oxide (OSHA 1984)
At the time of the rule limiting ethylene oxide (EtO) exposure in the
workplace,352 EtO was one of the twenty-five most common chemicals in the
United States. 53 OSHA's rule established a PEL for EtO of 1.0 ppm,
following a determination, "based on animal and human data, that exposure to
EtO presents a carcinogenic, mutagenic, genotoxic, reproductive, neurologic
and sensitization hazard to workers. 354 In determining the cancer risks posed
by EtO, OSHA relied on three epidemiological studies in populations of
workers exposed to EtO and on two studies showing carcinogenic effects in
rats and monkeys.355 One of the rat studies supplied the experimental
database for OSHA's quantitative risk assessment (that is, the numerical
estimates of lives saved by the rule were derived by applying an extrapolation
model to the data from this study). 6
347. See id.
348. See id. at 46,751.
349. See id. at 46,750.
350. Id. at 46,750-51.
351. Id. at 46,750.
352. See Occupational Exposure to Ethylene Oxide, 49 Fed. Reg. 25,734 (1984) (to be codifled at 29
C.F.R. pt. 1910).
353. See id. at 25,734.
354. Id.
355. See id. at 25,740-42.
356. See Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Tyson, 796 F.2d 1479, 1496 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
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In estimating the costs per life saved of this rule, Morrall reports that he
chose to rely on EPA's estimates of risk instead of on OSHA's because EPA's
were based on epidemiological data rather than on animal studies. 357 This
choice likely made a significant difference in Morrall's estimates of costs per
life saved. Before comparing Morrall's estimates of risk with OSHA's,
however, it is worth pausing over the oddity of Morrall's suggestion that only
the epidemiological studies were reliable in this case. The validity of, and
conclusions to be drawn from, these studies were hotly contested in OSHA's
rulemaking proceedings. The author of one of the studies testified that his
study should be regarded as negative evidence of EtO's carcinogenicity.
35s
Others testified that this study was inconclusive rather than negative as to
leukemia risk but that it clearly showed a connection between EtO and other
cancers (pancreatic cancer and Hodgkin's disease). 359 As for the other
epidemiological studies, some commentators thought that they overstated risk
because the workers in the studies were exposed to other chemicals in addition
to EtO or that they were invalid because of their small sample size.36
Despite these criticisms, OSHA found that the epidemiological evidence,
"although not by itself conclusive, [was] supportive of EtO's potential
carcinogenic ... effects.
Moreover, in line with a large scientific consensus that the results of
animal studies are scientifically reliable indicators of risks to human
health,362 OSHA also relied on the studies in experimental animals showing
increased cancer risks from EtO. Its ultimate judgment was based on an
assessment of all the evidence on the health risks of EtO, evidence from both
human and animal studies.363
Thus, in implying that only the human epidemiological studies in this case
were worthy of consideration, Morrall chose studies that the agency itself
admitted were methodologically flawed and suggestive rather than probative
of cancer risks. In discarding the results of the animal studies, Morrall-an
economist, not a scientist-also appears to have dismissed the vast scientific
357. See Morrall, supra note 1, at 29.
358. See Public Citizen Health Research Group, 796 F.2d at 1487.
359. See id.
360. See id.
361. Occupational Exposure to Ethylene Oxide, 49 Fed. Reg. 25.734. 25.740 (1984) (to be codified
at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910).
362. For a general discussion of the relevance of animal studies to regulatory dccisionmaking. see, for
example, Proposed Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment. 61 Fed. Reg. 17.960. 17.967
(Environmental Protection Agency 1986) (proposed Apr. 23. 1996).
363. In upholding OSHA's long-term exposure limit for ethylene oxide, the D.C. Circuit concluded
that OSHA's findings on risk-including those based on animal studies-were "ba.sed on evidence
submitted by a significant portion of the scientific community." Public Citizen Health Research Group. 796
F.2d at 1501.
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consensus that cancer risks in animals are relevant to determining cancer risks
in humans, even where epidemiological studies are available.
364
Strangest of all, EPA itself relied on animal studies in assessing the risks
of ethylene oxide. The agency criticized the human epidemiological studies
available for ethylene oxide, 365 and its quantitative estimates of the
incremental risks of ethylene oxide were based exclusively on animal
studies.36 Perhaps not surprisingly, therefore, Morrall's estimate of an
individual risk of 4.4 in 100,000367 does not jibe with EPA's estimates of the
risks of ethylene oxide.368 It remains a mystery why Morrall believes that
EPA relied only on epidemiological studies and also a mystery where he
obtained his figures on the risks of ethylene oxide.
Whatever the source, Morrall estimates that the ethylene oxide rule saves
2.8 lives per year at a cost of $25.6 million apiece.369 OSHA's figures on
risks and costs are very different. OSHA estimated that its standard would
prevent from 457 to 871 excess cases of cancer over a fifty-year period370
at a cost of approximately $35.45 million per year.37t Considering cancer
alone, this works out to a cost per life saved of between $2.03 million and
$3.88 million.372 These estimates are more than $20 million lower than
Morrall's estimates of costs per life saved. Moreover, OSHA did not find that
ethylene oxide posed only a risk of cancer. The agency also concluded that this
chemical posed "a serious and significant risk of adverse health effects going
well beyond those of an excess risk of cancer," such as increased risk of
spontaneous abortion, fetotoxicity, decreased fertility, decreased sperm count
364. For one of many discussions of the difficulties in obtaining adequate epidemiological data, see
COMMITTrEE ON RISK ASSESSMENT OF HAZARDOUS AIR POLLUTANTS, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT IN RISK ASSESSMENT 57-58 (1994)
365. See OFFICE OF HEALTH & ENVTL. ASSESSMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, HEALTH
ASSESSMENT DOCUMENT FOR ETHYLENE OXIDE, FINAL REPORT, No. EPA-600/8-84-009F, at 9-118 to - 136
(1985).
366. See id. at 9-160, 9-168 to -169.
367. See Morrall, supra note 1, at 30 tbl.4.
368. See OFFICE OF HEALTH & ENVTL. ASSESSMENT, supra note 365, at 9-169 (providing the upper-
bound estimates of risks of 3.5 in 10 and I in 10,000, based on different studies).
369. See Morrall, supra note 1, at 30 tbl.4. OMB, in contrast, estimated that the rule cost $60 million
per life saved. See 1986-1987 OMB REPORT, supra note 87, at xxi; 1987-1988 OMB REPORT, supra note
3, at xx. Since both OMB and Morrall used a 10% annual discount rate, and both adjusted OSHA's risk
estimates in determining costs per life saved, see 1987-1988 OMB REPoRT, supra note 3, at xxii, I do not
know why OMB estimated that the rule would cost over twice as much as Morrall estimated. The disparity
is especially curious in light of the fact that the 1987-1988 OMB report cites Morrall's 1986 article. See
1987-1988 OMB REPORT, supra note 3, at xx.
370. See Occupational Exposure to Ethylene Oxide, 49 Fed. Reg. 25,734, 25,768 (1984) (to be
codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910) (stating that the rule would reduce excess cancers from ethylene oxide from
a range of 532 to 1017 to a range of 75 to 146 over the next 50 years-leading to a net savings of 457 to
871 lives).
371. See id. at 25,767.
372. This estimate is based on undiscounted costs. OMB estimated that if costs were discounted but
benefits were not, the ethylene oxide rule would cost between $500,000 and $1 million per life saved. See
1987-1988 OMB REPORT, supra note 3, at xxii.
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and motility, mutagenicity, and chromosomal aberrations.3" The agency
could not, however, quantify these other risks.374 If it could have, the cost
of the rule, in relation to its benefits, would have been even lower. Once again,
a great discrepancy exists between Morrall's calculations and those of the
relevant agency.
f. Benzene (OSHA 1985)
OSHA's benzene rule,3 75 proposed in 1985, was issued on remand from
the decision in Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum
Institute, 76 in which the Supreme Court held that before OSHA issues a new
standard for workplace toxins, the agency must first find that a significant risk
exists, based on quantitative estimates where possible.3" OSHA's proposed
permissible exposure limit after remand was identical to the standard the
Supreme Court invalidated.37
OSHA thought that the 10.0 ppm standard in existence at the time of this
rulemaking led to a leukemia risk of between 44 and 152 in 1000."79 OSHA
noted that other estimates of risk in the record, some falling as low as 9 in
1000, were "based on assumptions which are not well supported."3" The
agency estimated that its regulation would save a total of 822 lives over a
fifty-year period: 571 saved from leukemia and 251 from aplastic anemia." t
The agency stressed, however, that it had not quantified all of the likely
benefits of the rule, including decreases in adverse health conditions other than
leukemia and aplastic anemia and improved health for employees who were
exposed to benzene in circumstances not analyzed in the rulemaking
proceeding.82 OSHA estimated that the annualized costs of the rule would
be about $29 million.383 Considering only the health benefits quantified by
OSHA, the cost per life saved of this rule thus comes to less than $1.8
million.3 4
373. Occupational Exposure to Ethylene Oxide, 49 Fed. Reg. at 25,766.
374. See id.
375. Occupational Exposure to Benzene. 50 Fed. Reg. 50.512 (1985) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt.
1910) (proposed Dec. 10, 1985).
376. 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (plurality opinion).
377. See id. at 642, 652-53.
378. See Occupational Exposure to Benzene, 50 Fed. Reg. at 50.512. 50.515 (stating that both the
invalidated and the proposed PELs were an eight-hour time-weighted average of 1.0 ppm).
379. See id. at 50,538-39.
380. Id. at 50,539.
381. See id. at 50,541. This works out to an average of approximately 16.4 lives saved per year.
382. See id. at 50,529.
383. See id. at 50,543-44.
384. As noted, the agency expected the rule to save 822 lives over a 50-year period at a yearly coat
of $29.04 million.
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Morrall, on the other hand, reports that the initial annual risk from benzene
was 8.8 in 10,000 and that the proposed rule would save 3.8 lives per year at
a cost of $17.1 million apiece.385 The discrepancy between OSHA's and
Morrall's calculations must be attributable both to discounting and to Morrall's
use of substantially lower estimates of risk.
Updated versions of Morrall's list often cite OSHA's final rule on
benzene,386 which was issued in 1987 .3" The costs per life saved for the
final rule are reported to range from $17.1 million (in 1984 dollars),388 which
is identical to Morrall's estimate of the costs of the proposed rule, to $23.1
million (in 1992 dollars).389 For its part, OSHA estimated that the annualized
costs of the final rule would be $24 million39° and would save at least 322
lives every forty-five years (230 from leukemia and 92 from aplastic anemia
and "other diseases of the blood and blood forming organs").3 , Thus,
according to OSHA's figures, the final rule costs approximately $3.3 million
for every life saved, well below Morrall's calculations with respect to the
proposed rule.
g. Summary
In determining the costs per life saved of the regulations discussed in this
subsection, Morrall not only continued the practice of discounting future lives
saved, but also used lower estimates of risk than did the agencies. These lower
risk estimates led to higher costs per life saved and thus produced a markedly
different picture of the cost-effectiveness of the regulations from that offered
by the agencies.
3. Conclusion
As the foregoing analysis demonstrates, Morrall's figures on benefits and
costs are starkly different from other reported estimates. As Table 3 shows, if
one adopts either the agency's (often implicit) estimate of costs per life saved
or the estimate offered by Morrall in other contexts, then in every case but
two, one finds a cost per life saved of less than $5 million.3" Only OSHA's
385. See Morrall, supra note 1, at 30 tbl.4.
386. See Occupational Exposure to Benzene, 52 Fed. Reg. 34,460 (1987) (to be codified at 29 C.ER.
pt. 1910).
387. For examples of updated lists, see Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs, supra note 2, at 1548; and
Viscusi, supra note 2, at 1434-35.
388. See Viscusi, supra note 2, at 1434-35.
389. See Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs, supra note 2, at 1548.
390. See Occupational Exposure to Benzene, 52 Fed. Reg. at 34,516.
391. Id. at 34,508.
392. The following table compares my findings, discussed at length in this section, with respect to
costs per life saved with the figures from Morrall's 1986 table. Numbers are rounded to the nearest ten
thousand.
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formaldehyde and arsenic regulations reflect a higher cost per life saved.
93
This means that, as to virtually every rule, the costs per life saved as calculated
by sources other than Morrall's 1986 table are below the range of current
estimates of the monetary value of a human life based on studies of wage
premiums for risky jobs. A figure of about $9 million is commonly reported
TABLE 3. COMPETING ESTIMATES OF THE COSTS OF VARIOUS RISK-REDuCING
REGULATIONS PER LiFE SAVED
REGULATION MORRALL'$ 1986 CosT RL tAOiY AGM-'Y'S (ExC.YT AS
IESTMATE (THOUSANDS)" Nora)) C=s' FS'rtAT1 (t0V1 %'DS)*
Asbestos (OSHA 1972) S7400 $190.o
Benzene (OSHA 1985) 17.100 1800
Arsenic/Glass Plant (EPA 1986) 19.200 4800
Ethylene Oxide (OSHA 1984) 25.600 2030-3880
Uranium Mill TailingstInactive (EPA 1983) 27.600 1570
Acrylonitrile (OSHA 1978) 37.600 3500.
Uranium Mill Tailings/Active (EPA 1983) 53.000 2500
Coke Ovens (OSHA 1976) 61.800 4500* °
Asbestos (OSHA 1986) 89.300 .8(00 ....
Arsenic (OSHA 1978) 92.500 10.000"..
Arsenic/Low-Arsenic Copper (EPA 1986) 764.000 4170
Land Disposal (EPA 1986) 3.500.000 23b0
Formaldehyde (OSHA 1985) 72.000.000 21.800
* Figures from Morrall, supra note 1, at 30 tbl.4. See also supra Table 1. These figures reflect a discount
rate of ten percent for lives saved.
** These figures reflect a discount rate of zero.
*** Figures from Broder & Morrall, supra note 91. at 250 & tbl.15.2. The costs for the arsenic rule were
cut roughly in half to reflect Morrall's doubling of his estimate of lives saved in his 1986 table. See supra
Table 2. For the rules as to which OSHA did not quantify lives saved. I have used Broder and Morrall's
estimates of costs per life saved, even though they may overstate these costs by a large margin See supra
note 239 and accompanying text; cf. supra text accompanying notes 340-345 (discussing Broder and
Morrall's higher estimates of costs per life saved as compared to OSHA's).
**** Figures from Lutter & Morrall, supra note 2, at 59 tbl.6.
I have not included the 1979 Food and Drug Administration (FDA) rule regarding diethylstsibestrol
(DES) in my calculations because I have been unable to locate any source documenting the risks avoided
and costs imposed by this rule (other than Morrall's own article). The FDA's decision effectively banned
the use of DES to promote growth in cattle. See Chemical Compounds in Food-Producing Animals. 44 Fed.
Reg. 17,070 (1979) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 70, 500. 514, 571) (proposed Mar. 20. 1979). The
decision came under the infamous "Delaney Clause" of the Federal Food. Drug. and Cosmetic Act. 21
U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1994), which bars the FDA from approving food additives that have been shown
to cause cancer in humans or animals. For general discussion and criticism. see Richard A MemlI, FDA's
Implementation of the Delaney Clause: Repudiation of Congressional Choice or Reasoned Adaptation to
Scientific Progress?, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 1. 25-29 (1988). Because the Delaney Clause does not require the
quantification of risk in order for a substance to be banned, the FDA did not provide any estimates of the
number of lives saved by this regulation. See Chemical Compounds in Food-Producing Animals. 44 Fed.
Reg. at 17,070. I do not know where Morrall obtained his figures on risks and costs for this rule.
393. For reasons to think that the costs per life saved I am reporting for these rules are oversEated see
supra notes 239, 285.
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today to be the preference-based value of life for nonmanual laborers;394 for
manual laborers, it is much lower, around $2.5 million.395 Another frequently
cited range for the value of a human life is $3 million to $7 million.39
According to these estimates, therefore, all of these regulations save two pass
even the test of cost-benefit analysis. 397 (At least, that is, when applied to the
richer among US.) 398 This is assuming what is in any event controversial, that
the implicit valuation of risk found in studies of workers' wage premiums has
meaningful implications for regulatory policy.
399
394. See Shapiro & McGarity, supra note 91, at 735 n.38 (citing Alan Manin & George
Psacharopoulos, The Reward for Risk in the Labor Market: Evidence from the United Kingdom and a
Reconciliation with Other Studies, 90 J. POL. ECON. 827 (1982)).
395. See id.
396. See, e.g., Hahn, supra note 275, at 216; Viscusi, supra note 2, at 1431; cf. Adam M. Finkel, A
Second Opinion on an Environmental Misdiagnosis: The Risky Prescriptions ofBreaking the Vicious Circle,
3 N.Y.U. ENVTL. LJ. 295, 319 (1994) (reporting that $10 million per life saved is "within the range most
economists would regard as reasonable").
397. This conclusion holds for all but three of the rules even when costs are adjusted for inflation.
Note, however, that the estimates of the monetary value of a human life are based on studies done in the
1980s and have not been adjusted for inflation. The following table reflects the costs per life saved reported
supra note 392, as converted to 1995 dollars based on the consumer price index:
TABLE 4. REGULATORY AGENCY'S* COST ESTIMATES ADJUSTED FOR INFLATION
REGULATION ADJusrED COST ESTImAT (I9IOUSANDS OF 1995 DO.LARS)
Asbestos (OSHA 1972) $700
Benzene (OSHA 1985) 2570
Arsenic/Glass Plant (EPA 1986) 6610
Ethylene Oxide (OSHA 1984) 3020-5780
Uranium Mill Tailings/lnactive (EPA 1983) 2410
Acrylonitrile (OSHA 1978) 8570
Uranium Mill Tailings/Active (EPA 1983) 3840
Coke Ovens (OSHA 1976) 12420
Asbestos (OSHA 1986) 3860
Arsenic (OSHA 1978) 24.490
Arsenic/Low-Arsenic Copper (EPA 1986) 5740
Land Disposal (EPA 1986) 3280
Formaldehyde (OSHA 1985) 31,100
* As noted supra Table 3, some of the estimates are not from the regulatory agency.
Source for conversions to 1995 dollars: U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATEs-1996, at 481 tbl.744 (1996).
398. Cf. W. Kip Viscusi, Equivalent Frames of Reference for Judging Risk Regulation Policies, 3
N.Y.U. ENVTL. LJ. 431, 447 (1994) ("[Tlhe United States Department of Transportation should want to
place a higher value of life on the well-being of the lives of airline passengers than those killed in motor-
vehicle crashes because the airline passengers have a higher income.").
399. For an excellent discussion of the relevant issues, see Shapiro & McGarity, supra note 91, at 734-
36. My alternative estimates of the costs per life saved of these health rules reduces not only the absolute
level of regulatory costs but also the variability of regulatory costs found by Morrall. This is because
discounting affects only those rules whose life-saving benefits are necessarily delayed, such as the health
rules at the bottom of the list.
Regulatory Costs
If one also considers the unquantified benefits of these rules, including
avoidance of human illness other than cancer, prevention of ecological harm,
and damage to values such as autonomy, community, and equity, the case in
favor of these regulations becomes clearer still.4 And this is all without any
adjustment for the well-documented tendency of agencies and industry to
overestimate greatly the costs of compliance with proposed regulation."
Such overestimation has, in fact, been confirmed in retrospective studies of the
compliance costs of some of the rules on Morrall's list.*'2
In short, if one adopts Morrall's 1986 estimates of costs per life saved, one
can paint a picture of a regulatory system out of control, with widely varying
and astronomical costs per life saved. This picture makes possible the critiques
of the current system charging that regulatory costs often exceed benefits; that
regulations are often cost-ineffective; that health regulations are the worst
offenders; that the system is a crazy quilt. The very high costs per life saved
reflected in Morrall's table also take the pressure off proponents of cost-benefit
analysis to identify when, exactly, it becomes too expensive to save a human
life because the numbers reported by Morrall are asserted to be well beyond
the range that could be considered reasonable."
If, on the other hand, one adopts the agencies' estimates of costs per life
saved, one sees a regulatory system in which these costs generally fall within
a far narrower range and compare favorably to current estimates of the
monetary value of a human life. One also sees a regulatory system striving to
reduce risks to human health beyond those that can be quantified, risks to the
environment, and risks to values that are widely shared.'
400. See infra Subsection III.A.3.
401. For a dramatic case of cost overestimation, see PERCIVAL ET AL. supra note 72. at 168-69. which
states that the actual costs of the lead phase-out were 95% less than the oil industry's estimated costs.
402. See, e.g., MENDELOFF, supra note 91, at 57-59 (discussing retrospective studies of costs of OSHA
standards).
403. Cf W. Kip Viscusi, Occupational Safety and Health in the 1990s. in TIlE SOCIAL RESPONSE TO
ENVIRONMENTAL RISK: POLICY FORMULATION IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY 187. 193 (Daniel W. Bromley
& Kathleen Segerson eds., 1992) ("[lit is not necessary to ascertain whether the appropnate value of life
is $3 million, $5 million, or S7 million. It is often sufficient to know that the value of life is in excess of
$1 million, yet falls considerably below a number such as S20 million.").
404. The variability of estimates of the relationship between regulatory costs and benefits is also
dramatically illustrated by another table that has made the rounds in the debate over regulatory reform. This
table reports the costs per life-year saved of various life-saving interventions, which include not only federal
regulations but also medical procedures such as mammograms. See Tammy 0. Tengs et al.. Five-Hundred
Life-Saving Interventions and Their Cost-Effectiveness, 15 RISK ANALYSIS 369 (1995). It is striking to
notice how the cost per life-year saved of the very same regulatory strategy varies according to the source
of the estimate. See, e.g., id. app. A at 375-76 (stating that the cost per life-year saved of a regulation
pertaining to high-arsenic copper smelters ranges from S36.000 (EPA's estimate) to $74.000 (OMB's
estimate), the cost per life-year saved of regulation of low-arsenic copper smelters ranges from $2.6 million
to $890 million, and the cost per life-year saved of regulation of arsenic emissions from glass plants ranges
from $2.3 million to $51 million); id. at 376 (stating that the cost of benzene control at rubber tire
manufacturing plants is estimated to be $76,000 or $20 billion): id. at 377 (stating that the cost per life-year
saved of a ban on urea-formaldehyde foam insulation in homes is either SII.000 (EPA's estimate) or
$220,000 (Viscusi's estimate)). The figures from Tengs et al.'s table bear out my general point regarding
Morrall's table: Such tables tell us more about the importance of the assumptions underlying numerical
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How can we choose between these two very different visions of the
regulatory system?
I. THE PERILS OF PRECISION
This part argues that we can choose between the two different visions of
the regulatory system I have sketched only by first making important and
contested choices about values. As we have seen, Morrall reaches his
conclusions about the costs of regulation by discounting lives saved, by
adjusting the agencies' estimates of risk, and by considering only quantified
human lives saved in tallying the benefits of regulation. Morrall's approach to
calculating costs thus incorporates implicit assumptions about the relative
worth of lives saved today and lives saved tomorrow, the appropriate response
to scientific uncertainty, and the purposes of environmental law. His estimates
of costs, in other words, grow out of choices about values. The regulatory
reformers who have relied on Morrall's table in critiquing the current system
thus err by thinking Morrall's numbers bring objectivity and clarity to a
contentious and complicated subject. On the contrary, the embedding of values
in this table of numbers disguises the numbers' true meaning and inhibits
useful and informed discussion about the matters in question. Indeed, the
numbers are derived from the very norms they have been thought to support.
So far, this is a familiar theme. Many other scholars have identified
situations in which seemingly technocratic decisions mask fundamental choices
about values.4"5 In arguing that John Morrall's calculations of regulatory
costs are infused with values, I mostly cover ground staked out by others in
different settings. But I eventually draw from this analysis a conclusion
different from the one others have offered. I do not argue in favor of ever
more complex and sophisticated methods of compressing the benefits of the
regulatory state into one aggregated number, such as costs per life saved, but
against such aggregation altogether.
A. Numerical Values
In this section, I discuss the values implicit in choices about discounting,
the methodology of quantitative risk assessment, and the range of benefits to
be considered in evaluating regulatory performance. I devote most of my
attention to discounting, as this technique is responsible for such a large part
estimates of risks, costs, and benefits than they do about the wisdom of any given regulatory strategy. See
infra Part III.
405. See, e.g., JOHN D. GRAHAM ET AL., IN SEARCH OF SAFETY: CHEMICALS AND CANCER RISK
(1988); Farber, supra note 90; Latin, supra note 109. For an extended discussion of this dynamic in
environmental regulation, see Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95
COLUM. L. REv. 1613 (1995).
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Discounting is the calculation of the present value of a future cost or
benefit. As applied to dollars invested in private projects, the concept of
discounting is both easy to understand and uncontroversial. The premise of
discounting dollars is that a dollar today is worth more than a dollar tomorrow:
While one waits for tomorrow's dollar to arrive, today's dollar could be
earning interest in the bank. In order to compare two investments that pay
benefits over different periods of time, therefore, not only does one need a
common currency (such as dollars), but one also needs to state that currency
in common temporal terms. This leads to the idea of computing present value.
The calculation of the present value of a sum of money is accomplished by
applying a fixed discount rate to the sum of money one expects eventually to
receive, over the period of time one must wait before one receives the
money.407
As long as the value of a human life is measured in dollars, the
justification for discounting remains as I have just described it. If lives are
commensurate with dollars-the premise of the monetary valuation of human
life-then there appears to be little reason to object, in principle, to the idea
of discounting the monetary equivalent of a human life, just as there is little
reason to object to the idea of discounting any future sum of money to present
value. Indeed, discounting the monetary compensation for the loss of a human
life has been done for a very long time in the context of tort awards. The value
of future earnings-the typical measure of loss in a wrongful death action-is
routinely discounted to present value to reflect the fact that the tort award may
be invested.4 8 This is, indeed, the way discounting made its first appearance
in the literature on risk regulation-as an adjustment to the dollar value of a
life saved in the future rather than as an adjustment to the estimate of the
number of lives saved. 4 9
If, for whatever reason, one does not assign a monetary value to human
life, the justification for discounting the benefits of health regulation is less
406. See supra Subsections I.B. 1-2.
407. For basic explanations of discounting, see WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BUNDER.
ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 386-87 (6th ed. 1994); MENELL & STEWART. supra note 138. at 88-
92; Daniel A. Farber & Paul A. Hemmersbaugh, The Shadow of the Future: Discount Rates. Later
Generations, and the Environment, 46 VAND. L. REv. 267, 277-79 (1993); and What Price Posterity?.
ECONOMIST, Mar. 23, 1991. at 73. For a more technical, but thoroughly readable, discussion, see EDITH
STOKEY & RICHARD ZECKHAUSER. A PRIMER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS 159-76 (1978).
408. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 192-96 (4th ed. 1992).
409. See Broder & Morrall, supra note 91. at 253; Albert L Nichols. The Regulation of Airborne
Benzene, in INCENTIVES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 145. 176-77 (Thomas C. Schcllhng ed.. 1983).
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straightforward. Now the future benefit to be discounted is not dollars, but
lives. And the premise of this discounting is not that today's dollar is worth
more than tomorrow's, but that a life saved today is worth more than one
saved tomorrow.
410
From the statement of this premise, it seems obvious that the decision to
discount lives saved in the future involves a choice about values, as to which
reasonable people may disagree.4 ' Thus, it is also obvious that the numbers
in Morrall's table, dependent as they are on his decision to discount future
lives saved, are themselves based on a contestable choice about values.
Reasonable people may thus disagree that the regulatory costs reported in
Morrall's table are as high as he says they are, and they may disagree by
orders of magnitude. But let me elaborate on the reasons that have been
offered in favor of discounting lives, in case the presence of values in
decisions about discounting is not as obvious as I think it is.
Some scholars who favor discounting nonetheless appear to reject the idea
that the premise of discounting lives is that tomorrow's lives saved are worth
less than today's. They suggest that discounting may be driven by uncertainty
about future benefits rather than by the differential valuation of present and
future deaths.4 t2 Perhaps a fabulous new technology will cure our
environmental problems or even cure the disease regulation is designed to
prevent.413 Or perhaps the risk that regulation is designed to address will turn
out to be lower than we have estimated it to be. Given this uncertainty, these
scholars argue, we should subtract from the expected benefits of a regulation
a fixed percentage for every year that passes before those benefits accrue. This
is precisely what Morrall does.4"4
For several reasons, however, uncertainty about future benefits does not
justify this kind of discounting. First, to justify discounting lives saved in the
future by reference to uncertainty about future benefits is to imply that
uncertainty cuts only in one direction, in the direction of fewer lives saved. But
410. See, e.g., Viscusi, supra note 398, at 437 (arguing that "lives saved in the future should be
discounted to take into account the lower value such lives have when compared with lives saved
currently"),
411. This has also been obvious to many others. See, e.g., HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT &
INVESTIGATIONS, 99TH CONG., EPA's ASBESTOS REGULATIONS: REPORT ON A CASE STUDY ON OMB
INTERFERENCE IN AGENCY RULEMAKING 78-82 (Comm. Print 1985); STOKEY & ZECKHAUSER, supra note
407, at 173-76; Michael S. Baram, Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Inadequate Basis for Health, Safety, and
Environmental Regulatory Decisionmaking, 8 ECOLOGY L.Q. 473, 487 (1980); Thomas 0. McGarity,
Regulatory Analysis and Regulatory Reform, 65 TEx. L. REv. 1243, 1295-96 (1987); William H. Rodgers,
Jr., Benefits, Costs, and Risks: Oversight of Health and Environmental Decisionmaking, 4 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REv. 191, 197-98 (1980).
412. See, e.g., Farber & Hemmersbaugh, supra note 407, at 290 n.93.
413. See, e.g., Morrall, supra note 13, at 107-08 (arguing in favor of discounting lives saved in the
future by OSHA's cotton dust standard, in part on account of "a nonzero probability of finding a cure for
byssinosis"). Of course, such optimism may be unfounded. For a grim recent assessment of progress in the
"war on cancer," see John C. Bailar III & Heather L. Gomik, Cancer Undefeated, 336 NEw ENG. J. MED.
1569 (1997).
414. See Morrall, supra note 1, at 28.
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as the regulatory history discussed at length in this Article reveals, agencies are
often just as convinced that their estimates of lives saved may be too low as
they are that they may be too high."5 Recall that in many cases the agencies
were confident that the rules in question would produce human health benefits
that they were unable to quantify.416 Various features of quantitative risk
assessment may also lead to an underestimation rather than overestimation of
risk and thus of lives saved.1 7 The agencies' estimates of risk are, moreover,
based on contemporaneous data like population size and life expectancy," 8
figures that tend to increase over time, thereby increasing both the number of
lives at risk and the number saved through regulation. Thus it appears that
uncertainty justifies appreciating estimates of future benefits as much as it
justifies discounting them.
Second, scientific uncertainty is already taken into account in decisions
about risk regulation, not through discounting but through the methodology of
quantitative risk assessment. In this context, the approach historically has been
to incorporate a series of conservative assumptions into risk assessments that
may tend to overestimate rather than underestimate risk, based on a policy
judgment that false positives in this context are better than false negatives
(although, as I have just noted," 9 several features of quantitative risk
assessment may also underestimate risk).420 It makes no sense effectively to
undo this policy judgment by applying a discount rate to future lives saved on
account of uncertainty. If the policy judgment is deemed wrong, better to undo
that judgment directly and forthrightly by giving up the default assumptions
considered too conservative, rather than indirectly and obliquely by applying
a discount rate to scientific estimates of lives saved. 2'
Finally, if discounting for uncertainty is appropriate, the kind of
discounting I have been discussing is an exceedingly odd way of
accomplishing it. It suggests, bizarrely, that scientific uncertainty can be
measured in fixed percentages and yearly packages, as if uncertainty increases,
lockstep, by a specific rate every year. This might be true if, for every year
that passes, there is a chance that the people who would have been saved by
a regulation will die from causes unrelated to the regulated substance or
415. See, e.g., supra note 109.
416. See supra notes 108, 136, 151, 165, 272. 331. 354, 382 and accompanying text (discussing the
unquantified health benefits of rules pertaining to benzene. asbestos. acrylonitfile. EDB. coke ovens, and
ethylene oxide).
417. See, e.g., Proposed Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment. 61 Fed. Reg. 17.960. 17,967
(Environmental Protection Agency 1996) (proposed Apr. 23, 1996) (discussing the ways in which the
default assumptions used in quantitative risk assessments may underestimate risk).
418. See, e.g., Environmental Standards for Uranium and Thorium Mill Tailings at Licensed
Commercial Processing Sites, 48 Fed. Reg. 45,926, 45,928-29 (1983) (to be codified at 40 C.FR. pt. 192).
419. See supra note 417 and accompanying text.
420. See generally Proposed Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 61 Fed. Reg. 17.960. For
a concise critique of current risk assessment methodologies, see BREYER. supra note 2. at 42-50.
421. Cf. DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 482 (1984) (arguing that we should discount, not for
time, but based on the probability that predictions will be false).
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activity; thus the probability of obtaining the expected life-saving benefits of
regulation would decrease with every passing year.422 But this misconceives
the nature of quantitative risk assessment. Quantitative risk assessment attempts
to predict the number of lives that will be saved by a regulation, excluding
other causes of death. In other words, the estimates of lives saved based on
quantitative risk assessment already have taken account of the possibility that
people will die of other causes before they can be saved by regulation.423
Thus uncertainty about future benefits does not provide a justification for
discounting, let alone a value-free one. Aside from invoking uncertainty,
another way scholars try to avoid the conclusion that discounting involves a
choice about values is to observe that it is not the discounter's values that are
involved. The idea here is that the discounter, in discounting, is simply
reflecting the way people really think about lives saved in the future. 44 The
government, these scholars argue, should respect these preferences in its
decisions.
There are a number of problems with this justification for discounting.
First of all, it is not clear that this claim about people's preferences is factually
accurate. Although some have advocated discounting on the ground that it just
"seems plausible that most people would place a lower value on preventing
risks that materialize in the future,"4 5 the empirical evidence of people's
actual preferences does not support this intuition. In fact, empirical research
on intertemporal choice has found that people prefer to suffer a negative
consequence sooner rather than later. In one study, for example, subjects were
asked to identify "the most you would pay now" to avoid a nonlethal electric
shock in five different time periods: immediately, and following delays of three
hours, one day, three days, one year, and ten years.426 Subjects proved
"willing to pay substantially more to avoid a shock to be received in one or
ten years than one in the immediate future. 4 27 Likewise, subjects asked to
identify the least amount of money they would demand for cleaning 100
hamster cages within the following week and one year from that time revealed
422. Cf. Farber & Hemmersbaugh, supra note 407, at 281 n.56 ("Discounting may have evolutionary
advantages given the risk that death may intervene before the decisionmaker receives future benefits.").
423. See, e.g., Occupational Exposure to Asbestos, Tremolite, Anthophyllite, and Actinolitc, 51 Fed.
Reg. 22,612, 22,644 (1986) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 1910, 1926) ("In the longer exposure
categories, where exposures will affect older workers, some adjustments have been made for competing
risks which are likely to affect the death rate from lung cancer."); Exposure to Coke Oven Emissions, 41
Fed. Reg. 46,742, 46,750 (1976) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910) ("[l1f one accounts for deaths from
competing causes over the next 45 years, the estimate of excess mortality would decline to 21 l.").
424. See, e.g., MENDELOFF, supra note 91, at 48; PARFIT, supra note 421, at 480; see also Farber &
Hemmersbaugh, supra note 407, at 286 (noting that concerns about paternalism justify putting the burden
of proof on those who oppose discounting).
425. MENDELOFF, supra note 91, at 49.
426. Richard H. Thaler & George Loewenstein, Intertemporal Choice, in THE WINNER'S CURSE:
PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIC LIFE 92, 104 (Richard H. Thaler ed., 1992).
427. Id.
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that they would demand more for postponing the unpleasant task. Such
studies cast doubt on the common assumption among discounters that
immediate unpleasantness is worse than postponed unpleasantness. 4-
Even when the postponed harm is death, rather than nonlethal harm, the
empirical evidence on people's temporal preferences is decidedly mixed. One
attempt to measure the discount rate reflected in workers' willingness to accept
wage premiums in return for accepting a risk of long-latency disease found an
implicit discount rate of approximately two percent.4 - An attempt to measure
the relative worth of present and future deaths more directly, through surveys
rather than wage premiums, revealed a lower discount rate for a longer time
horizon. Specifically, respondents in this study indicated that they would, on
average, discount future lives saved at approximately eight percent per year if
the lives would be saved within twenty-five years, but would discount lives
saved at only about three percent per year if the lives would be saved within
100 years.43' This suggests that the respondents, on average, valued lives
saved in the distant future more highly than they valued lives saved in the near
future. Individual responses in this study varied widely: Some respondents had
infinite discount rates (meaning they attached no value to future lives saved)
while others had negative discount rates (meaning they attached more value to
future lives saved).432
One must also somehow account for the many studies showing a
divergence between lay and expert views of risk. Lay people tend to perceive
greater hazards from what have been called "dread" risks: risks that are
characterized by, among other things, long latency periods and effects on
future generations.433 These findings complicate the claim that people value
lives saved today more than lives saved tomorrow as they suggest that people
fear activities and substances that produce remote health effects more than they
fear activities and substances that produce immediate effects. The findings also
unsettle efforts to use human behavior in one context-such as the decision of
many people to smoke cigarettes despite general knowledge that they are
428. See id. at 105.
429. Cf Richard A. Posner, Are We One Self or Multiple Selves?: Implicatons for Law and Public
Policy, 3 LEGAL THEORY 23, 31 (1997) ("In thinking about the future, we discount pleasures more heavily
than pains.").
430. See Michael J. Moore & W. Kip Viscusi. Discounting Environmental Health Risks: New Evidence
and Policy Implications, 18 J. ENvT.. ECON. & MG.mT. at S-5 I S-59 (1990). This contrasts with discount
rates found in some of Viscusi's other work. See, e.g., viscusI, supra note 2, at 55. 145 (finding the
discount rate for future health "in the vicinity of" I 1%. which is comparable to the financial rate of return
on private projects); Mark K. Dreyfus & W. Kip Viscusi. Rates of lime Preference and Consumer
Valuations of Automobile Safety and Fuel Efficiency, 38 I.L. & EcON. 79, 98-99 (1995) (finding an implicit
discount rate of 11% to 17% in private consumption decisions with respect to automobile safety).
431. See Maureen L. Cropper et al., Discounting Human Lives. 1991 AN,. J. AGRIC EcoN. 14 10, 1413.
432. The empirical studies of discount rates for life-saving measures are discussed in Farber &
Hemmersbaugh, supra note 407, at 283-84.
433. A classic work is Paul Slovic et al., Facts and Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk, in SOCIETAL
RISK ASSESSMENT. How SAFE IS SAFE ENOUGH? 181 (Richard C. Schwing & Walter A. Albers. Jr. eds.,
1980).
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dangerous-to show that people, generally, prefer consumption today over
health tomorrow.434 Just as people's perception of risk appears to be highly
dependent on context, and on the qualitative aspects of a risky situation, their
relative preferences regarding immediate and latent risks may also depend on
context.
Given the conflicting evidence on preferences, it is difficult, as a factual
matter, to defend the claim that discounting in general necessarily reflects
people's preferences. Certainly a simple appeal to intuitions about temporal
preferences cannot suffice, given the empirical evidence that is in such tension
with those intuitions. In addition, it appears impossible to defend a particular
discount rate-such as ten percent-as reflective of actual preferences in all
regulatory contexts, across all analytical horizons. The data on people's
preferences do not reflect such consistency.
Even if the empirical data were not so chaotic, a decision to discount
future lives based on people's private preferences would still involve a
contestable choice about values. A vast portion of our regulatory state
interferes with private preferences, and a correspondingly vast literature has
sprung up to defend it.435 Saying that a particular decision would reflect
private preferences only begins the debate over regulatory policy. Many
scholars have observed that private preferences, revealed in the market, may
not reflect public preferences, revealed in decisions about government. 436
And even those who are reluctant to interfere with private preferences often
agree that such interference is permissible when private behavior hurts other
people without compensation (or, if you prefer, creates externalities) and when
market choices systematically reflect incomplete information or cognitive
distortions.4 37 On this view, a preference for this generation's consumption
over the next generation's health-a kind of externality-need not stand in the
way of regulation interfering with that preference. Likewise, private
preferences for risky jobs, risky products, and risky lifestyles need not
inevitably impede regulation insofar as these preferences reflect incomplete
information or confused thinking about risks.438 In other words, even if one
finds a need for a kind of market failure or cognitive limitation to justify
434. See, e.g., MENDELOFF, supra note 91, at 49. As Mendeloff writes:
It seems plausible that most people would place a lower value on preventing risks that
materialize in the future.... [E]vidence indicates that many people, especially blue-collar
workers, have high discount rates .... [This] can be seen in the refusal to give up behaviors
that are hazardous in the long run but pleasurable or difficult to give up, such as smoking.
Id
435. For a thorough discussion of the justifications for government interference with private
preferences, see Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 1129
(1986).
436. See, e.g., Mark Sagoff, On Markets for Risk, 41 MD. L. REV. 755 (1982).
437. For a brief catalog of the reasons why government might interfere with private preferences, see,
for example, Draft Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations, 62 Fed. Reg.
39,352, 39,355 (Office of Management & Budget 1997).
438. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 435, at 1166-69.
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government interference with private preferences-itself a contestable
proposition--one could, with little trouble, fit the differential valuation of
present and future lives saved in that category.
Thus neither appeals to uncertainty nor to private preferences can squeeze
the normative content out of decisions to discount lives saved. What else can
be said in favor of discounting? Are the arguments for discounting that are
based forthrightly on arguments about values so compelling that reasonable
people may not disagree with them?
Sometimes people say that discounting is required in order to avoid
ridiculous or even perverse results. This is Morrall's claim. Recall that, in
calling his judgment on discounting "impeccable," Morrall explained that
discounting prevented an outcome whereby one would be forced to prefer a
regulation saving 100 lives a decade from now to one saving ninety-nine lives
today.439 Without discounting, Morrall explained, one would be forced to
conclude that "all rules yielding continuous benefits are worth any amount of
immediate costs." 0 To put it slightly differently, "failure to discount would
leave all generations at a subsistence level of existence, because benefits would
be postponed perpetually for the future." '
As usual, however, absurdity can be found at both extremes. Indeed, one
could as easily argue against discounting on the ground that it yields obviously
wrong results. As Derek Parfit has observed: "At a discount rate of five
percent, one death next year counts for more than a billion deaths in 500 years.
On this view, catastrophes in the further future can now be regarded as morally
trivial."" 2 A decision, reached through discounting, to favor one life now
over one billion lives in the distant future seems just as obviously wrong as the
indefinite postponement of all benefits.
Moreover, the reason that postponing all benefits to a distant future seems
obviously wrong-and thus lends itself to an argument from absurdity-is that,
as a matter of fairness, it seems inappropriate to require excessive sacrifice on
the part of one generation for another, even if, as a matter of efficiency, this
is the correct result. But if the concern is about equity, then one could,
following Parfit 43  and John Rawls,' match the principle of
intergenerational efficiency, which generates the possibility of excessive
sacrifice, with a principle of intergenerational equity, which strives to ensure
439. See Morrall, supra note I, at 28; see also supra text accompanying notes 35-37
440. Morrall, supra note 1, at 28.
441. Farber & Hemmersbaugh, supra note 407, at 291 n.96 (citing DMVID W. PEARCE & R. KERRY
TURNER, ECONOMICS OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT 223-24 (1990)); see also Nichols.
supra note 409, at 176 ("Carried to its logical conclusion, the no-discounting position argues for investing
all available funds for life saving in the indefinite future, rather than spending them immediatcly on
programs that yield benefits only after a long delay.").
442. PARFIT, supra note 421, at 357.
443. See id. at 484-85.
444. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 284-93 (1971).
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a fair distribution of benefits between different generations. This would allow
the present generation to avoid excessive sacrifice, even without
discounting.
445
Perhaps most important, the argument from absurdity depends on the idea
that, without discounting of the kind I have been discussing, we would be
forced-always-to prefer saving more lives in the future over saving fewer
lives today if both life-saving results could be achieved at the same cost. But
this just assumes that the relevant decisionmaker has the same slavish devotion
to numbers as many of the people advocating discounting do. One could
decide that saving fewer lives today is better than saving slightly more lives
tomorrow without, at the same time, embracing the technique of applying a
fixed yearly discount rate to future lives saved. The argument from absurdity
depends, ultimately, on a play on words: Because we will undoubtedly
sometimes prefer today's lives over tomorrow's-thus "discounting" the
importance of tomorrow's lives relative to today's-we must embrace
"discounting" in the sense it is understood by economists, that is, the reduction
of future benefits by a fixed yearly percentage.
The predictable response to this line of argument is to say that if we ever
prefer to save fewer lives today over saving more lives tomorrow at the same
cost, then our decision will reflect an implicit discount rate of a certain
amount. That is, we will be discounting in the way I have been
discussing-reducing future benefits by a fixed yearly percentage-even if we
do not acknowledge it.446 The same argument has been raised, repeatedly, in
the context of valuing human life: Even if we resist assigning an explicit dollar
value to saving a human life, our regulatory decisions will reflect an implicit
valuation through our willingness to expend costs on saving life.447 The large
and growing literature on incommensurability, however, is all about the
difference between these explicit and implicit judgments. 448 I do not wish to
wade into that debate here, except to observe that one cannot defend
discounting by blithely assuming that these kinds of judgments are equivalent.
Some scholars defend discounting on the ground that people will be richer
in the future, and thus the same benefits will be worth less to them than they
445. See PARFIT, supra note 421, at 484-85.
446. The empirical studies of private discount rates for life-saving investments, discussed supra notes
430-432 and accompanying text, reveal only implicit discount rates. That is, even the studies that elicited
consumer preferences for present versus future life-saving through direct surveys calculated the discount
rates implicit in respondents' answers rather than asking about discount rates directly. See, e.g., Cropper
et al., supra note 431, at 1412-13 (discussing the methodology of a survey that asked about a hypothetical
preference of saving 100 lives now or 700 lives in 50 years).
447. This is the line COWS took in chiding OSHA for its refusal to attach an explicit dollar value
to saving a life. See, e.g., Exposure to Coke Oven Emissions, supra note 213, at 6; Levine, supra note 211,
at 27.
448. See, e.g., ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS (1993); Cass R. Sunstein,
Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 903 (1996).
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are to us, who are poorer." 9 This claim is, again, easier to understand when
applied to dollars. For dollars, one can cite the "diminishing marginal utility"
of income, and ask, with Judge Posner: "[W]hy should we worry about
reducing our consumption so that they can consume even more?"4'"' The
argument is more complicated as applied to lives, even if the value of lives is
measured in dollars. A discount rate as high as ten percent is premised on an
expectation of high productivity growth, which will raise future income, which
will increase the monetary value assigned to saving life.15' Thus, the very
factors supporting a high discount rate also suggest that people will, in the
future, value life-saving more than they value it today. This seems to me to
undermine rather than support the case in favor of discounting, insofar as that
case is premised on the idea that delaying life-saving diminishes its value.
Several scholars have argued that the way out of this puzzle is not to
abandon discounting, but to increase the monetary valuation of lives saved in
the future and then to discount that amount by the usual rate.452 Professor
Viscusi has even suggested that, if the monetary valuation of lives saved in the
future is properly adjusted, discounting "should not drastically affect the
attractiveness of policies with long-term implications. " 53 But this is to say
that the only way to correct for greater future wealth in estimating the benefits
of health regulation is to assign a dollar value to human life. The device of
increasing the monetary value of human life will not help when it is lives, not
dollars, that are being discounted. One could, I suppose, increase the estimates
of the number of lives saved in order to take account of greater future wealth
and then discount that number. It seems far more sensible and direct, however,
simply to recognize that one argument offered in favor of discounting in
general-the greater wealth of people in future years-actually cuts against
discounting lives.
Equally important, the assumption that people in the future will enjoy
greater wealth than they do today is in tension with the most basic premises
of environmental law: that clean air, clean water, and clean land are kinds of
wealth, and that they may be irreversibly threatened by actions we take today.
As William Baumol wrote in an important early article on discounting the
benefits of public projects:
449. For reference to, and criticism of, this argument, see Farber & Hemmersbaugh. supra note 407.
at 292.
450. POSNER, supra note 408, at 489; see also William J. Baumol, On the Social Rate of Discount,
58 AM. ECON. REV. 788, 800 (1968) ("[ln our economy if past trends and current developments are any
guide, a redistribution to provide more for the future may be described as a Robin Hood activity stood on
its head-it takes from the poor to give to the rich.").
451. See VISCUSI, supra note 2, at 145. This is assuming that the discount rate is based on some
measure of the rate of return on private investment. OMB's discount rate (currently seven percent) is based
on such a measure. See Economic Analysis of Federal Regulations Under Executive Order 12.866 (Report
of an Interagency Group Chaired by a Member of the Council of Economic Advisers. Jan. IH. 1996).
452. See, e.g., VIsCust, supra note 2, at 145; Farber & Hemmersbaugh, supra note 407. at 292 n.101.
453. Viscusi, supra note 2, at 145.
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There are important externalities and investments of the public goods
variety which cry for special attention. Irreversibilities constitute a
prime example. If we poison our soil so that never again will it be the
same, if we destroy the Grand Canyon and turn it into a hydroelectric
plant, we give up assets which like Goldsmith's bold peasantry, "...
their country's pride, when once destroy'd can never be supplied." All
the wealth and resources of future generations will not suffice to
restore them.454
On this view, not only does the possibility of widespread irreversible damage
weaken the assumption of ever-increasing wealth, it also supplies an argument
against discounting in the environmental context.4
55
Sometimes it is said that, as long as future costs are discounted to present
value, future benefits, including future lives saved, must be discounted too, in
order to put costs and benefits on common terms. Indeed, in invalidating
EPA's ban on asbestos, the Fifth Circuit held that EPA was required to
discount benefits for this very reason:
Although various commentators dispute whether it is ever appropriate
to discount benefits when they are measured in human lives, we note
that it would skew the results to discount only costs without according
similar treatment to the benefits side of the equation. Adopting the
454. Baumol, supra note 450, at 801 (quoting OLIVER GOLDSMITH, THE DESERTED VILLAGE 7
(Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott Co. 1894) (1770)). Stokey and Zeckhauser make a similar observation:
It is arguable that ordinary discount rates are not appropriate for discounting flows that consist
of intangibles such as pain and suffering, or improved health, or especially changes in the risk
of death. Such goods are not exchanged in the market; forward and backward flows through
time will not be in accord with market interest rates.
STOKEY & ZECKHAUSER, supra note 407, at 175-76.
455. Surprisingly, some scholars have used the prospect of irreversible environmental damage as an
argument in favor of discounting:
If preferences adapt to what is currently available (a "sour grapes" approach to amenities), then
it is likely that future scarcity imposed by current consumption will not necessarily adversely
affect the enjoyment of future generations. Assume, for instance, that future generations value
wilderness areas less highly than the current generation does. If that change were to materialize,
future generations would look askance at current decisions to forgo technological advances in
order to preserve natural settings for posterity.
Gillette & Hopkins, supra note 2, at 403. Gillette and Hopkins' reasoning is reminiscent of the following
passage from an article in Science, quoted by Laurence Tribe in his famous essay on environmental law:
The demand for rare environments is ... learned .... (C]onscious public choice can
manipulate this learning so that the environments which people learn to use and want reflect
environments that are likely to be available at low cost.... Much more can be done with
plastic trees and the like to give most people the feeling that they are experiencing nature.
Martin H. Krieger, What's Wrong with Plastic Trees?, 179 SCIENCE 446, 451, 453 (1973), quoted in
Laurence H. Tribe, Ways Not To Think About Plastic Trees: New Foundations for Environmental Law, 83
YALE LJ. 1315, 1316 (1974). This kind of reasoning would justify any amount of environmental
degradation, and moreover human loss and subjugation, so long as people's preferences eventually adapted
to the degradation, loss, and subjugation. This is, to say the least, an unusual use of the phenomenon of
adaptive preferences. Far from being an excuse not to regulate, adaptive preferences are usually cited in
defense of regulation. See, e.g., JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES: STUDIES IN THE SUBVERSION OF RATIONALITY
109-40 (1983); Cass R. Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, Environmental Law, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 217,
236-37 (1993); Sunstein, supra note 435, at 1146-50.
2052
Regulatory Costs
position of the commentators who advocate not discounting benefits
would force the EPA similarly not to calculate costs in present
discounted real terms, making comparisons difficult. Furthermore, in
evaluating situations in which different options incur costs at varying
time intervals, the EPA would not be able to take into account that
soon-to-be-incurred costs are more harmful than postponable costs.
Because the EPA must discount costs to perform its evaluations
properly, the EPA also should discount benefits to preserve an apples-
to-apples comparison .... 456
One worries about "preserv[ing] an apples-to-apples comparison," however,
only if one is dealing only with apples. In the asbestos case, the costs were
dollars and the benefits were lives. These costs and benefits are the same only
if dollars and lives are the same. Again, therefore, it turns out that the implicit
premise of an argument in favor of discounting is that lives can be measured
in dollars. Far from being a "value-free and good workable rule,' as
Morrall has claimed, the decision to treat future costs and benefits the
same-to discount them both and to discount them at the same rate-silently
resolves one of the central moral questions of the modern regulatory state.
The problems do not end there. The reigning theory about the appropriate
way to value human lives-which holds that lives should be valued by asking
how much money people would be willing to spend to avoid small reductions
in risk or how much they would demand to accept themSS--depends on a
premise fundamentally at odds with the premise of discounting lives.
Discounting is used, as I have said, to calculate the present value of fiaure
benefits. To decide whether discounting is necessary, one must have some
notion of what the relevant benefit is and when it occurs. The benefit of a
regulation reducing the risk of a long-latency disease could be regarded either
as an immediate reduction in risk of future death or as the future avoidance of
death itself.459 To justify discounting in this context, one must say that the
benefit of such regulation is the prevention of death (which occurs in the
future), not the reduction of risk (which occurs as soon as the regulation is
implemented). But this is not the way benefits are described in the context of
valuing human lives according to the willingness to pay. In that context,
sophisticated observers realize that it is crazy to talk about a rational person's
willingness to accept money in exchange for certain death. Most people would
not accept such an exchange. Instead, the bargain being valued is described as
456. Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201. 1218 (5th Cir. 1991).
457. Morrall, supra note 13, at 107.
458. This approach is often defended, despite its limitations, as better than other available valuation
methods, such as the "human capital" approach. See, e.g., Gillette & Hopkins, supra note 2. at 382-99. For
the seminal work on willingness-to-pay approaches to valuing life. see Thomas Schellmg. The Life You
Save May Be Your Own, in PROBLEMS IN PUBUC EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS 127 (Samuel B Chal, Jr ed..
1968), reprinted in THOMAS SCHELUNG, CHOICE AND CONSEQUENCE 113 (1984)
459. See, e.g., Gillette & Hopkins, supra note 2, at 401,
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the acceptance of money in return for acceptance of slightly increased risk of
death.46° In other words, the benefit to be measured is the reduction in risk,
not the avoidance of death.
Thus, the very move that makes it possible even to talk about valuing life
in terms of dollars also makes it clear that the benefit being measured is a
reduction in risk, not an avoidance of death. If a reduction in risk is the
relevant benefit for purposes of valuation, it must also be the relevant benefit
for purposes of discounting. This benefit accrues as soon as exposure to the
risky substance or activity is reduced.46' In many cases, this will occur
roughly contemporaneously with the expenditure of costs, rendering
discounting unnecessary. This line of reasoning would suggest that discounting,
if it is to be done at all, should be done only for the short interval between
expenditure of costs and reduction in risk, not for the interval between the
reduction in risk and the saving of lives.
Of course, one might still say that there is a difference between the
reduction in a risk that will materialize in harm, if at all, immediately or in the
near future, and the reduction in a risk that will materialize in harm, if at all,
in the distant future. One might value the reduction in the former risk more
than the reduction in the latter, and on this view discounting would still be
appropriate even if the relevant injury is regarded as the risk, rather than the
development of disease or death itself. But the existing empirical evidence on
people's preferences as between risks materializing in harm over different
temporal periods is, as I have explained,462 inconclusive as to which kind of
risk people actually prefer. Absent new and different empirical evidence on
people's preferences, the preference-based argument for discounting remains
tethered to a normative assumption about what people's preferences should be
rather than what they are.
All of this suggests that the practice of discounting future lives saved
embodies normative choices at the core of modem risk regulation. 463 This
460. See, e.g., MENDELOFF, supra note 91, at 27; Glenn C. Blomquist & Sam Peltzman, Passive
Restraints: An Economist's View, in THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS OF HEALTH AND SAFETY REGULATION, supra
note 13, at 37, 48; Farber & Hemmersbaugh, supra note 407, at 276.
461. See HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT & INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 411, at 80.
462. See supra notes 425-434 and accompanying text.
463. In this discussion, I have ignored the question that has preoccupied most scholars of this subject,
which is the choice of a particular discount rate. I have focused instead on the normative choices implicit
in the decision whether to discount lives at all. I should note, however, that there appears to be a growing
consensus, even among advocates of discounting, that 10% is too high a discount rate for public endeavors
like the regulations on Morrall's list. See, e.g., Gillette & Hopkins, supra note 2, at 407 ("[Mlost would
agree that 10% is too high a rate."). Indeed, OMB itself has reduced the discount rate presumptively
applicable to cost-benefit analyses of regulatory actions from 10% to 7%. See Benefit-Cost Analysis of
Federal Programs; Guidelines and Discounts, 57 Fed. Reg. 53,519, 53,522-23 (1992). Others have argued
for an even lower discount rate for the benefits of health and environmental regulation, on the order of 1%
to 2%. See, e.g., Farber & Hemmersbaugh, supra note 407, at 303.
There is also increasing recognition, even by Morrall himself, that the discount rate should be
sensitive to context. See, e.g., Morrall, supra note 1, at 28. Even assuming that discounting lives is
appropriate, the discount rate appropriate for projects that draw resources from investment, for example,
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leads me to three conclusions. First, decisions about discounting future lives
saved-including decisions about whether to discount at all, and, if so, about
what discount rate and discounting period to assume-should be explicit and
transparent. These choices are too important and too value-laden to be buried
in work papers, in footnotes, or even in textual discussions, where the textual
discussion is-as in Morrall's paper-segregated from the numerical results of
the analysis.
Second, where estimates of regulatory benefits already incorporate
discounting, it is sheer bootstrapping to use those same estimates to argue that
the benefits of health regulation are trivial or that health regulation that
addresses long-latency diseases and long-term ecological threats is,
systematically, less cost-effective than safety regulation. These conclusions are
already built into the estimates of benefits through the practice of discounting.
The estimates are merely a numerical representation of these ideas.
Finally, the breezy attitude that has characterized so much of the case in
favor of discounting-"surely people prefer postponed harm to immediate
harm"; "surely benefits must be discounted if costs are"-must give way to a
more serious and sustained examination of the factual and normative premises
of this technique. More empirical work, for example, needs to be done to sort
out the conflicting evidence on people's preferences. And scholars and
policymakers should accept the possibility that people's preferences about risk
will not be linear across time.' Moreover, approaches to discounting should
vary across contexts. The easy assumption that all the future benefits of all
health regulations should be discounted, and discounted at the same rate,
ignores the fact that health regulations are not all alike. They differ, among
other things, in their relative effects on present and future generations; in the
relative magnitude of their unquantified, and perhaps immediately realized,
benefits; and in their expected effects on the environment.
Thus, more case-by-case attention needs to be given to the question of
whether the future benefits of health and environmental regulation should be
is different from the one appropriate for projects that draw resources from consumption Morrall himself
recognizes as much but says that "the analytical demands of tailonng a precise discount rate for each rule
were impossibly large, and for comparative purposes the benefits of the greater precision would have been
small." Id. This is perplexing. The choice between a 10% discount rate and. say, a 1% rate makes an
extraordinary difference in the attractiveness of programs producing benefits remote in time. (At a discount
rate of 10%, a rule predicted to save 10 lives in 25 years would be treated as saving 0.92 lives; at a
discount rate of 1%, the same rule would be treated as saving 7.97 lives.) And it is not immediately
apparent why the analytical demands of identifying the appropriate discount rate for each rule are any more
prohibitive than the analytical demands of applying cost-benefit or cost-effectiveness analysis to each rule
(though proponents of these methods, such as Morrall, would insist that their analytical demands are
manageable). At the very least, then, according to a growing consensus even among proponents of
discounting, Morrall's list reflects a discount rate that is at once too high and too uniform.
464. It is quite possible, to take just one example, that many people care more about risks to their
children than they do about risks to themselves but that their concern about future harm then dissipates for
succeeding generations. For a discussion of intergenerational discounting concerns, see. for example. Farber
& Hemmersbaugh, supra note 407, at 281-87.
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discounted at all, and, if so, at what rate. More case-by-case work is also
needed to identify the appropriate discounting period. For example, in deciding
how long a period to assume in discounting the benefits of cancer-preventing
rules, one must determine the latency period for the kinds of cancers, and
kinds of exposures, prevented by such rules. Latency periods vary not only
according to the type of cancer involved465 but also according to the timing
and intensity of exposure.466 Estimates of latency periods have also varied
according to the assumed terminal point of the latency period, that is, whether
onset of symptoms, diagnosis, or death is assumed to mark the end of the
latency period.467 Moreover, some have argued that the status of a particular
substance as an early- or late-stage carcinogen goes a longer way toward
elucidating the temporal distribution of cancer risk than does the concept of
latency.4 68 In sum, the identification of an appropriate period over which to
discount the benefits of cancer-preventing regulation is a matter filled with
variation and uncertainty. Indeed, this may be another argument against
discounting altogether.469
2. Quantitative Risk Assessment
I have explained that the disparities between the agencies' and Morrall's
estimates of costs per life saved are attributable not only to discounting but
also to Morrall's adjustments to the agencies' estimates of risk.470 Save for
the case of OSHA's ethylene oxide rule,47 ' however, Morrall does not
elaborate upon his reasons for these adjustments. As to that rule, recall that
Morrall explained that he chose to use EPA's estimates of risk rather than
465. See B.T. Westerfield, Asbestos-Related Lung Disease, 85 S. MED. J. 616, 618-19 (1992)
(reporting different latency periods for asbestos-related lung cancer and mesothelioma).
466. See Harvey Checkoway et al., Latency Analysis in Occupational Epidemiology, 45 ARCHIVES
ENVTL. HEALTH 95, 99 (1990).
467. See Richard B. Hayes & Paolo Vineis, Time Dependency in Human Cancer, 75 TUMORI 189, 190
(1989).
468. See id. at 194.
469. Confusion over the appropriate discounting interval is evident in Morrall's calculations. By
comparing the agencies' estimates of total compliance costs and lives saved with Morrall's estimates of
costs per life saved (which incorporate the compliance costs estimated by the agencies), one can derive
Morrall's estimate, after discounting, of the number of lives saved. By plugging all these numbers into the
formula for calculating present value, one can then derive the number of years Morrall must have assumed
would pass before lives were saved. The general formula for calculating the present value of a benefit of
X to be received N years from now when the discount rate is r is: X / (I + rYN. See BAUMOL & BLINDER,
supra note 407, at 386-87. If one performs these calculations with respect to three different arsenic rules
(OSHA's 1978 arsenic rule and EPA's 1986 rules on glass plants and copper smelters), one finds that
Morrall assumed three different latency periods for these rules: 15 years for the glass plants rule, 30 years
for the copper smelters rule, and 37 years for OSHA's rule. Given that all three rules addressed the same
carcinogenic substance operating through the same route of exposure, the variation in discounting intervals
is perplexing. Perhaps it can be explained by differences in exposures, but this is unknown.
470. See supra Subsection II.B.2.
471. See Occupational Exposure to Ethylene Oxide, 49 Fed. Reg. 25,734 (1984) (to be codified at 29
C.F.R. pt. 1910).
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OSHA's because (he thought) EPA's estimates were based on epidemiological
rather than animal studies.47 For the adjustments made with respect to the
other rules, however, we do not have an explanation other than that Morrall
chose what he regarded as the "most reliable" estimates of risk. 73
Several general remarks about the normative choices embodied in
quantitative risk assessment will therefore suffice. Quantitative risk assessment
produces "a numeric estimate of the possibility of cancer in a given population
over a lifetime from exposure to a chemical substance. '" 74 It does this
through reliance on studies showing elevated risks of cancer in either humans
or animals. Almost always, however, the epidemiological and experimental
data are based on exposures that are higher than those of regulatory
concern.475 Thus, some method of extrapolating from high-dose to low-dose
exposures is necessary in order to produce numerical estimates of risks at the
relevant exposures. The extrapolation model used can have an enormous
impact on the numerical assessment of risk. When relying on animal studies,
risk assessors must also figure out how to translate risks found in animals to
risks in humans. This decision, too, can have a large effect on conclusions
about risk. Each of these decisions is typically made in the absence of
scientific proof about what decision is appropriate. Such decisions have thus
come to be known as "default assumptions," operative in the absence of
evidence indicating that they are invalid in a particular case. 76
The use of default assumptions, and the assumptions themselves, generally
spring from two normative choices that lie at the heart of risk regulation. First,
the whole point of risk regulation is to prevent harm before it occurs. This is
part of the reason why reliance on animal studies is a nearly inevitable part of
quantitative risk assessment; to require adequate epidemiological studies would
be to require people to die or fall ill before regulation could take place.
Second, a basic ethic of risk regulation is that it is worse to be proven to have
been overly optimistic about a risk than to be proven to have been unduly
pessimistic; or, in other words, false positives are worse than false
negatives.4 77 Thus, many of the default assumptions underlying quantitative
risk assessment tend to be public-health conservative, insofar as it is more
likely that they overstate risk than that they understate it.
472. See supra text accompanying note 357-368.
473. Morrall, supra note I, at 28.
474. Mark Eliot Shere, The Myth of Meaningful Environmental Risk Assessment. 19 HARV. E,;vTL.
L. REV. 409, 412 (1995).
475. See, e.g., Latin, supra note 109, at 98.
476. For a concise description of the major default assumptions used in quantitative risk assessment.
see JOSEPH V. RODRICKS, CALCULATED RISKS 188-89 (1992). For a discussion of justifications for
departures from default assumptions, see Proposed Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment. 61 Fed.
Reg. 17,960 (Environmental Protection Agency 1996) (proposed Apr. 23. 1996).
477. For discussion of limiting false positives and false negatives in the context of environmental law.
see Talbot Page, A Generic View of Toxic Chemicals and Similar Risks. 7 ECOLOGY L.Q 207. 230-36
(1978).
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For these reasons, risk assessments have historically tended to emphasize
the upper bound of the large range of estimates typically produced through
quantitative risk assessment; 478 the notion is that the actual risk is unlikely
to be above the highest plausible estimate derived in the risk assessment. By
relying on one risk estimate in preference to another on the ground that it
allegedly better reflects "prevailing scientific views, '479 Morrall implicitly
rejects the conservatism built into risk assessments through, among other
things, the emphasis on highest plausible risks. But in a matter riddled with
uncertainty, deciding whether to favor low, medium, or high estimates of risk
is not a purely scientific choice.8
Moreover, even if one accepted the intuitive appeal of stressing the "best"
(and lower) estimate of risk, deciding which risk estimate is "best" can itself
be as much a matter of political as of scientific judgment. In estimating the
costs per life saved of OSHA's formaldehyde rule,48' for example, Morrall
appears to have relied on figures calculated by OMB economists untrained in
the scientific disciplines that contribute to our understanding of risk, such as
epidemiology, biochemistry, and toxicology.8 2 And in estimating the costs
of OSHA's ethylene oxide rule,483 Morrall inexplicably chose to rely on the
results of epidemiological studies that nearly everyone involved in the
rulemaking proceeding agreed were flawed. 4 This picking and choosing
among the results of various risk assessments is as easily explained by a desire
to undermine the case for regulation as it is by a desire to get at scientific
"truth." Truth in this area is slippery; one may, using the same epidemiological
or experimental database, reach dramatically different estimates of risk simply
by applying different statistical models for extrapolating from high to low
doses and from animals to humans. Anyone with training in statistics might
therefore convince himself that he is as qualified to perform quantitative risk
assessment as someone with training in epidemiology, biochemistry,
toxicology, or industrial hygiene. One should be wary of accepting an
economist's adjustments to agencies' risk assessments, especially when those
adjustments are largely unexplained.
I cannot leave the subject of risk assessment without touching on Morrall's
estimates of risks from safety (as opposed to health) hazards. As I noted
earlier,48 5 Morrall explains that the safety risks reported in his table are less
478. See Adam M. Finkel, A Return to Alchemy, ENvTL. F., Sept.-Oct. 1996, at 15, 16-17.
479. Morrall, supra note 1, at 28-29.
480. For elaboration of this idea, see Finkel, supra note 478, at 16-17.
481. See Occupational Exposure to Formaldehyde, 50 Fed. Reg. 50,412 (1985) (to be codified at 29
C.F.R. pt. 1910) (proposed Dec. 10, 1985).
482. See supra text accompanying notes 288-289.
483. See Occupational Exposure to Ethylene Oxide, 49 Fed. Reg. 25,734 (1984) (to be codified at 29
C.F.R. pt. 1910).
484. See supra text accompanying notes 357-364.
485. See supra text accompanying note 46.
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likely to be overstated than the health risks on account of "the greater
availability of hard data" on safety risks."M It is interesting to consider what
Morrall considers "hard data." Take, for example, the Consumer Product
Safety Commission (CPSC) rule on unvented space heaters, which occupies the
enviable position of second from the top of Morrall's original list"' and is
at the very top of some later versions. 8S This rule required an oxygen
detection system for unvented space heaters, which would shut off the heater
when oxygen levels were so depleted that the heater would pose a risk of
carbon monoxide poisoning.4 89 The CPSC estimated that the addition of an
oxygen detection system to the 120,000 heaters expected to be produced in
1980 would save fourteen lives over the life of the heaters. 90 By the time
nearly all unvented space heaters complied with the new standard, the rule
would save sixty-three lives per year. 9'
The estimate of fourteen lives saved in relation to the 1980 production run
was based on the following chain of data and reasoning. In 1977, the agency
reported, there were 176 deaths from all domestic-fueled heaters. 94 In
arriving at this number, the agency estimated that there were 348 poisonings
by residential fuels in 1978. 493 Based on CPSC's specific information on 289
of these incidents, the agency figured that half of the poisonings in 1978 were
due to space heaters. 49 CPSC then had to convert the figure of 176 deaths
from all space heaters to an estimate of deaths from unvented space heaters.
It did this by considering the results of forty-one investigations of such deaths.
Based on ratios it found in these studies, CPSC estimated that approximately
61% of the 176 deaths from space heaters were due to unvented space
heaters.495 CPSC adjusted the resulting figure of 106 deaths, in an
unelaborated way, to account for "regional differences" and "possible bias" in
investigative files.496 This led to the figure of seventy deaths per year. There
486. Morrall, supra note I, at 32.
487. See id. at 30 tbl.4.
488. See, e.g., Viscusi, supra note 2. at 1432-33 tbl. I.
489. See Safety Standard Requiring Oxygen Depiction Safety Shutoff Systems (ODS) for Unvented
Gas-Fired Space Heaters, 45 Fed. Reg. 61,880 (1980) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 1212).
490. See id. at 61,927. CPSC estimated the life of a space heater to be 25 years. Because its estimates
of lives saved were based on this long time interval, Morrall should have discounted lives saved due to this
rule too in order to be consistent with his approach to health regulation. There is no evidence that he did
this, as his table reports costs per life saved (S100,000) that lie at the mid-range of CPSC's undiscounted
estimates. See id. at 61,926.
491. See id. at 61,928 n.8. This would not happen for approximately 64 years. the time it would take
for the nation's inventory of approximately 7.7 million space heaters to turn over at a rate of 120,000 per
year. See id. at 61,927. For his part, Morrall reports that the rule will save 63 lives per year, without noting
that this would not happen for over 60 years. See Morrall. supra note I. at 30 tbl.4.
492. See Safety Standard Requiring Oxygen Depletion Safety Shutoff Systems (ODS) for Unvented
Gas-Fired Space Heaters, 45 Fed. Reg. at 61.923-24.
493. See id. at 61,923.
494. See id. Half of 348, however, is 174 not 176.
495. See id.
496. Id. at 61,924.
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were 7,681,000 space heaters then in existence.497 Combining the death rate
with the number of heaters led to a death rate per heater of 0.0000091. The
agency estimated that there would be approximately 120,000 space heaters
manufactured in 1980.49' The death rate of 0.0000091, multiplied by
120,000, led to an estimate that, absent regulation, sixteen deaths would occur
during the life of the space heaters manufactured in 1980. After assuming that
the oxygen detection system would be 90% effective in preventing poisonings,
the CPSC finally concluded that the oxygen detection system would save
fourteen lives if installed in heaters made in 1980.' 99
Are these hard data? Where is the evidence that 1977 and 1978 were
representative years as far as poisonings from space heaters were concerned?
Or the evidence that the data from forty-one cases were representative? What
was the empirical basis for the adjustments for regional differences, bias in
investigative files, and effectiveness? Was it reasonable to assume that the
number of space heaters would remain stable in the future? The conclusion
seems inescapable that CPSC's estimate of lives saved was based on inferences
and hunches--even guesses-in the same way that estimates of risk from
carcinogenic substances are. Agency estimates of lives saved by other safety
regulations on Morrall's list exhibit similar guesswork.5" All this suggests
that "hard data" on risk are elusive, even when the risk is to safety rather than
health.
3. Regulatory Purposes
In reporting regulatory cost-effectiveness as a function of human lives
saved (and only quantified lives at that), Morrall's table implies that risk
regulation is exclusively concerned with quantifiable human health risks. This
ignores the many benefits of health and environmental regulation that are not
susceptible to quantification and that range beyond human health.
A focus on quantifiable human health risks leads in practice to a fixation
on cancer risks.5 'O Despite the many limitations of carcinogen risk
497. See id. at 61,927.
498. See id.
499. See id.
500. See, e.g., Airplane Cabin Fire Protection, 49 Fed. Reg. 21,010, 21,012-14 (1984) (to be codified
at 14 C.F.R. pt. 121) (notice of proposed rulemaking, May 17, 1984) (estimating benefits of a rule requiring
smoke and fire detectors in airplane galleys and lavatories by considering the number of deaths in airplane
fires from 1973 to 1983, as reduced by assumptions about the effectiveness of the newly required devices
in preventing deaths).
As for Morrall's figures on the lives saved by the safety rules on his list, in some cases it is simply
hard to fathom how he came up with his estimates. Compare Morrall, supra note 1, at 30 tbl.4 (estimating
that the FAA's rule on seat cushion flammability will save 37 lives per year), with Flammability
Requirements for Aircraft Seat Cushions, 49 Fed. Reg. 43,188, 43,191 (1984) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R.
pts. 25, 29, 121) (estimating the range of annual lives saved from a low of 4.4 to a high of 22.3).
501. See, e.g., OFFICE OF POLICY ANALYSIS, supra note 67, at 98-99; Applegate, supra note 71, at
1659.
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assessment, this remains the best-developed branch of quantitative risk
assessment. This is why, in justifying the rules on Morrall's list, the agencies
generally quantified only risks of cancer. But these agencies frequently cited
health benefits in addition to the prevention of cancer."- These included the
prevention of reproductive abnormalities and dysfunctions, neurological effects,
blood disorders, and other ailments. In the case of EPA's asbestos ban, for
example, the unquantified benefits included even the prevention of asbestosis,
one of the signature illnesses associated with the substance. 5 3 The agencies
did not just make up these risks but relied on scientific studies showing that
the risks existed. They were not, however, able to quantify them.
Focusing on human lives saved also ignores consequences beyond human
health. Hazardous waste disposal, radioactive contamination, and air
pollution-the harms targeted by the environmental rules on Morrall's list-all
affect living things besides humans. These effects are, if anything, even harder
to quantify than are human health effects. Thus, agencies frequently cite
ecological benefits without quantifying them.-
Finally, a narrow focus on human morbidity and mortality effectively
dismisses the great body of evidence showing that, when citizens think about
risk, they think about more than mortality and morbidity.55 They also
consider such things as whether the consequences are immediate or latent,
diffuse or catastrophic, certain or uncertain. And people care about whether the
consequences are equitably or inequitably imposed and whether they fall on the
present generation or on future generations. To quote Mark Sagoff:
In the regulation of risk, safety is not our only goal, and it may not
even be our principal concern. We are also concerned about man's
inhumanity to man. We rightly spend more to reduce comparatively
small risks that outrage us than to reduce larger risks that occasion no
such resentment. The acceptability of risk may depend less on its
magnitude than on its meaning."°
502. See supra notes 108, 136, 151. 165, 272, 331. 354, 382 and accompanying text (discussing the
unquantified health benefits of rules pertaining to benzene, asbestos. acrylonitrile, EDB. coke ovens, and
ethylene oxide).
503. See Asbestos; Manufacture, Importation, Processing, and Distribution in Commerce Prohibitions,
54 Fed. Reg. 29,460, 29,468 (1989) (to be codified at 40 C.FR. pt. 763).
504. See, e.g., id. at 29,480 (mentioning the unquantified environmental benefits of the asbestos ban);
Land Disposal Ban, 51 Fed. Reg. 44,714, 44,737-38 (1986) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pis. 260-62. 264-
65, 268, 270-71) (mentioning the unquantified environmental benefits of the land disposal ban). See
generally Lisa Heinzerling, Reductionist Regulatory Reform. 8 FORDHAM ENvL. iU. 459 (1998)
(discussing EPA's tendency to leave ecological benefits of regulation unquantified).
505. See, e.g., Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 SciNCF 280 (1987).
506. Mark Sagoff, Forum One-The Policy, EPA J., MarJApr. 1991. at 30. 30. quoted in Robert I-
Kuehn, The Environmental Justice Implications of Quantitative Risk Assessment, 1996 U. ILL L REV. 103,
127.
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In short, the benefits of the rules on Morrall's list include what have come to
be known as the "nonstatistical" or "qualitative" features of risk, such as
autonomy, community, and equity."
Some observers, in fact, have suggested that at least part of the disparities
in regulatory costs shown on Morrall's list can be explained by reference to
these unquantified and nonstatistical features of risk.5°8 They have found the
disparities too great, however, to be explained wholly in these terms.509 But
if one uses the estimates of costs per life saved that I have derived based on
the agencies' estimates of risks and costs, then the wide disparities in
regulatory costs either disappear altogether or shrink to a size that could be
explained by reference to the unquantified benefits of the rules in question.
510
It would not surprise me to learn that Morrall and most if not all of the
regulatory reformers who have relied on his table believe that human health
effects other than cancer, ecological effects, and the nonstatistical features of
risk are all appropriate objects of regulatory concern. Nor would it surprise me
to learn that most if not all of them believe that these effects are real costs of
nonregulation and that preventing them is a real benefit of regulation. But
these concessions have little significance unless one allows these benefits to
have a meaningful, even decisive, impact on regulatory decisions."'
The implicit message of Morrall's list is that the greatest benefits of
regulation are covered there and that any adjustments based on noncancer
507. For a sustained defense of the incorporation in risk regulation of the features of risk ranging
beyond human morbidity and mortality, see Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 53. See also Clayton P. Gillette
& James E. Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1027 (1990); Donald T. Hornstein,
Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative Critique of Comparative Risk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. REV.
562 (1992).
508. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 455, at 251-52.
509. See, e.g., id.
510. Gillette and Hopkins urge greatest caution in making regulatory decisions turn on willingness to
pay precisely in those situations where regulatory costs are closest to willingness-to-pay values:
Our critique of willingness-to-pay... should be understood less as an appeal to ignore these
studies than as a warning to understand their limitations. Acceptance of findings from these
studies should be viewed most skeptically where they produce dollar values close to the cost
per life of proposed regulations, for it is in those situations that failure to consider all relevant
variables will have the greatest impact on ultimate result.
Gillette & Hopkins, supra note 2, at 399.
511. In its decision invalidating EPA's asbestos ban, the Fifth Circuit conceded the legal relevance
of unquantified benefits and then effectively held that they could not play an important role in
decisionmaking under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (1994):
While TSCA contemplates a useful place for unquantified benefits beyond the EPA's
calculation, unquantified benefits never were intended as a trump card allowing the EPA to
justify any cost calculus, no matter how high.
Unquantified benefits can, at times, permissibly tip the balance in close cases. They
cannot, however, be used to effect a wholesale shift on the balance beam. Such a use makes
a mockery of the requirements of TSCA that the EPA weigh the costs of its actions before it
chooses the least burdensome alternative.
Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1219 (5th Cir. 1991). The court went on to state that "[b]y
not using such concerns in its quantitative analysis, even where doing so was not difficult, and reserving
them as additional factors to buttress the ban, the EPA improperly transformed permissible considerations
into determinative factors." Id. at 1219 n.20.
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health effects, ecological effects, and the nonstatistical features of risk would
not disturb the relative rankings of the rules on the list. This is certainly the
way the list has been interpreted.5 t2 This is a tempting view since the benefit
cited on the list (human lives saved from cancer) is a big one. There is no
empirical basis, however, for concluding that the cancer risks cited on
Morrall's list dwarf the other risks posed by these substances; the size of a risk
does not determine our capacity to quantify it. There is growing evidence, for
example, that many synthetic chemicals disrupt human and animal endocrine
systems, causing such diverse problems as abnormal reproductive function and
impaired cognitive development." 3 We may eventually come to understand
that such consequences are more serious and widespread than the carcinogenic
effects of these chemicals, but so far researchers have been unable to quantify
these emerging threats. To say nevertheless that cancer must be the biggest
threat from the chemicals on Morrall's list because we can measure the risk
of cancer is to give in to a kind of cognitive distortion. The ability to quantify
cancer risks makes such risks vivid to us-or "available" to us-in a way that
unquantified risks are not. But availability should not be confused with
magnitude." 4
The assumption that the consequences we can quantify dwarf the ones we
cannot also makes some previous regulatory decisions look very odd. For
example, when the EPA proposed phasing down the amount of lead in
gasoline, it did so because of concern about the health effects caused by lead
in children's blood.1 5 When it came time to quantify the costs and benefits
of the proposed phasedown, however, the greatest quantified benefit turned out
to be not improved children's health, but improved maintenance for cars and
other vehicles.1 6 If one looked at EPA's quantification of costs and benefits
in isolation, one would have to conclude that the major benefit of the rule was
its effect on cars rather than its effect on people. This would be an absurdly
wrong interpretation.
In sum, fixation on quantified benefits to human health either assumes, as
a normative matter, that benefits that cannot be counted do not count, or
assumes, as a factual matter, that benefits that cannot be counted are not very
512. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Legislative Foreword: Congress, Constitutional Moments. and the
Cost-Benefit State, 48 STAN. L. REv. 247, 258-60 (1996) (recognizing the benefits besides human lives
saved, but concluding that "in the face of these variations [in costs per life saved], good pnority-stting is
unlikely").
513. For a catalog of the scientific evidence of harms from hormone-disrupting chemicals. see THEO
COLBORN ET AL, OUR STOLEN FUTURE (1996).
514. Cf Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and
Probability, 5 CoGrNvE PSYCHOL 207, 208 (1973) ("A person is said to employ the availability heuristic
whenever he estimates frequency or probability by the ease with which instances or associations could be
brought to mind.").
515. See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 72, at 489-91.
516. See id. at 563 fig.4.9 (citing SCHWARTZ Er AL., supra note 199. at VIII-26 tbl.Vll-).
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big. The first assumption involves a choice of values, about which reasonable
people may disagree. The second is a hopeful superstition.
4. Conclusion
The numbers in Morrall's table, and in my own, embody normative
choices that lie at the heart of current debates about the regulatory state.
Moreover, the observations I have made with respect to the values underlying
these two tables are not unique to our two tables. One cannot construct any
table of this sort-reflecting costs per life saved-without making such
choices. In order to determine the denominator in the relevant fraction-lives
saved-one must take a stand on discounting and on appropriate methodologies
for quantitative risk assessment. One must also decide whether the very project
of measuring regulatory benefits solely in terms of human lives saved takes
inadequate account of other regulatory benefits. In short, a value-free table of
this kind does not exist.
B. Danger in Numbers
There are two standard responses to the observation that numerical
representations of risks, costs, and benefits embody important choices about
values. One response is to suggest that the underlying values be more
forthrightly acknowledged. Where, for example, quantitative risk assessments
incorporate default assumptions, which themselves incorporate political or
moral choices, many observers have proposed that the implicit choices be
made explicit.5 7 Another response--consistent, and often overlapping, with
the first-is to propose the incorporation of a wider range of values in
numerical estimates of the costs and benefits of regulation. 518 I do not place
much stock in either of these alternatives.
1. More Words?
The experience with Morrall's table should be convincing evidence that all
the explicit qualifications in the world will not neutralize the impact of a table
of impressive numbers. When he produced his table in 1986, Morrall dutifully
informed his readers that he had discounted lives saved by ten percent per
517. See, e.g., Proposed Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 61 Fed. Reg. 17,960, 17,965
(Environmental Protection Agency 1996) (proposed Apr. 23, 1996) (stating that "these guidelines call for
identification of the default assumptions used within assessments"); COMMITrEE ON RISK ASSESSMENT OF
HAZARDOUS AIR POLLUTANTS, supra note 364, at 81 (urging EPA to adopt "principles for choosing default
options and for judging when and how to depart from them," and describing public policies that underlie
choices among default options).
518. See, e.g., Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 53, at 75-86 (discussing three methods of capturing lay
valuations of health quantitatively).
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year. But this table has since been reproduced dozens of times without
reference to, or indeed apparent knowledge of, this adjustment. The lack of
awareness of this adjustment is illustrated most dramatically by the fact that
several of the scholars who have cited Morrall's table for the truth of the
assertion that regulatory costs are either wildly variant or wildly high,, 9 have
also argued against application of a ten percent discount rate in the very same
pieces of scholarship.-20
Especially when a table can be plucked from an article in one clean page,
without taking along with it any qualifications, explanations, or caveats, the
danger of misinterpretation and misunderstanding is great. The excision of
Morrall's table from his discussion of how he derived the numbers reflected
therein has contributed to over a decade's worth of overconfident and
overblown claims about the costs of the regulatory state.
There is no reason to believe that the inattention to Morrall's explanation
of the numbers in his table, and others' seizing upon these numbers as if they
were incontrovertible, are unique to this setting. 2' In the area of quantitative
risk assessment, for example, the power of numbers is deemed so great that
everyone seems to agree that numerical estimates of risk should be ringed by
qualifications, caveats, and expressions of uncertainty.52 The special power
of numbers has been remarked upon in other contexts as well.52 The
emerging literature on differences in people's perception of numerically and
linguistically expressed risk is especially instructive here. One study in this
area concluded that
[w]hen faced with a high chance of a gain, individuals want to lock
in the "sure thing" that numeric risks provide[], and when faced with
the high chance of a loss, they want the linguistic risk which provides
the possibility [that] the actual chance of loss will come from the
lower tail of the distribution.524
All in all, there can be little doubt that numerical precision is often mistaken
for accuracy and certainty. My point is that there is no evidence that this
problem will be solved by surrounding the numbers with words.
519. See. e.g., Gillette & Hopkins, supra note 2. at 405-06 (citing 1987-1988 OMB REPORr. supra
note 3, at xx-xxii, which cites Morrall, supra note I): Arrow ct al.. supra note 2. at 222 (citing Morrall.
supra note 1).
520. See, e.g., Gillette & Hopkins, supra note 2. at 407 (suggesting that -10% 1S too high a rate").
Arrow et al., supra note 2, at 222 (arguing for the use of "a range of rates").
521. For criticism of the use of quantitative estimates of the distnbutional and rcsenuc-rclated effects
of tax legislation in the tax policymaking process. see Michael J. Graetz. Paint.b)-Numbers Tat
Lawmaking, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 609 (1995).
522. See sources cited supra note 517.
523. See, e.g., Christoph-Friedrich von Braun. Numbers-Magic and Mania, 18 lSEiRDiSC. So. REV.
59, 59 (1993) ("Whoever can support his arguments with numbers is presumed to be right.-).
524. Richard Dusenbury & M.G. Fennema, Linguistic-Numeric Presentation Made Effects on Risky
Option Preferences, 68 ORGANIZATIONAL BnHAv. & Hus. DECISION PROCESSES 109. 119 (1996).
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Numbers are perilous not only because they appear objective and certain
even when they are not, but also because they can so easily be transported
across contexts. This is especially so when analysts purport to compress all of
the relevant information about regulatory decisionmaking into one single
number, such as cost per life saved. Indeed, a paramount reason to describe the
costs and benefits of regulations in terms of a single number, such as cost per
life saved, is precisely to enable comparisons and evaluations across different
regulatory contexts. This means, however, that the number can easily be
imported into inappropriate settings. This danger is evident in the role
Morrall's table has played in the debate over whether regulation designed to
save lives actually kills people by making them poorer. The claim is that the
cost of regulation may itself increase risk through effects on personal income.
In other words, "richer is safer": Income affects health, and so decreases in
income brought about by regulation may impair health as well as wealth.5"
Building on studies finding a correlation between wealth and health,
researchers have attempted to identify the level at which regulatory
expenditures will produce one fatality by reducing individual wealth. One
frequently cited range of estimates for this level is $3 million to $7.5 million,
based on a study by Ralph Keeney.526 Professor Viscusi's estimate is much
higher: He reports that a regulatory expenditure of approximately $50 million
is required to induce one fatality.527
525. For the seminal statement of this hypothesis, see Aaron Wvildavsky, Richer Is Safer, 60 PUB.
INTEREST 23, 27-29 (1980).
526. See Ralph L. Keeney, Mortality Risks Induced by Economic Expenditures, 10 RISK ANALYSIS
147 (1990). For discussions relying on this estimate, see, for example, International Union, UAW v. OSHA,
938 F.2d 1310, 1326-27 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Williams, J., concurring); BREYER, supra note 2, at 23; and
Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs, supra note 2, at 1544. There are numerous problems with such
estimates. First of all, the wealth-health relationship may not work in the direction researchers like Keeney
have assumed; that is, wealthy people might be wealthy partly because they are healthy, rather than the
other way around. See, e.g., C.P. Wen et al., Anatomy of the Healthy Worker Effect: A Critical Review, 25
J. OCCUPATIONAL MED. 283, 283 (1983) (discussing studies suggesting that the "healthy worker effect"
is a result of selection for employability, meaning that healthy people are the ones who get jobs). Keeney,
however, simply assumed that "higher incomes will lead to lower mortality risks." Keeney, supra, at 149,
Another problem with attempts to identify a uniform level at which regulatory costs will induce one
fatality is that they ignore the fact that the relationship between health and wealth is "highly nonlinear."
Paul R. Portney & Robert N. Stavins, Regulatory Review of Environmental Policy: The Potential Role of
Health-Health Analysis, in THE MORTALITY COSTS OF REGULATORY EXPENDITURES, supra note 2, at I ll,
116. To put it another way, Donald Trump is not likely to be less healthy than Bill Gates because he has
less money than Bill Gates. Thus, the actual distribution of regulatory costs in an individual case will make
a large difference in determining whether the costs in fact impair anyone's health. Uniform estimates like
Keeney's ignore this distributional variation.
527. See Viscusi, supra note 2, at 1454. Viscusi reaches this conclusion through the following
reasoning. He asserts, based on his own studies of the wage premiums workers demand in order to accept
small increases in risk on the job, that the value of a statistical life is approximately $5 million. He also
claims that the marginal propensity to spend on risk-reducing measures is approximately 0.1. Thus, he
concludes, if society had $50 million to spend, it would spend $5 million to save one life. If the $50
million is unavailable to spend (because, for example, it has been spent on regulation), that life will not
be saved, and thus one life will be lost through the $50 million expenditure. See W. Kip Viscusi, Risk-Risk
Analysis, in THE MORTALITY COSTS OF REGULATORY EXPENDITURES, supra note 2, at 5, 9-12.
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The important point for present purposes is not, however, the exact level
of regulatory expenditures that will allegedly induce one fatality. It is that
scholars have used Morrall's figures on costs per life saved to identify the
regulations that are self-defeating in the way just described. Viscusi has
argued, for example, that all of the regulations on Morrall's table with costs
per life saved of more than $50 million will induce one or more fatalities. 5'
Professor Sunstein has used the table for a similar purpose. 5 9
Relying on Morrall's figures in this way ignores the large influence of
discounting on his calculations. Without discounting, the cost per life saved of
all but two of the regulations on Morrall's table is below even the level
Keeney claims is necessary to induce one fatality.530 Discounting the benefits
of regulation is particularly inappropriate, however, when one is trying to
figure out how much money individuals may have to give up, out of pocket,
as a result of a regulation (the determination relevant to the "richer is safer"
analysis). Costs based on discounting future benefits do not reflect the amount
that firms and individuals actually must spend, out of pocket, to respond to
regulation. Indeed, even without discounting, costs per life saved do not reveal
the amount of money actually spent on regulation. For example, imagine a
regulation that costs one dollar to implement and eliminates, for one person,
a 1-in-1,000,000 chance of dying. This regulation has a cost per life saved of
$1 million, but the absolute cost of the rule is only $1. Absolute costs, not
costs per life saved and not costs reflecting discounting, are the only costs that
might, theoretically, increase risk by decreasing wealth. But absolute costs are
not reflected in Morrall's table.
Using Morrall's table to show which regulations will kill people through
effects on income thus ignores the basic assumptions and structure of the table.
Representing the diverse consequences of regulation in a single number-costs
per life saved-facilitates this misuse because the number itself does not
declare its own limitations and assumptions.
2. More Numbers?
As for the second standard response to the observation that numerical
representations of risks, costs, and benefits reflect normative choices-the
response that encourages quantification of all the factors relevant to a decision,
including the kinds of value choices I have been discussing-I would observe
that this is exactly what Morrall himself did. His ten percent discount rate for
528. See Viscusi, supra note 2, at 1454-55.
529. See Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs, supra note 2. at 1544-48 (noting that estimates of the level
of regulatory costs inducing one fatality range from S3 million to S12 million, and pointing to Morrall's
table as evidence that "some regulations fail health-health analysis whether or not they pass cost-benefit
analysis").
530. See supra note 392.
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future lives saved, his adjustments to the agencies' estimates of risk, and his
fixation on quantified benefits are part of an effort that incorporates normative
choices in quantitative analysis. To say that the quantification of value choices
is a solution to the problems with Morrall's table is thus to travel in a circle.
Even if one said that the solution is to incorporate a wider range of values
in quantitative analysis-including, for example, incorporation of numerical
representations of widely shared values such as autonomy, community, and
equity-one would then simply generate a different set of numbers. But to
figure out whether one agrees with the new set of numbers, or with Morrall's,
one would have to dig underneath them to find the values that determine them.
Once one does that, the numbers become irrelevant. If one agrees with
Morrall's view of the relative value of lives today and lives tomorrow, for
example, one will likely favor safety regulation, in general, over health
regulation because, in general, it will produce more immediate benefits.3 '
One does not need Morrall's numbers to come to this conclusion.
In short, we are unduly credulous when it comes to numbers, and our
numbers cannot, in this context, help but reflect our values. It is thus a mistake
to assume, as many regulatory reformers have, that increased attention to "the
numbers"-risks, costs, and benefits-will dilute the influence of politics and
emotion on risk regulation. If no one believes that such numbers are neutral
reflections of some factual reality, that is, if everyone sees that they reflect
contestable choices about values, then a debate based on the numbers will be
no more informed or informative than an explicit discussion about the values
underlying the numbers, in which case one could dispense with the numbers
altogether. The more likely scenario, however, is that some, probably many,
people will be fooled into believing that numerical estimates of risks, costs,
and benefits are impartial reflections of factual reality, in which case the likely
result of increased reliance on quantification in setting regulatory policy will
be that the side that best obscures the value choices implicit in its numbers will
prevail. This will not produce more sensible regulation, but it will produce a
more dishonest debate about regulation.
3. Conclusion
This is not to say that quantification has no role to play in regulatory
policy. Instead, it seems to me that the practices I have described-discounting
human lives, quantifying risks, and identifying regulatory purposes-all come
to grief because they do not recognize the limits of extrapolation. They aspire
to assess the benefits of regulation by reducing a large amount of data, some
of it presented numerically, into a single number or range of numbers.
531. Naturally, this may not hold true in specific cases. See, e.g., supra notes 487-500 and
accompanying text (discussing the regulation of unvented space heaters).
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Discounting and quantitative risk assessment, in particular, have this aim.
Because we sometimes prefer ninety-nine lives saved today over 100 saved
tomorrow, or because a substance has been associated with ten cases of cancer
in a population of 100 workers, we think we must be able to identify how
much we prefer today's lives over tomorrow's or how much risk is posed by
the substance that has caused harm. And so, often with great misgiving, we
force our intuitions about present and future lives, and our evidence about
chemical harm, into theoretical models that allow us to bring those intuitions
and that evidence into sharp focus, in a single number, transportable across
contexts. Likewise, by quantifying some of the benefits of regulation, we begin
to think we can quantify all of them, and we become convinced that if we
cannot, they cannot be very important.
Thus, in sharpening the focus we distort the picture. It would be better, I
think, if we left the picture blurry, and declined to connect the dots between
all the confusing and sometimes conflicting intuitions and evidence. This
would mean that, with respect to discounting, we would cease the search for
the magic number that can convert future lives saved into present lives saved.
With respect to quantitative risk assessment, we would stop massaging the
same poor old databases with ever more sophisticated statistical models, which
produce numerical point estimates that are either asserted to be too low or too
high, never just right. And as for defining regulatory purposes, we would give
up the faith that the things we can count are the worst things we have to fear.
IV. CONCLUSION
John Morrall's table showing the costs per life saved of various federal
regulations may be the single most widely cited piece of evidence in current
critiques of the regulatory system. The critiques are familiar to any student of
risk regulation: The costs of regulation often exceed its benefits; there are
many more cost-effective strategies for reducing risk; regulation sometimes
increases risk; the system is a crazy quilt. If one accepts the fantastic numbers
at the bottom of the table, one is hard pressed to say these critiques are wrong.
I have sketched a different, more sympathetic portrait of current regulation.
The regulatory system managed to catch some of the allegedly costliest
regulations before they were ever implemented, on the precise ground that their
benefits did not exceed their costs. It has also managed to save lives at a cost
that compares favorably to current estimates of the monetary value of human
life while at the same time reducing risks to human health that cannot be
quantified, risks to the environment, and risks to values that are widely shared.
Certainly, even on this view, the regulatory system can produce some clunkers.
But the overall picture is of a system striving to achieve a broad range of
regulatory purposes and doing so at a reasonable cost.
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One cannot consult a table in order to determine whether Morrall's vision,
or mine, is correct. In order to choose between them, one must instead grapple
with a range of fundamental issues, such as the relative worth of lives saved
today and lives saved tomorrow, the proper response to scientific uncertainty,
and the purposes of environmental law. I have tried to show how a
normatively plausible perspective on each of these issues would lead one to a
sympathetic, rather than unsympathetic, account of current regulation. I have
also suggested that embedding these normative choices in a table of numbers
makes serious engagement with these important issues unlikely, as experience
with this particular table has indeed shown.
Many thoughtful scholars of the regulatory process have embraced the
numerical results of Morrall's table, seemingly without attention to the
problematic legal status of many of the rules in the table or to the wide
divergence between Morrall's numbers and the agencies' own estimates of
risks and costs. These numbers are beguiling because they promise objectivity
and clarity. But the numbers in tables like Morrall's and mine tell us more
about our preexisting values than they do about the subjects under study. At
best, these numbers can only confirm what we already know or fear. At worst,
they derail thoughtful discussion by offering the illusion of objective accuracy.
The debates that have grown out of Morrall's table illustrate this danger. These
debates have taken Morrall's table to be the starting point of discussion rather
than the conclusion of a process of moral inquiry. The table is a Trojan horse
that has been wheeled into the debate over regulatory reform, loaded with the
values the debate is supposed to be about.
2070 [Vol. 107: 1981
